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ABSTRACT
A new space infrastructure is being planned and designed, and is expected to be in place
within the next 10 to 15 years. Political, economic, and technical factors will drive its
development. The cost of propellant supply for space based reusable orbital transfer
vehicles has long been considered a significant factor in the development of the new space
infrastructure. There are two primary approaches to this problem: minimize propellant
requirements or reduce propellant costs.
This thesis investigated the utilization of expendable launch vehicle (ELV) capabilities in
roles beyond Earth-to-orbit transportation. A framework was introduced for looking at
what ELVs can offer the new infrastructure, and what the associated demand might be.
Many opportunities for enhanced orbital utilization of ELVs were identified. Reduction of
orbital propellant costs through propellant reclamation was established as having the
greatest near term potential.
An orbital propellant supply infrastructure simulation (OPSIS) was developed. Through
parametric simulation, data on quantity and cost of delivered propellant for different
scenarios was generated. Sensitivity analyses were performed on selected infrastructure
scenarios. An ELV utilization scenario was identified which provides propellant for orbital
needs at less than one third of the cost proposed by methods currently under consideration.
The political feasibility of propellant reclamation was researched through evaluation of
current policies. Technical feasibility was investigated through review and status of
relevant development programs. A scenario for implementation was introduced calling for
accelerated technology development, international participation, and private operation.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Walter M. Hollister
Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
Thesis Reader: Dr. Leon Trilling
Professor of Aeronautics and Astronautics
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. is preparing to embark on its second generation of space exploration
activities. The first generation began with the early satellite launches and climaxed with the
manned lunar landings. There was a strong link with mother Earth in that first generation,
and space was a place to visit, but not to live and to work. The missions were independent
and self contained, carrying everything with them when they were launched. All were
dedicated missions, designed to be used once for a singular purpose. Missions were
limited in scope by the equipment and supplies a spacecraft could carry on its journey.
Manned missions were of limited duration, and satellites would 'live' only so long as their
supplies held out. Skylab began to extend man's stay in orbit and was the first step to the
next generation.
The second generation will be one of interdependence. There will be an
infrastructure of several components, each performing critical functions which in turn
enable the other components to perform their functions. Instead of a lone spacecraft strictly
on its own, new spacecraft will interact with each other. Interaction will include routine
maintenance, propellant and consumables resupply, and emergency repair. Reusability will
become an important characteristic in the second generation, particularly for orbital
operations. Commercial operations will strengthen and grow as costs of transportation are
reduced. Ties to Earth will still be significant, but not directly so. Spacecraft will have the
ability to operate in orbit indefinitely and man will begin to live and work in space.
Far on the horizon is a third generation of space operations. In this vision, earth to
orbit transportation will be routine with fully reusable vehicles. Space travel will become
an experience for more of the population, and space will have an impact on our daily lives.
Commercial operations will support a large industry and manufacturing in space will make
18
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use of extraterrestrial resources enabling complete independence from earth. A schematic
illustrating this progression is shown in Figure 1.1.
04P EMH3E
First Generation Second Generation
llq PqM
- w ,
Third Generation
Figure 1.1
Schematic indicating three generations of space program evolution.
The space shuttle brought the dream of reusable spacecraft into reality in 1981 when
it first flew, and the planned space station will begin to establish a permanent manned
presence in space for the U.S. when it becomes operational in the mid-1990's. Spacecraft
are being designed and built incorporating consumables resupply capability and will shortly
enter operation. The dawn of the second generation is upon us, but many of its
characteristics are still vague and uncertain.
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Some things are generally settled upon. The infrastructure of the next generation
will contain earth to orbit transportation vehicles, both reusable and expendable. Orbital
operations will be centered around the space station. Reusable upper stages known as
Orbital Transfer Vehicles (OTVs) based at the space station will provide transportation for
high energy missions to geosynchronous orbit and beyond. There will be maintenance and
supply satellites such as the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle, and there will be a supply of
propellant and other consumables to support this array of operations. That these will be the
basic components of a new space infrastructure is agreed upon in principle. What the
details will be, how the program will be funded and administered are as yet unclear.
The cost of orbital propellants for space based reusable orbital transfer vehicles has
long been considered a very significant factor in the development of a new space
infrastructure. There have been two primary approaches to this problem. The first is to
improve the efficiency of the orbital operations so that the propellant requirement is
minimized. 1 This solution has been approached through the use of aerobraking for
reusable OTVs to minimize return AV requirements2 , or through a combination of high-
thrust chemical OTVs and low-thrust electrical OTVs.3 The second approach is to reduce
the cost of propellants to the user spacecraft. This has been primarily associated with
1 Sponable, J.M., DeWispelare, AR., USAF, Optimizing the Space Transportation System with a Space
Fueling Station & Tug, AIAA/SAE/ASME 20th Joint Propulsion Conference, 11-13 June 1984,
Cincinnati, Ohio, AIAA Paper 84-1324.
2 General Dynamics Space Systems Division, Orbital Transfer Vehicle Concept Definition and System
Analysis Study. Final Report, NASA-CR-179055, December 1986.
3 Dunn, B.P., "High-Energy Orbit Refueling for Orbital Transfer Vehicles", Journal of Spacecraft and
Rockets, Vol. 24, No. 6, November-December 1987, pp. 518-522.
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propellant scavenging from the shuttle.4 ,5 An area for propellant cost reduction that has
not been addressed is the utilization of expendable launch vehicles through propellant
reclamation to deliver large amounts of propellant to orbit.
The primary concern of this thesis is the utilization of ELV capabilities in roles
beyond the historical one of earth to orbit transportation. A framework is introduced for
looking at ELVs in terms of what they have to offer to this new infrastructure. There are
many areas for enhanced orbital utilization of ELVs, but the primary one initially is to
provide propellants for orbital activities in a cost effective manner as part of the new
infrastructure. A significant reduction in cost of propellants delivered to orbit can be
achieved through the enhanced orbital utilization of ELVs through propellant reclamation.
There are many policies which affect this concern, many questions which must be
answered and many events that must occur if the enhanced orbital utilization of ELVs is to
occur. Some of these questions are:
* Will ELVs be a part of the new space infrastructure?
* Will new ELVs be developed for this role?
* What will be the nature and capabilities of these new ELVs?
* Will there be a requirement for propellants in orbit?
* What will those propellants be (cryogenics or storable)?
* Can ELVs provide those propellants?
* Can the propellant be provided by other sources such as the
space shuttle?
* Will the infrastructure be international or U.S. only?
* What will the military and civil roles be in this infrastructure?
4 Heinz, V.M., MIT Space Systems Laboratory, Analysis of a Sace-Based Fuel Station, AIAA 14th
Aerospace Sciences Meeting, Washington, D.C., 26-28 January 1976, AIAA Paper 76-196.
5 Rockwell International Space Transportation Systems Division, Space Transportation System (STS)
Propellant Scavenging System Study Final Report. Volume I. Technical Report, NASA -CR-171848,
January 1985.
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* Where will the funding for development of the infrastructure
come from?
* To what degree will there be commercial involvement?
* How will the infrastructure be operated: will it be run by
military, civil or private organizations, and on a national or
international level?
This thesis will establish a framework for addressing these questions through
simulation of different infrastructure scenarios, assessment of current policies, and review
of relevant studies and technology development. A set of recommendations will then be
made for guiding the development and implementation of an orbital propellant supply
infrastructure which utilizes ELVs through propellant reclar ation.
1.1 Background
The space program in the United States is in a period of transition that will be of
significance for many years to come. The events of the past several years have led to a
perception that the U.S. space program does not enjoy the preeminence it once did. This
has been highlighted by the Challenger disaster plus Titan, Atlas and Delta launch vehicle
failures. The western space program experienced further setbacks with the failure of
Ariane, which resulted in a virtual hiatus in space launches over a period of 2 years.
During this time, the Soviet Union continued to launch rockets into space at the rate of
nearly 100 per year.6 They successfully tested their new Energia heavy lift booster7, they
6 Smith, Marcia, The First Quarter Century of Spaceflight, Futures, October 1982, Pages 353-373.
7 Clark, Phillip S., Energia: Soviet Superbooster, SPACE, Volume 3, Number 4, September-October
1987, Page 36.
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provided routine orbital resupply and refueling operations to their 'MIR' (Peace) space
stations as their cosmonauts set endurance records for time spent in space.
The primary reason for the western failures and Soviet successes centers on space
transportation. The stable of launch vehicles in the west has been plagued with failure
while those of the Soviet Union have continued to provide reliable, assured access to
space. The reason for this current state of affairs in the U.S. program is primarily the
fallout of space transportation policies which were set in the late 1960's and early 1970's.
According to James Bennett and Phillip Salin of the Reason Foundation,
The underlying causes of the crisis lie in the policy-making
process, in which confused, short-sighted decisions
dominated by political expediency have been made about
space development over the past 30 years.9
A conscious decision was made to develop the shuttle system as the primary source
of transportation to Earth orbit, phasing out expendable launch vehicles entirely. In 1976,
Dr. James Fletcher as Administrator of NASA prophesied to congressional committees the
routine operation of 60 shuttle launches per year with an order of magnitude cost reduction
over then current launch costs.1 0 As history has shown, this dream never became reality.
The Shuttle has launched at most 9 times in a year, the actual costs are higher than
expendables, although the price charged to customers for launch services is less.
Expendables have not been phased out and are in fact enjoying a renaissance of sorts.
8 Mills, P., REFUELLING SALYUT SPACE STATIONS BY PROGRESS TANKERS, Journal of the
British Interplanetary Society, August 1985, pp. 381-384.
9 Bennett, J., Salin, P., "The Private Solution to the Space Transportation Crisis", SPACE POLICY,
August 1987, pp. 181-204.
10 Simon, Michael C., Keeping the Dream Alive: Putting NASA and America Back in Space, Earth Space
Operations, San Diego, California, July, 1987.
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Expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) have had a varied and colorful history in the
development of space exploration and exploitation. They are direct descendants of ballistic
missiles which were developed in the late 1950's as delivery systems for nuclear warheads.
The power of these ballistic missiles was harnessed to place satellites in space, initially by
the Soviet Union and followed closely by the United States. Satellite launching progressed
from the near earth domain to other heavenly bodies and deep space. Soon, ELVs were
launching men into space and providing the transportation for men to walk on the moon.
Through all these developments, the basic scenario was to use the ELV as a workhorse,
delivering its payload to orbit. After achieving their missions the launch vehicles were
destroyed, burning up in the earth's atmosphere during re-entry. This historic role is
varied by mission but singular in the task of delivering payloads from earth to orbit. ELVs
have the potential to contribute much more than this to the overall space operations
scenario.
The most advantageous location for utilization of launch vehicles (beyond their
primary task of earth to orbit transportation) is in space, to utilize more fully the energy
that went into placing not only the payload but the rest of the launch vehicle in orbit. To
date, there has been talk of using the external tant T) of the shuttle in orbit for a variety
of purposes, many of which are applicable to an ELV. However, there is an inherent
advantage to using ELVs in addition to ET's. This is that the ELV is a self contained
vehicle, with avionics, guidance, and propulsion. This can allow the ELV to fly itself to a
desired orbital position (limited of course, by the amount of propellant available).
There has been no established need for the materials that compose an ELV after
payload delivery in the history of space operations. This is beginning to change. There are
several needs that can be fulfilled by orbital ELVs presently and in the future. Some of
these can be seen in Table 1.1 below.
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* Propellant Supply
* Avionics Components
* Propulsion Components
* Orbital Transfer
* Storage Vessels
* Experimental/ Habitation/
/Manufacturing Modules
* Supply Stock for Orbital
Manufacturing Facility
* Residual Propellant/
Fluids
* Modular Avionics
Components
* Modular Propulsion
Components
* Entire ELV
* Propellant Tankage
* Propellant Tankage
* Tankage Materials
* Reclaimed and Stored for
Reuse
* Reuse on Orbital Spacecraft/
Return to Earth for Reuse
* Reuse on Orbital Spacecraft/
Return to Earth for Reuse
* Refuel and Use as Orbital
Transfer Vehicle
* Refuel and Disburse
as Required
* Partial Disassembly
and Modification
* Material Recovery and
Reconfiguration
Table 1.1
Uses for ELVs in orbit.
The first one is the use of residual propellant in the tanks of the ELV after it has
delivered its payload. Residual propellant is the result of reserves for the flight propellant,
ullage in the tanks, and off-loaded tanks from missions requiring less than rated payload
capacity. The use of this residual propellant will lie in resupply of propellant for satellites
and space stations, and most significantly orbital transfer vehicles.
Currently the limiting factor on the life of many satellites is the amount of propellant
they can carry on board. This is of course limited by the launch capacity of the vehicle that
places them in orbit. Some satellites are being designed with inherent resupply capability
which will extend the life of the satellites significantly over their current counterparts.
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Plans now call for the development of special logistical servicing satellites which will travel
to the satellites needing refueling and servicing to perform these tasks. However, this
means that a separate satellite will need to be built and launched. ELVs which are modified
and used for this purpose could provide a more cost effective and efficient use of
resources.
After achieving orbit, ELVs could be refueled and reused as orbital transfer
vehicles. Envision a deep space probe which requires a significant amount of velocity for
its mission. It is placed in LEO by its ELV, then its ELV is effectively refueled by a co-
orbiting ELV tanker which has collected residual propellant from several previous ELV
missions to LEO. The ELV in effect, could function as both lower and upper stage.
A parts inventory could be maintained in orbit through modular design for 'plug in'
and 'plug out' utilization of ELV components. The components could range from
structural material to avionics or propulsion. Uses for their material could begin with
components which could be removed in space and used directly for orbital applications.
An example would be propellant tank stiffeners being removed from the tanks and used as
structural members for truss construction. Other uses could include modular avionics or
propulsion components which could be taken from ELVs and used on satellites, or orbital
transfer vehicles. The key to these types of uses lies in the design of the components and
the ease with which that design lends itself to modularization and 'plug in/plug out'
capability. Complicated procedures for removing and installing components would likely
require manned involvement or very sophisticated remote manipulator systems. If the
designs emphasized simplicity, these uses have the potential to be cost effective.
Beyond the use of materials from the launch vehicle as they are when placed in
orbit, the materials could be reconfigured and used as supply stock for an orbiting
manufacturing facility. The materials used for this would principally be structure and
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tankage. Ultimately, the common vision for space manufacturing is to utilize
extraterrestrial materials from the moon, the asteroids, and other heavenly bodies. In the
interim however, ELVs could provide the initial supply stock to orbiting facilities. This
would allow for an evolutionary path of development for the technology required for
manufacturing in space.
The modes of utilization of expendable launch vehicles will be paced by the demand
for what the ELVs can offer. Some of these demands are beginning to emerge, while
others are further off. The most significant demand for any of the resources which ELVs
have to offer in the near future is that of propellant for space based reusable orbital transfer
vehicles (OTV). The demand has been estimated by many sources in industry and
government, and will be a minimum of 200,000 lb per year beginning with OTV operations
expected to start in mid to late 1990's. The demand could grow to several million pounds
per year, given certain factors such as SDI deployment, a robust civil space program
(Moon bases or Mars missions), and burgeoning commercial space development.
The need for propellant resupply for OTV operations is an integral part of the space
transportation infrastructure for the next several decades. Many studies have addressed the
issue, arriving at recommendations which involve the shuttle as the focal point of the
transportation system. With the Challenger disaster, the role of the shuttle as the only
mode of space transportation has been dispelled and ELVs have regained a firm position in
space transportation. Following the cancellation of the shuttle Centaur program for safety
reasons, it is doubtful whether the shuttle bay can be used to carry cryogenic propellants on
resupply missions. This adds to the notion that unmanned expendables should play a
central role in the provision of resupply propellants for OTV operations in the future, which
is the focal point of the thesis.
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The utilization of ELVs can be divided into two distinct phases. The first phase is
the historical utilization of ELVs as providers of earth to orbit transportation. The second
phase is that which will come in the next decades, answering the demand for orbital
resources with resources which are available in the ELVs themselves. This second phase
will be provide additional utilization beyond earth to orbit transportation. The relationship
between the areas of utilization of ELVs in the past and projected for the future can be seen
in Figure 1.2.
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Utilization
of ELV's
*Earth to Orbit
Transportation
Enhanced Utilization
of ELV's
*Orbital Utilization
Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles'
Launch of Earth Orbiting Satellites
Launch of Satellites Beyond Earth Orbit
Launch of Men into Earth Orbit
Launch of Men Beyond Earth Orbit
/ Orbital
/
/
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Orbital Reuse of Entire ELV
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Figure 1.2
Historical and projected utilization of ELVs by the United States.
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1.2 Thesis Organization
This thesis looks in some detail at the background and future utilization of ELVs,
and at the technological, economic and political factors involved in the development of
propellant reclamation capability. The following two chapters will address the roles that
ELVs have played and may play in the space program of the United States. Chapter 2 will
address the historical utilization which began with the development of ICBMs to the
launching of the Apollo Moon missions atop the giant Saturn V booster. Chapter 3 will
address the potential areas of development for enhanced orbital utilization of ELVs. The
establishment of demand for various avenues of utilization will be addressed as will the
ways in which ELVs can fulfil such demand.
In Chapter 4 the current policy environment surrounding ELVs will be examined
regarding its effect on enhanced utilization. Impacts of the administration's policies on
space development and commercialization, and the impact of legislation will be assessed.
A political assessment will be made to determine the forces in industry, government, and
other institutions which may help or hinder enhanced utilization of ELVs. The emergence
of a commercial launch capability and the potential for enhanced utilization to provide a
competitive advantage for U.S. producers will be assessed. Issues of international
competition as a policy driver will be raised, as will conflicts that may arise in the tradeoffs
between competition and cooperation with foreign producers.
Chapter 5 will describe the technologies required to utilize ELV propellant
reclamation for orbital propellant resupply. Current launch vehicles will be assessed to
determine the degree to which they may fulfill the objectives of enhanced utilization.
Additionally, proposed vehicles which are under design and consideration for development
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will be assessed. The assessment will include capability to fulfill projected demands in the
appropriate time period, as well as the presence of the necessary technology.
Chapter 6 will describe a simulation called OPSIS (Orbital Propellant Supply
Infrastructure Simulation) of the orbital propellant supply infrastructure which has been
developed as an analytical tool. Cost figures will be assessed for the processes of resupply
from ELV propellant reclamation, and 'conventional' resupply from dedicated resupply
missions. These different methods will provide a comparison. The model is set up
parametrically, allowing sensitivity analyses for a number of parameters defining the
various characteristics of the system.
Results of the OPSIS simulation will be given in Chapter 7. These will include the
economic advantages of ELV propellant reclamation over other alternatives, and
sensitivities of various simulation parameters to deviation from the baseline values.
Discussions of the implication of the results such as identification of trends and threshold
levels of certain parameters will also be included.
Conclusions will be drawn and recommendations made in Chapter 8 for policies
which will allow for and encourage the enhancement of ELV utilization. Recommendations
will be made for governmental as well as private institutions. The intended effects of those
recommendations will be discussed, as will expectations of implementation methods and
obstacles. The result of the research will be the outline of a program for orbital utilization
for ELVs over time. This will include recommendations for organizational responsibility
for performing particular tasks, which technologies should be developed and when, and
policies that should be implemented or changed.
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HISTORICAL UTILIZATION OF ELVs
Expendable launch vehicles have played a central role in the space program in the
United States. They have been the sole source of Earth to orbit transportation prior to the
development of the Space Shuttle, and continue to be the backbone of the space
transportation infrastructure after the tragedy of the Challenger disaster. There are three
primary expendable launch vehicles currently in the stable of the United States space
program. These vehicles, with their principal manufacturer, are indicated in the table
below:
ELV Manufacturer
Atlas General Dynamics
Delta McDonnell Douglas
Titan Martin Marietta
ELVs have fulfilled many roles in the course of their development and utilization in
the history of the U.S. space program. All of the roles performed the same task of
delivering a payload from the surface of the Earth into space, but the payloads varied as did
the purpose of the missions. The uses of ELVs thus far in the U.S. space program can be
broken into five categories as shown below:
* Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
* Launch of Earth Orbiting Satellites
* Launch of Satellites Beyond Earth Orbit
* Launch of Men into Earth Orbit
* Launch of Men Beyond Earth Orbit
The development of the launch vehicles for each of these tasks was a very
complicated and intricate process. The history of each of the uses of ELVs is in many
ways interconnected and interdependent on at least one of the other uses. In order to
understand how the launch vehicles that are in existence today got here, and how others
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were developed but used for only a short period of time, it is important to understand the
history and interaction of launch vehicle development over the past several decades. The
following sections are synopses of the history associated with the development of
expendable launch vehicles for each of the functions which have been indicated above.
2.1 Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM)
The first use for modern day ELVs was that of a ballistic missile, providing an
inter-continental delivery system for nuclear warheads. The development of the modem
expendable launch vehicle was primarily a result of the military desire after WWII to
develop a delivery system for nuclear warheads. The basic technology necessary for this
development grew from the WWII era when German A4 missiles were used as delivery
systems for conventional warheads over distances greater than 200 miles. Over time
through the development process, the modest range of the A4 would increase to 500 miles
with the development of medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM), then approach 2000
with the development of intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM). The goal of this
train of development, the inter-continental ballistic missile (ICBM) would be capable of
delivering nuclear warheads to targets more than 6000 miles away from their launch site.
What follows is a description of the early development of rockets in the United States for
use as ballistic missiles. Only missiles which had further use as space launch vehicles are
discussed, but this includes all the early missile development programs which developed
the technology and paved the road to space.
The Germans were the leaders in rocketry during WWII, having developed the A4
(or V-2) rocket which they used to bombard London. The A4 was developed by a group
of German scientists working at research establishments at Kummersdorf-West and
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Peenemunde. Robert Goddard had done significant research in the development and use of
liquid rockets prior to WWII, and his interest was primarily scientific. He neither sought
nor received very much military interest. However, the Germans were aware of his work
and borrowed much of it in the development of propellant delivery systems and basic
engineering details. 1
The first successful test flight of the A-4, which was conceived in 1936, occurred
on 3 October 1943. The A-4 then went into production for use as a strategic weapon and
on 8 September 1944, the first A-4 fell on England. More then 3,700 A4 rockets were
fired after that, the last being on 27 March 1945. The thousands of scientists and engineers
in Peenemunde working on this new rocket saw it not only as a weapon, but as a stepping
stone to space travel. In March 1944, Wernher von Braun who was the director of
engineering at Peenemunde, was arrested by the German Gestapo with two of his leading
colleagues. They were placed in jail for talking too much about space travel and not about
the A4 rocket as a weapon. They were released only after convincing Hitler that they were
indispensable to the rocket program. 2
The A4 had come two years too late to turn the tides for Germany, and as the war
came to an end, military interest in rocket technology took on a new light. The Americans
had developed the capability of producing nuclear weapons as demonstrated in August of
1945 which could, and would, become significant strategic weapons in combination with
rockets capable of placing them almost anywhere on the Earth. The Soviet Union was also
developing nuclear weapons with a keen interest in developing the technology to deliver
1 Baker, David, THE ROCKET: The History and Development of Rocket & Missile Technology, Crown
Publishers, Inc., New York, 1978.
2 Dornberger, Walter R.,Emme, Eugene M., ed., The History of Rocket Technology: German V-2, Wayne
State University Press, Detroit, 1964.
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those weapons. This military interest in rocketry placed a high value on the technology
which the Germans had developed in the A-4.
At the end of the war, the Americans and the Soviets were very interested in
acquiring the German scientists which had been the masterminds of this rocket. By August
1945 under Operation Overcast, the U.S. Army had secured 350 of the top German
scientists. Over a hundred were rocket scientists and many were from Peenemunde
including Wernher von Braun. The Soviets received a larger number of the German rocket
scientists, but it was generally felt that those most influential in the development of the A4
were secured by the Americans. The German scientists were later brought to the United
States where they began work on the development of ballistic missiles at Fort Bliss in E1l
Paso and at the White Sands proving ground in New Mexico.3
This group of German researchers aided the U.S. Army in performing test launches
of the 100 A4s which were captured in Germany. The testing was performed at the White
Sands proving ground in New Mexico. Several improvements were made and information
was gathered on upper atmospheric conditions using the captured A4s as sounding rockets.
The group of researchers, led by Wernher von Braun, moved to Redstone Alabama with
the Ordinance Guided Missile Center when it moved there in 1950. in Redstone, which
would later become the Marshall Space Flight Center, this group began the design of a
medium range ballistic missile for the U.S. Army.
After 18 months of design work on 8 April 1952, the project of developing a U.S.
MRBM was officially named Redstone. With a gross lift-off weight (GLOW) of 61,000
lb, the Redstone was to deliver its payload over a distance of more than 200 miles. The
3 Ordway, F.I.III, Sharpe, M.R., The Rocket Team, MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1982.
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Redstone missile was heavily dependent on the practical experience of the German A4
engineers, and used many concepts similar to those used in the A4. The first successful
launch of the Redstone occurred on 20 August 1953 and over the next 5 years, 37 research
and development flights would be made. The initial Redstone rockets were built at
Redstone Arsenal, until Chrysler Corporation won a contract to began manufacturing the
missiles. The Redstone entered field service in Germany in 1958 and fulfilled this role
until 1965 when it was replaced by the Pershing.
A derivative of the Redstone was the basis for the Jupiter Intermediate Range
Ballistic Missile (IRBM) which began with a joint Army/Navy decision in 1955 to develop
the first U.S. IRBM. With a range of over 1500 miles and a gross lift-off weight (GLOW)
of 110,000 lb, the Jupiter was twice the size, with more than seven times the range
capability of its predecessor the Redstone. The Jupiter had its first test launch on 1 May
1957, was declared operational in 1958, and underwent operational deployment to Italy and
Turkey in 1960. By the mid-1960's, the Jupiter was retired as an IRBM in favor of
ICBMs based on the continental United States (CONUS) and Submarine Launched
Ballistic Missiles (SLBM).
The Air Force began a program for development of an Intermediate Range Ballistic
Missile (IRBM) in December of 1955, which was similar in many respects to the
Army/Navy Jupiter program. They contracted with the Douglas Aircraft Company in Santa
Monica (which would become McDonnell Douglas Corporation) for hardware design,
development and fabrication of the Thor missile which would have a range capability of
1500 miles. The Thor was a single stage liquid propellant missile which was first
successfully launched on 20 September 1957. The Thor IRBM was declared operational in
June of 1958, and about 60 Thor missiles were deployed in the United Kingdom. The role
as an IRBM for the Thor launch vehicle ended in 1962 when it was retired from service.
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In the United States, initial studies were begun in 1946 for Inter-Continental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) development. The MX-774 was the initial development program
for a U.S. ICBM. The contractor for this program was the Consolidated-Vultee Aircraft
Corporation, which later became the Convair Division of General Dynamics Corporation.
The MX-774 incorporated many technologies from the German A4 but pioneered several
revolutionary concepts as well. This program was competing as a delivery system with the
B-50 superfortress bomber which was in full production. At the time the Department of
Defense saw little reason for continuing research on ICBM development with the
development and production of the B-50 going so well. The MX-774 was effectively
cancelled in 1947 and support for ICBM development was low until the early 1950's,
when the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) developed smaller nuclear weapons and there
came to be a general realization that the Soviet Union was involved in similar research.
This threat of a Soviet capability for delivering a nuclear warhead from their soil to U.S.
soil was of paramount concern in the 1950's. The result was a tremendous push to
develop a vehicle capable of such a mission.
A massive program was then launched to develop an intercontinental delivery
vehicle for nuclear warheads. In order to do this, the vehicle had to escape the earth's
atmosphere with near orbital velocities, and maneuver itself into a precise trajectory for
delivery. In January 1951, the Air Force began Project MX-1593, which was basically a
continuation of the MX-774 project which had begun in 1946. Again the contractor for this
program was the Convair Division of General Dynamics in San Diego, which had
performed the work on the MX-774 project. The United States exploded its first Hydrogen
bomb on 1 November 1952, which brought the notion of using ICBMs with nuclear
warheads squarely into reality. Hydrogen bombs were much smaller and lighter than the
early atomic bombs, requiring a missile of relatively modest performance. The Soviet
Union shocked the United States by following suit with the explosion of their own
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Hydrogen device less than 9 months later on 12 August 1953. This fact, coupled with
intelligence reports that the Soviets had been developing their own capability for ICBMs
had a significant impact on the ICBM program in the United States.
By 1954 the ICBM program, which was named ATLAS in 1951 (after the Greek
God who supported the world on his shoulders), was gaining a great deal of momentum.
By mid-1955, it had the highest of national priorities. The first successful launch occurred
with an Atlas B version on 2 August 1958, with a range of 2500 miles. The Atlas was
tested more and improved, then the D version of the Atlas was implemented as the first
operational U.S. ICBM system on 9 September 1959. Additional improvements in the
system led to a range of over 9000 miles in 1960, which was more than doubled the
original design goals of the program.4 New versions of the Atlas, versions E and F were
designed to be placed in underground silos for increased survivability in the event of a
Soviet attack on the launch site. The Atlas continued to serve its military strike role until
1965, when the Atlas ICBMs began to be replaced by a second generation ICBM system,
the Minuteman.
Early in the development of the Atlas program, the Air Force was concerned with
the complexity of the design and felt it should undertake the parallel development of an
alternate vehicle to ensure the successful development of a U.S. ICBM. In 1955, the Air
Force awarded the Martin Company (now Martin Marietta) a contract to design and develop
a two staged liquid rocket as an alternative and backup to the Atlas missile. The program
was named Titan in reference to mythological Greek giants that once roamed the Earth, and
was given official approval to begin production in 1957. The first flight of the Titan launch
vehicle occurred on 6 January 1959 and the Titan entered service with the Strategic Air
4Von Braun, Werhner, et. al., Space Travel: A History, Harper & Row, Publishers, New York, 1985.
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Command (SAC) in 1962. The initial Titan was flawed with the same problem as the Atlas
in that it used non-storable liquid propellants which required an exposed launch site and
had long fuelling and preparation times. This was contrary to what SAC was looking for
regarding preparedness, and a preemptive Soviet attack would destroy the missiles before
they could make retaliatory strikes. Because of this situation, SAC pressed for the
development of a storable propellant ICBM which was named the LGM-25C, or the Titan
II. It was introduced into service with SAC in 1963, and by 1965 the storable propellant
Titan II had replaced the non-storable Titan I which was withdrawn from service as an
ICBM. The Titan II served for many years as the big gun for SAC, providing the longest
range at nearly 10,000 miles and the highest destructive capability at 20 MT.1 It continued
in service until very recently when on 5 May 1987 the last of the Titan IIs in service as an
ICBM was deactivated at Little Rock, Arkansas. As the Titan IIs have been phased out of
service, they are being replaced with the new MX, or Peacekeeper missile.5
Repeatedly, the story of ELVs and their role as warhead delivery systems ends as
they are replaced by rockets better suited for that task. There are two primary reasons for
this. First, the ELVs are all liquid propelled rockets. In the case of the Atlas and the Titan
I, non-storable propellant had to be loaded into the rocket immediately prior to launch.
This rendered them ineffective in a retaliatory strike because they would be destroyed
before they could be launched. In the Titan II and the Thor (Delta), the propellants are
storable, in that they can be loaded into the launch vehicle substantially prior to launch, but
they involve complicated systems which hamper their launch readiness. The alternative to
liquid rockets for warhead delivery is solid propellants. Solids are storable, and require no
5 Ropelewski, Robert R., Soviet Weapons Gains Spur U.S. Strategic Modernization, Aviation Week &
Space Technology, 18 March 1985, Page 29.
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loading of propellant. In addition, they are readily adaptable to silo launch and are
transportable in a launch mode.
The second reason for solids rockets over liquid rockets as ballistic missiles is that
the liquid rockets have a payload capability which is much more than required for delivery
of nuclear warheads. A strategic decision was made to go with a large number of missiles,
each delivering a relatively modest warhead of 1 MT yield. This would force the Soviets to
silo-target their missiles, in hopes of diverting attacks on civil and industrial targets. Based
on this strategy, the liquid rockets were too large. Smaller liquid rockets could have been
developed, but would have been much more costly than solid rockets of the same
capability. The Titan II was kept in service for many years to preserve the U.S. retaliatory
threat of a big gun which was capable of destroying an entire city, but with the deployment
of the Peacekeeper the Titan II was eventually replaced by a solid fueled rocket as were all
the other liquid rockets.
A summary of the ballistic missiles which have been described, and their
performance and operational characteristics can be seen in Table 2.1.
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Name Class GLOW
[lbl
Atlas D
Atlas E
Atlas F
Jupiter
Redstone
Thor
Titan I
Titan II
ICBM
ICBM
ICBM
IRBM
MRBM
IRBM
ICBM
ICBM
254000
267000
260000
110000
61000
105000
220000
330000
Length
[ftl
76
82
82
60
69
65
90
103
StagesDia
rftl
10 1.5
10 1.5
10 1.5
9 1
6 1
9 1
10 2
10 2
Range
rn mi I
9200
10400
10400
1740
230
1730
6000
9300
Yield
[MT
2
2
4
1.5
H.E.
1.5
4
10
Year
Deloved
1959
1960
1961
1958
1958
1958
1962
1963
Table 2.1
Characteristics of Ballistic Missiles which evolved into ELVs.6
The general developmental relationships for these vehicles which has been
described is summarized in Figure 2.1. The summary indicates the general relationships
between the development of the different programs, and give the date of the conception and
the date of their first successful flight.
6 Baker, David, THE ROCKET: The History and Development of Rocket & Missile Technoloyv, Crown
Publishers, Inc., New York, 1978, page 270.
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1964
1965
1965
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1965
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1963
1987
I III _
-~~~~~~~~-----
IEIL i Ill AIAAI I| . ^ &v & Is 4-
V-2
Germany
Conceived 1936
First flight 1943
MX 774 ICBM -
Army Air Force /
General Dynamics
Conceived 1946
Cancelled 1947
Redstone MRBM --
Army / Chrusler
Conceived 1949
First flight 1953
Atlas ICBM
Air Force /
General Dynamics
Conceived 1951
First flight 1958
Jupiter IRBM
Army/Navy
Conceived 1955
First flight 1957
Thor IRBM
Air Force /
McDonnell Douglas
Conceived 1955
First flight 1957
Titan I ICBM - Titan II ICBM
Air Force / Air Force /
Martin Marietta Martin Marietta
Conceived 1955 First flight 1963
First flight 1959
Figure 2.1
Developmental flow of ballistic missiles which evolved into ELVs.7
As the capabilities of rockets began to mature, and the nature of requirements for
warhead delivery systems such as MRBMs and ICBMs became better defined, the rockets
which had been initially developed to fulfill those tasks became obsolete in those roles.
Nonetheless there were many other roles for which these rockets, bred as weapons of
destruction, were much better suited.
7 Collected from information in:
Baker, David, THE ROCKET: The History and Development of Rocket & Missile Technology, Crown
Publishers, Inc., New York, 1978.
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2.2 Launch of Earth Orbiting Satellites
The primary role of ELVs in the process of their evolution has been the launching
of satellites which orbit the Earth and provide space-based platforms for communication,
surveillance, and remote sensing. The placement of satellites in Earth orbit had been a long
held dream of many people, particularly those involved in the development of rocket
systems. The push to develop ballistic missiles for warhead delivery in the mid to late
1950's provided the technology which made the dream of achieving the necessary Earth
orbiting velocities a reality. All of the early rockets developed as ballistic missiles
contributed directly to the placement of satellites in orbit. There was much interest in
orbiting satellites, for military as well as civil endeavors.
There was a conscious separation of civil and military space programs by President
Eisenhower in the 1950s. It is argued that these policies may have prevented the U.S.
from being in space before the Soviet Union. President Eisenhower would not allow
technology from the IRBM Thor to be used for placement of a satellite in orbit until after
the Soviets had launched Sputnik. The Thor reportedly could have orbited a satellite as
early as 1956, and it was in fact a Thor derivative, the Juno 1 which place the first U.S.
satellite in orbit.8 An explanation for this policy is that the U.S. was concerned with Soviet
response to overflight of their territory by satellites. By holding back from orbiting a
satellite until after the Soviets had done so, the concern was mitigated. The Soviets could
not dispute the rights of the U.S. to overfly Soviet soil, if they had done so over U.S.
soil.9
8 Smith, Marcia, The First Quarter Century of Spaceflight, Futures, October 1982, Pages 353-373.
9 McDougall, Walter A., The Heavens and the Earth. A Political History of the Space Age, Basic Books,
Inc., Publishers, New York, 1985, pp. 120-124.
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The policy of separation between civil and military space programs was formalized
when the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 created NASA. In section 102(b) of
the act, NASA is given responsibility for aeronautical and space activities with the
exception that:
...activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the
development of weapons systems, military operations, or the
defense of the United States (including the research and
development necessary to make effective provision for the
defense of the United States) shall be the responsibility of,
and shall be directed by, the Department of Defense... 10
Any disputes over jurisdiction between NASA and DoD is to be settled by the
National Aeronautics and Space Council, which is composed of the Vice President who is
chairman, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the NASA Administrator, and the Chairman
of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). It is also the responsibility of the Council to
"advise and assist the President, as he may request, with respect to the performance of
functions in the aeronautics and space field." In the original version of the act, Section 204
created a Civilian-Military Liaison Committee which was to serve as a link between the
activities of the civil and military space programs, and as a forum for dispute resolution.
The committee was abolished in 1965, with its functions transferred to the President.
After the NAS act was passed, some of the new NASA facilities were directly taken
from operations that were previously military. A prime example of this is the George C.
Marshall Space Flight Center in Huntsville, Alabama, which was part of the Army's
Redstone Arsenal run by the Army Ballistic Missile Agency (ABMA). After the creation of
NASA, the facilities and personnel of the ABMA in Huntsville became part of NASA.
10 United States Congress, National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Public Law 85-568, 29 July
1958.
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The Army, Navy and Air Force all were involved in power struggles for their
shares of the military space effort. In spite of these power struggles, there was cooperation
between the services and in particular between the civil and military space programs. A
brief history of the development of launch vehicles as orbital satellite delivery systems will
indicate the amount of cross-fertilization that was occurring, and the degree to which each
successive step in the launch vehicle evolutionary process built upon previous ones.
Sounding rockets have been used since the 1945 when the Wac Corporal first flew,
for scientific missions such as atmospheric research. They were effective in their purpose,
but were incapable of achieving the velocities required for placing a satellite in Earth orbit.
When satellites became operational, sounding rockets seemed at first obsolete, but have
continued to play an important role in space science. They have remained in use because of
their low cost, simplicity, and short lead time. Sounding rocket technology and
components were directly as part of satellite launchers such as the Vanguard.ll
The development of ballistic missiles provided the capability of placing satellites in
Earth orbit, although this capability had much lower priority than did that of missile
delivery. However, when on 4 October 1957 the Soviets orbited the world's first artificial
satellite, the U.S. response was to raise the priority of developing satellite launching
capability to match the Soviet achievement. Not only was it a political embarrassment for
the U.S. to be outdone by the Soviets, but it was a clear demonstration of their capability to
launch warheads which could attack the U.S. mainland.
Following the Russian exploits of the Sputnik launch, there was a heated rush in
the United States to orbit a satellite. The efforts centered on the Vanguard project which
11 Corliss, V.R., NASA Sounding Rockets. 1958-1968. A Historical Summary, Scientific and Technical
Information Office, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1971.
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had been initiated by the Navy on 5 July 1955 when the Naval Research Laboratory issued
a report titled A Scientific Satellite Program. This report discussed the advantages, and
problems associated with placing a small satellite in orbit. On 29 July 1955 President
Eisenhower approved plans for the U.S. to launch Earth orbiting satellites, in support of
the 1957-58 Geophysical Year. By March 1956 the design was finalized, the first stage
being derived largely from the Viking atmospheric sounding rocket which was also a Navy
program. The first Vanguard prototype launch on 23 October 1957 came after Sputnik had
been orbiting the Earth for nearly three weeks, but was only a suborbital test flight with
inert second and third stages. In its first launch attempt at placing a satellite in orbit,
Vanguard TV-3 exploded after rising 3 feet from the launch pad then losing thrust.
Vanguard TV-4 was successful in placing a four pound payload, the Vanguard 1, in orbit
on 17 March 1958. Ending in late 1959, the Vanguard program had made 11 attempts to
orbit payloads of which 3 were successful. Elements of this program lived on however,
finding applications as upper stages of the Delta, Atlas, and Scout launch vehicles.12
As an alternate vehicle to the Navy Vanguard project, the Army Ballistic Missile
Agency (ABMA) was directed on 8 November 1957 to develop a launch vehicle capable of
placing a satellite in orbit. The idea behind having two parallel programs was to enhance
the probability of success. The rocket under development by the Army was the Jupiter C,
which was modified by the addition of a fourth stage and renamed the Juno I. The Jupiter
C had previously been used as a test vehicle for the development nose cone material needed
for atmospheric re-entry. The Jupiter C was based on the Redstone MRBM, with upper
stages added to gain enough velocity to subject the nose cones being tested to re-entry
conditions. On 31 January 1958, the Juno I launch vehicle successfully placed the first
12 McLaughlin Green, C., Lomask, M., Vanguard. A History, Scientific and Technical Information Office,
Office of Technology Utilization, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1970.
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U.S. satellite in orbit. The satellite was Explorer 1 which weighed 30 lb. The Juno I was
launched six times of which three were successes. The last successful Juno 1 launch
placed Explorer 4 in orbit on 26 July 1958, making the Juno I the only space launcher to
retire from successful service before the creation of NASA.13
The Juno II space launch vehicle was derived from the Jupiter IRBM which was
used as the first stage. The Juno II was a four stage vehicle with the three upper stages
comprised of eleven, three, and one solid propellant Baby Sergeant rockets. The first
successful launch of a Juno II came on 13 October 1959, placing the Explorer 7 satellite
into Earth orbit. In 1961 after 10 flights of which only 3 were successful, the Juno II was
cancelled. However, the first stage of the Juno II went on to become the central propellant
tank in the Saturn 1 and 1B launch vehicles, and the S-3 engine used in the Juno II led to
the design of the H-1 engine used in the Saturn 1, 1B, and Delta launch vehicles.
After achieving success at meeting its specified performance goals as an ICBM in
November 1958, the Atlas was called upon to go into Earth orbit. Under the name of
Project SCORE (Signal Communications by Orbital Relay Experiment), an Atlas B placed
itself and 120 lb of communications equipment in orbit on 24 December 1958. The Atlas
broadcast a recorded Christmas message from President Eisenhower to the world for 13
days. While the mission was of scientific value, it was more significantly a signal that the
U.S. had matched the Soviet capability to launch nuclear warheads between continents as
was demonstrated with Sputnik. In 1959, the Air Force began to develop the true potential
of the Atlas as a satellite launcher by combining it with the Able upper stage which had
been developed in 1958 as an upper stage to provide nose cone re-entry tests for the Thor
IRBM . None of the three flights with this combination was a complete success. The Atlas
13 Baker, David, THE ROCKET: The History and Development of Rocket & Missile Technology, Crown
Publishers, Inc., New York, 1978, page 237-238.
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was then paired with another Thor upper stage, the Agena in support of the Samos and
Midas programs being run by the Air Force. On 24 May 1960 the first successful Atlas-
Agena flight placed a payload of 5,000 lb in orbit.
Developments progressed in 1961 with a new Agena stage being combined with
the new Atlas E and F versions. The new Atlas-Agena B emerged, and on 12 July 1961
placed the Air Force Midas satellite in orbit. Most significant in the development of the
Atlas as a satellite launcher was its combination with the Centaur high energy upper stage.
The Centaur is powered by liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen, and when combined with
the Atlas can place payloads of up to 10,000 lb in low Earth orbit (LEO). The first
successful flight of the Atlas-Centaur occurred on 8 May 1962. Over seventy flights later,
the basic Atlas-Centaur is still flying today and will continue to launch satellites as one of
the first commercial launch vehicles in the United States.
Early in 1958, NACA began studies aimed at providing a low cost launch vehicle
for orbiting small payloads. The Langley Research Center was responsible for this project
which was named Scout, and remained in control of project Scout after NACA was
absorbed by NASA in late 1958. The Scout was seen as a four stage rocket using solid
propellants which were proven and relatively simple in construction, storage, and
operation. The four stages for the Scout were borrowed from three other rocket programs.
The first stage coming from the Navy's Polaris missile, the second from the Army's tactical
Sergeant rocket, and the third and fourth stages coming from the third stage of the Navy's
Project Vanguard. The Scout was first launched on 1 July 1960, but did not successfully
place a satellite in orbit until 16 February 1961 when the 15 pound Explorer 9 was placed
in orbit. The Scout has provided launch services with steadily improving capabilities and
performance for NASA the past 27 years and will continue to do so in the future.
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In 1960 the Air Force became interested in NASA's Scout program for ballistic as
well as orbital flight experiments and developed four versions of the Scout. This was done
under the Air Force Systems Command of the Space Systems Division. The first launch
was on 7 January 1961.
The Army was interested in providing a satellite launching capability of its own,
and proceeded to use the Thor IRBM for this purpose. Using the upper stages of the Navy
Vanguard rocket as upper stages for their Thor, they created a satellite launcher and called it
the Thor-Able. The new agency for administration of civil space programs also wanted to
develop a launcher of its own. NASA created a launch vehicle nearly identical to the Thor-
Able of the Army using the same Vanguard upper stages and Thor first stage, and they
called it the Thor Delta. The NASA Thor Delta was intended to provide civil launch
capability in the interim until a more advanced launcher was available. Thus from the same
components, the Air Force launch vehicle for military missions kept the name Thor, and the
NASA version for civil missions came to be known as the Delta.1
The first successful Delta flight was on 12 August 1960, placing an inflatable Echo
1 passive communications satellite in orbit. This first version of the Delta was launched 12
times by 1962, placing the Echo communications satellites, Tiros weather satellites,
scientific research satellites, as well as the first satellite of the United Kingdom (the Ariel
1), into orbit. In 1962 the uprated Delta versions were introduced, and there continued to
be a proliferation of new Delta versions, each with more capability than the previous. The
Delta D was introduced on 10 August 1964 with three Castor 1 solid propellant rockets
attached, which brought it to resemble more closely the modern Delta. The move by
NASA to augment the Delta thrust with solid rocket motors followed suit with the Air
Force which had introduced virtually the same improvement in their Thor-Agena D nineteen
months earlier. The series of improvements in the Delta improved its launch capability to
LEO by more than an order of magnitude, from 600 lb in 1960 to 7,610 lb with the
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currently operational Delta 3920 PAM-D which is being marketed commercially by
McDonnell Douglas.
The Titan launch vehicle has been an integral part of the U.S. satellite launch
capability for over 25 years. There have been four primary configurations of the Titan
vehicle. The first was the Titan I which lived a short life as a ballistic missile, after which
the retired ICBMs were used to launch military satellites. The Titan II was a storable
propellant derivative of the Titan I, developed by the need for a storable propellant ICBM to
increase readiness. It was used to launch the Gemini spacecraft but was not used as a
satellite launcher until missiles commissioned as ICBMs began to come out of service and
be refurbished as satellite launchers. There are at least 60 decommissioned Titan II ICBMs
currently planned for refurbishment as military satellite launchers.
The Titan III was developed by the Air Force as a satellite launcher. This was done
by adding a third stage called Transtage of storable bi-propellants using nitrogen tetroxide
(NTO) as the oxidizer and unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine (UDMH) as the fuel. The
first successful flight of a Titan rI-A came on 10 December 1964 and was followed on 18
June 1965 with the Titan III-C which was the heaviest lift vehicle launched to that date.
The Titan III-C was a Titan III-A with two large solid rocket motors attached to the liquid
core vehicle. The solids acted as the first stage, and the liquid engines were ignited at
altitude after SRB burnout. The effect was a four stage vehicle with a lift capability of
nearly 30,000 lb.
On 29 July 1966 the Titan III-B was introduced with its first successful launch.
This launch vehicle had an enhanced upper stage using the Agena D rather than the
Transtage of the Titan III-A and would become the standard launch vehicle for medium
weight military satellites. The Titan III-D was an enhanced version of the III-C which
began service in 1971.
49
The first non-military use of Titan rockets as satellite launchers came with the
development under NASA of the Titan -E/Centaur in 1974. Other than the Saturn V, this
was the most powerful launch vehicle ever developed in the U.S. Its primary task has been
to launch planetary missions and space probes.
The stable of expendable launch vehicles that has been used over the past thirty
years by the U.S. to place satellites in orbit were direct descendants of the early ballistic
missiles. There is a considerable degree of shared technology and hardware between the
various programs, and between organizations. Perhaps the most vivid illustration of this is
the Thor IRBM which became a primary satellite launcher for the Army as well as for
NASA.
2.3 Launch of Satellites Beyond Earth Orbit
Once the door to space had been opened and the first steps had been taken into orbit
about the Earth, efforts expanded to begin the exploration of the solar system and beyond.
To satisfy this area of scientific inquiry, expendable launch vehicles began to launch
satellites beyond the gravitational influence of the Earth, on missions to the Moon, the
planets, and into deep space.
Early attempts at sending satellites beyond Earth orbit were centered on the Moon as
either lunar orbit or impact missions. However the early missions were plagued with
failure. The U.S. launched 9 Pioneer satellites between August 1958 and December 1960
aboard the Thor Able 1, Juno II and Atlas Able launch vehicles to the Moon and none them
was fully successful. Meanwhile the Soviets achieved the first lunar impact on 12
September 1959. The U.S. achieved the first successful planetary fly-by with the Mariner
2 mission to Venus which was launched aboard an Atlas Agena-B on 27 August 1962.
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The Atlas Agena-B and Atlas Agena-D vehicles launched almost all U.S.
interplanetary probes from 1962 to 1965. This included the Ranger missions to the Moon
and the Mariner missions to Mars and Venus. The Thor-Agena Delta launched Pioneer 6 to
lunar orbit on 16 December 1965 and served as a launcher until 1969. The Atlas Agena-D
continued in service until 1967. In 1966 the Atlas Centaur was introduced as the launch
vehicle for the Surveyor lunar landing missions, launching all seven missions successfully.
The Atlas Centaur continued as the primary launcher of interplanetary probes until the Titan
HI-E/Centaur entered service with the 10 August 1975 launch of the Viking 1 Mars landing
mission. The Titan III-E Centaur had significantly greater capability than the Atlas Centaur
and has been the standard launcher for heavy probes while the Atlas Centaur has continued
to fulfill its role as the launcher of medium weight interplanetary probes.14
2.4 Launch of Men into Earth Orbit
Initial manned launch programs in the United States began with project Mercury
which was initiated in October 1958. The beginnings of project Mercury can be traced
back to July 1952 and a National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) resolution
aimed at devoting effort to the problems of manned flight to high altitudes, escaping from
earth's gravity. The U.S. Air Force initiated a study in March 1956 entitled Manned
Ballistic Rocket Research System, which was known as project 7696.
In the 1950's, several aerospace companies presented proposals for a manned
orbital flight. These proposals were largely based on multi-stage launch vehicles which
were still in the study stage and far away from operational development. By early 1958,
1 4 Wilding-White, T.M., Jane's Pocket Book II. Space Exploration, MacDonald and Janes, London, 1976.
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NACA personnel had come to favor the use of ballistic missile boosters for manned orbital
flight. These boosters were already in advanced stages of development, particularly the
Atlas which had been given the highest of national priorities in early 1957. Atlas was
selected as the launcher for the Mercury orbital flights in late 1958, and nine missiles were
ordered for the program in December. 15
In addition to the Atlas, two other rockets were used in the Mercury program. The
Little Joe rocket was a cluster of Castor and Recruit solid rocket motors used as a testbed
for measuring ascent factors such as dynamic pressure, and evaluating spacecraft systems
with Rhesus monkeys on board. The Little Joe rocket was incapable of placing the
Mercury spacecraft in orbit, as was the Redstone. However, the Redstone was capable of
placing the Mercury capsule in an exo-atmospheric ballistic flight and it was decided to use
the Mercury-Redstone as another test vehicle prior to orbital launch with the Atlas.
A Chimpanzee named 'Ham' was launched on a suborbital flight aboard a Mercury-
Redstone rocket on 31 January 1961, and after five further test launches of Mercury
capsules Alan B. Shepard became the first U.S. man in space on 5 May 1961 aboard the
Mercury-Redstone Freedom 7. The Mercury-Atlas launched John Glenn into orbit on 20
February 1962 aboard the Friendship 7 for three revolutions about the Earth. In all there
were six manned Mercury missions, two suborbital flights on the Mercury-Redstone and
four orbital flights on the Mercury-Atlas. The launch vehicles performed flawlessly in all
manned flights, although of the total 25 Mercury launches there were seven failures.
The successes of the Mercury program had paved the way for the next step in U.S.
manned space activities which was the Gemini program. Project Gemini was conceived
15 Emme, Eugene M., ed., The History of Rocket Technoloev: Project Mercury, Wayne State University
Press, Detroit, 1964.
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and approved as an intermediate step to Apollo in 1961. The Gemini (initially called the
Mercury Mark II) was a two man capsule which required a higher performance launch
vehicle than the Atlas. The Titan II was selected as the only proven launch vehicle capable
of launching the Gemini program on schedule. The first Gemini-Titan launch was on 8
April 1964 with a boilerplate spacecraft, and the first manned Gemini-Titan launch was on
23 March 1965 with Grissom and Young. The last of twelve Gemini-Titan flights (10
were manned) ended on 15 November of 1966 and all were successful. The Gemini
program provided data on the prolonged effects of weightlessness on the human body, and
orbital rendezvous and docking operations between spacecraft in orbit.16
The Apollo program was the culmination of the series of early manned space
launches of the U.S. A planned sequence of developments in manned exploration was
leading to the goal which President Kennedy stated in his 25 May 1961 address to congress
of 'landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely to the Earth'. A series of Saturn
vehicles was envisioned, with the capability of ultimately launching the Apollo Moon
mission.
The Saturn launch vehicle began in April 1957 when the U.S. Army Ballistic
Missile Agency (ABMA) studied the possibility of achieving a large lift capability by
clustering existing rockets. On 15 August 1958 the plans for this development were
authorized by the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) under the project name of
Juno V. The name was changed to Saturn on 3 February 1959 at the urging of Wernher
von Braun. The Saturn program was then transferred to the new National Aeronautics and
Space Administration (NASA) from the ABMA on 21 October 1959. This was done
because the Saturn program had no direct military role as an ICBM and was applicable to
16 Hacker, B.C., Grimwood, J.M., On The Shoulders of Titans. A History of Project Gemini, Scientific
and Technical Information Office, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1977.
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the launching of satellites and space probes which fell under the auspices of NASA. Along
with the Saturn program went the Development Operations Division of the ABMA. The
first successful Saturn launch came with the 27 October 1961 launch of a Saturn SA-1.
This vehicle was basically eight Redstone propellant tanks clustered around a Jupiter tank
which was the core, using eight engines. A high energy S-IV cryogenic upper stage was
used as well for the early Saturn 1, which provided a payload delivery capability of 20,000
lb to low Earth orbit, but was never used for manned missions. The Saturn 1B used
essentially the same first stage as the Saturn 1 but a larger and more powerful cryogenic
upper stage, the Saturn IVB which doubled the payload capability to 40,000 lb. This was
enough to place manned Apollo capsules in orbit for testing. The first Saturn 1B was
launched on 26 February 1966, and the initial manned flight was delayed when a flash fire
in the capsule during tests killed astronauts Grissom, White, and Chaffee on 27 January
1967.
The first manned Saturn flight was aboard a Saturn 1B on 22 October 1968, placing
Schirra, Eisele and Cunningham in orbit for 10 days. This was the last Saturn 1B flight for
four and a half years, until a Saturn 1B was used to launch men to Skylab. The final
Saturn 1B flight was in support of the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project on 15 July 1975.
Nineteen vehicles of the Saturn 1 family were launched from 1961 to 1975, five of which
were manned.
The Saturn V was developed as the launch vehicle for the Moon mission, and after
considerable debate as to its configuration the basic design as we now know it was
approved in January 1962. The Saturn V was largely a vehicle made from scratch, not
directly using any significant hardware elements from previous launch vehicles with the
exception of its Saturn IVB third stage which was the second stage of the Saturn 1B. It
was design to serve a single purpose: placing a man on the Moon and returning him safely
to the Earth.
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AS-501 was the first Saturn V mission. It was unmanned and launched on 9
November 1967. The third Saturn V launch placed Apollo 8 with Borman, Lovell and
Anders on a trip to the Moon and back in preparation for the first lunar landing. Apollo 11
was launched by a Saturn V on 16 July 1969 to enable Neil Armstrong to be the first man
on the Moon. A total of 6 lunar landings were made, the final one launched on 7 December
1972.17
The Apollo program was very successful, requiring only five Saturn V launches
prior to the first Moon landing when it was initially expected that as many as 15 preliminary
flights might be needed.
The Saturn V was modified to launch Skylab into orbit on 5 May 1973. Skylab
was built in a reconfigured S-IVB third stage of a Saturn V. This was the last of 13 Saturn
V launches and left hardware for two completed launch vehicles unused. 18
Manned activity in space for the U.S. experienced a hiatus of over 7 years between
the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) of July 1973 and the first Shuttle flight of 12 April
1981. Shuttle flights placed men and women in orbit on 23 successful flights, but the
Challenger disaster of 28 January 1986 has again created a hiatus in U.S. manned space
activity. The shuttle is expected to fly again in late 1988, and will remain the only source
of manned launch capability in the U.S. for the foreseeable future. There is no serious
consideration in the U.S. of restoring the role of manned launch activities to expendable
launch vehicles.
17 Turnill, R., The Observers Book of Manned Spaceflight. Frederick Warne, London, 1978.
18 Bilstein, R.E., Stages to Saturn. A Technological History of the Apollo/Saturn Launch Vehicles,
Scientific and Technical Information Branch, NASA, Washington, D.C., 1980.
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However, the Soviet Union continues to launch manned missions to their MIR
space station aboard the manned expendable launch vehicle Salyut.
2.5 Launch of Men Beyond Earth Orbit
The Apollo Moon missions are the only manned missions which have gone beyond
the bounds of Earth orbit. The first to do so was the first manned Saturn V mission in
which Borman, Lovell and Anders orbited the Moon and returned back to Earth. There
were a total of nine manned missions beyond Earth orbit, all of them to the Moon. Six
resulted in lunar landings, with Apollo 13 the only failure. An oxygen tank explosion en
route to the Moon resulted in a loss of propellant which aborted the lunar landing. There
are no definite plans for future manned missions beyond Earth orbit, however it seems
likely the there will be a return to the moon or a mission to Mars after the turn of the
century.
2.5 Summary
The expendable launch vehicles which have been developed and used in the history
of space transportation in the U.S. are shown in the Table 2.2.
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Table 2.2
Summary of ELV performance characteristics.19
Over the past 30 years, many launch vehicles have ne and gone. From the tiny
Vanguard to the awesome Saturn V, there are many launch vehicles that are no longer in
service. However, there are a few launch vehicles that have survived through an
19 Baker, David, THE ROCKET: The History and Development of Rocket & Missile Technologyv, Crown
Publishers, Inc., New York, 1978, page 267. Updates made from various sources.
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Name Agency
evolutionary development process that has allowed them to be flexible and provide a variety
of services. The survivors, particularly the Atlas, Delta, and Titan are all proceeding to the
new market for commercial space launches.
There are common elements between the ELVs that have survived. Each of them
has possessed the following characteristics:
* Flexible / Adaptable
* Successful / Reliable
· Cost Effective
The next generation launch vehicle will progress beyond the capabilities of the old
reliable stable of Atlas, Delta and Titan. To be as successful as these vehicles have been
must, it must retain these characteristics.
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ENHANCED UTILIZATION OF ELVs
In the past thirty years of space activity, orbiting systems have been materially
autonomous once in space. Some spacecraft have been dependent on ground control for
telemetry, but none have relied on any material resource for effective operation. As the
infrastructure of space operations begins to mature, dependencies are beginning to develop
between systems that will be placed in orbit. Spacecraft will require maintenance and
refueling to extend their operational lifetime. Reusable orbital transfer vehicles will provide
transportation services, and they will require servicing, refueling and refurbishment. The
space station will be a focal point of the space operations infrastructure, and it will require
replenishment of expendables and regular maintenance and servicing. As space operations
begin to mature, the dependencies between the elements of the space infrastructure begin to
grow, and new functions, services, and resources are required that were never previously
required.
There are several visions of what the future infrastructure of space operations might
look like. 1,2,3 The Space Transportation Architecture Study (STAS) has been addressing
the issue of what the best mix of space transportation vehicles might be for the space
infrastructure. STAS is a study being cosponsored by NASA and the Air Force and is
1 Waltz, D., TRW Military Space Systems Division, TRW Space & Technology Group, Design and
Support of Serviceable Spacecraft, Satellite Servicing Workshop III, NASA/Goddard Space Flight Center,
9-11 June 1987.
2 Rockwell International., Space Transportation Systems Division, Space Platform Expendables Resupply
Concept Definition Study. Final Report, NASA-CR-178819, December 1985, page 13.
3 Office of Technology Assessment, United States Congress, Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future
in Space, OTA-STI-241, November 1984, pp. 49-102.
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Chapter 3
being performed by four contractors. There are certain elements to all of the proposed
infrastructures which are basically common. These elements are:
* An Unmanned Heavy Lift Launch Vehicle (Shuttle class or
larger)
* A Space Station (Current baseline for International Space
Station)
* An Orbital Transfer Vehicle (Reusable, initially unmanned
but manned potentially)
* Spacecraft Servicing Satellites (Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle
(OMV) and future more sophisticated systems)
* Propellant Storage and Transfer (Space Station based or
free-flying)
The efficacy of an infrastructure utilizing these basic components has been studied
extensively. However, in order to establish an infrastructure which incorporates each of
these functions, it is not necessary to have separate hardware items for each of the
functions. A schematic of these basic functions of the future space operations
infrastructure and hardware elements that can provide them can be seen in Figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1
Basic elements of the future space operations infrastructure options.
Infrastructure A incorporates the standard elements which are being considered
currently. The shuttle is to be the primary propellant delivery vehicle, with propellant
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scavenging used to take advantage of low shuttle load factors which are projected to be
from forty to seventy five percent. The scavenging missions will be augmented by a mix
of dedicated missions which utilize more of the shuttle payload capability than is allowed
by taking advantage of a low load factor.4 Propellant will be loaded into a tank located
either in the payload bay or in an aft cargo carrier (ACC) for transportation and delivery.
The use of scavenging will provide a significant portion of the propellants required, but
dedicated flights will be required to match projected demand. 5
Infrastructure B incorporates an ELV as the transportation vehicle for propellant
delivery. The shuttle is replaced in this scenario, but similar operations are used for
propellant delivery. A separate tank is used as part of the payload, and used to provide
propellant by taking advantage of the unused payload capability due to a load factor less
than one.
Infrastructure C uses the ELV of B in an additional role beyond that of
transportation only. The separate tanks used for propellant storage are not needed because
the propellants are transferred from the propellant tanks of the ELV itself once in orbit.
Some additional technology for propellant transfer must be added to the ELV tanks, but this
eliminates the need for development of a separate hardware element to perform the
propellant storage function during delivery.
Infrastructure D builds on the concept used in C by using the ELV not only as a
transportation and propellant storage vehicle for delivery, but as a long term propellant
4 Fester, D., Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace, Earth-to-Orbit Propellant Transportation Overview, NASA
Report N85-17002, 1985.
5 Rockwell International Space Transportation Systems Division, Space Transportation System (STS)
Propellant Scavenging System Study Final Report. Volume I. Technical Report, NASA -CR-171848,
January 1985.
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storage depot in orbit. This reduces the total number of hardware elements of the system
from five to three.
The final infrastructure in the figure is E. This infrastructure incorporates
maximum use of the ELV by adding to the uses in D an additional role as high energy
upper stage for large payloads. This scenario finds the ELV fulfilling four different
functions that in the original A and B infrastructures were performed by four separate
hardware elements.
Expendable launch vehicles have the potential to contribute much more to the space
operations infrastructure than merely earth to orbit transportation. There are many ways
which they can contribute resources which they are composed of, which are already in
orbit, and can be economically utilized if there is sufficient demand. The feasibility of any
proposed utilization is dependant on matching the resource with a demand for that resource.
Identification of some areas of future demand which can be fulfilled by ELV resources was
seen in Chapter 1 in Table 1.1.
The development of the demand for resources in space is a process which takes
place over a considerable time period. The time period at which various resources of an
ELV might satisfy orbital demand is a function of the maturity of the infrastructure, thus the
type of demand, and the complexity of deriving that resource from the ELV. These
distinctions will become more clear as this discussion progresses, but let assume us for
now that certain categories of utilization will become manifest with the maturity level of the
space operations infrastructure. Therefore the utilization of ELV resources will be a time
phased process. As seen in the introduction, the categories for utilization can be generally
categorized into four groups. These groups are identified in Figure 3.2, with the primary
resources to be used by each group, the sources of demand for those resources, and the
author's estimate of the year when those resources might begin to be used in space.
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* Space Manufacturing
Figure 3.2
Orbital utilization is driven by the demand for resources in orbit.
The following discussion will address the resources which can be provided by the
ELV and the demand which may develop to utilize the resources. The time factor is critical
to match the technological maturity and availability for economic provision of the ELV
resource with the infrastructure maturity which develops the demand for the resource.
Various sources of demand will be addressed for each of the categories, along with the
feasibility or expected likelihood of a potential match between demand and supply.
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YEAR
1994
1992
1989
1994
2000+
2000
2000
2000
2000
1996
2010+
____
USE
3.1 Orbital Propellant Reclamation
The need for resupply of propellants in orbit for spacecraft and OTVs is well
established and will be an operational reality in the near future. The Soviets are routinely
performing refueling and resupply missions to the MIR space station with their Progress
tanker. NASA has performed propellant transfer flight experiments aboard the space
shuttle prior to the Challenger disaster and has plans for several propellant transfer
experiments in the near future. As Rockwell pointed out in a recent study,
NASA has recognized that the capability for remote resupply
of space platform expendable fluids will help transition space
utilization into a new era of operational efficiency and
cost/effectiveness.6
Expendable launch vehicles have propellants in their tanks when they achieve orbit,
which is destroyed with them as they burn up in the atmosphere. Orbital facilities will be in
need of propellant supplies for their own propulsion system, for resupply of other
compatible consumables (for LOX and LH2 systems) and for supply of propellant for
orbital maneuvering and transfer vehicles. The specifics of the resources which can be
supplied and the demand for utilization of those supplies is addressed in the next sections.
3.1.1 Propellant Supply
On a nominal mission to LEO for satellite deployment, a launch vehicle will have
propellant left over in its tanks that is equivalent to ten or twenty percent of its payload
Rockwell International Corporation, Space Platform Expendables ResuDply Concept Definition Study,
Final Report, NASA-CR-178819, December 1985, page 9.
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weight. This leftover propellant on nominal missions is the result of residuals and flight
reserves. Propellant residuals are the propellant that the propulsion system is unable to
remove from the tanks during the normal ascent phase of the mission. The amount of
residual propellants varies between launch vehicles and their tanks, but is generally in
excess of one percent of the propellant handling capability of the tank.
Flight propellant reserves are the other component of the nominal propellant which
is leftover on a typical flight. The reserves are a contingency built into the launch vehicle
that allow for a flight which requires more than the nominal amount of velocity to achieve
orbit. Additional velocity requirements can arise for several reasons. The basic
components which constitute the total velocity requirement of a launch vehicle are as
follows:
* Orbital velocity
* Velocity losses due to the earth's gravitation
* Velocity losses due to atmospheric drag
* Velocity losses due to atmospheric expansion of engine
exhaust
* Velocity losses due to steering
The orbital velocity is constant for a particular mission, so that does not deviate and
cause use of propellant reserves. Gravitation losses can increase if there is a loss in thrust
level, or if there is a deviation from the nominal ascent trajectory. Drag losses can increase
if atmospheric conditions are stormy with increased wind velocities, or with non-standard
variations in the atmospheric density. Expansion losses from the engine exhaust are fairly
constant but can vary with deviations in the nominal atmospheric pressure. Steering losses
are basically the losses associated with a thrust vector that is not parallel to a velocity
vector, and can be increased by anything that creates greater deviation in the thrust vector.
Such deviations might be caused by loss of thrust, changes in the nominal ascent trajectory,
and wind conditions.
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The amount of propellant which is set aside as reserve is typically one or two
percent of the propellant to be used, so it is on the same order as the residuals. Therefore,
when the residuals and the reserves are taken into account, there should be nominally at
least two percent of the propellant capability of the tanks left in them after they are in orbit.
As mentioned previously, this amount of weight in orbit is at least ten to twenty percent of
the payload capability of the launch vehicle. Simply put, if there is a need for this
propellant in orbit, a significant portion of payload capability is being wasted when the
launch vehicles are destroyed.
There is another source for propellant in orbit which is more substantial than the
residuals and the reserves. This is the propellant that can be placed in orbit to take
advantage of a load factor that is less than one hundred percent. The load factor is simply
the percentage of the payload capability that is being used for the particular mission. For
the majority of launch vehicles which are currently in service, the load factor normally
approaches one hundred percent because the payload capability is relatively small and the
payloads are usually a single satellite that is specially designed and sized to match the
capability of its launcher. However, with the space shuttle and with launch vehicle or
payload capability comparable to the shuttle or larger, load factor decreases.
Load factors decrease from one hundred percent for larger payload vehicles because
as the payload capabilities increase, multiple manifesting is used. Most satellites are not
large enough to require the entire launch capability of the shuttle or one of the proposed
heavy lift launchers. Therefore several payloads are launched at once, and they are
packaged within the cargo bay or payload shroud to accomplish multiple deployments.
There are two limits for multiple manifesting, the first being volume and the second being
weight. Volume limited payloads take the entire volume of the cargo bay or the payload
shroud but do not match the total payload weight of the launcher thereby leaving some of
the launch capability unused. When multiple manifesting is limited by the payload limit,
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there is still often excess capability. A simple example would be a vehicle with 65,000 lb
payload capability such as the shuttle, which is launching four 15,000 lb satellites. There
is 5,000 lb available but there may not be a satellite of 5,000 lb or less that is ready at that
launch date or is compatible with the deployment requirements of the other satellites.
Because of these limitations, the load factor is less than one hundred percent for larger
capability launcher. Load factors generally average on the order of sixty to eighty percent,
which means that on the average twenty to forty percent of the lift capability of a launcher is
being wasted.
Utilization of the load factor can be achieved by adding more payload to the vehicle
somehow, or by flying the nominal trajectory with full tanks and having excess propellant
in the tanks after achieving orbit. Typically for a mission which uses less than the
maximum payload capability, the propellant tanks will be off-loaded so that they are not
completely full and only carry the propellant necessary to satisfy the mission requirements.
By always flying with the tanks full rather than partially full, the losses to the system which
are brought on by having an average load factor which is inevitably less than one hundred
percent can be mitigated.
Launch vehicles perform most effectively at their design conditions. There is not a
full recovery of payload by flying with full tanks and less than full payload. The recovery
is roughly ninety percent, depending on the particulars of the vehicle and the mission.7 As
an example, if a launch vehicle with 100,000 lb nominal payload capability is manifested
with a load factor of eighty percent, the excess propellant placed in orbit should be 18,000
lb. With the addition of propellant available from reserves and residuals in the tankage, the
7 Rockwell International, Space Transportation Systems Division, Space Transportation System (STS)
Propellant Scavenging System Study. Final Report. Volume 1. Technical Report, NASA-CR-171848,
January 1985, page 2.
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amount of propellant available on orbit from a 100,000 lb payload class launch vehicle is
seen in Figure 3.3.
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Figure 3.3
Orbital propellant available as a function of load factor for a 100,000 lb
lift capability ELV using liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen propellants.
A more detailed discussion of the relation between load factor and the amount of
propellant available on orbit is in chapters 5 and 7.
Once in orbit, the propellant would be transferred to an orbital propellant depot for
storage until it is needed by an OTV or some other use. An example of a nominal trajectory
which outlines this basic scenario of propellant reclamation and gives an idea of the amount
of reclaimable propellant delivered to orbit as a function of load factor is shown in Figure
3.4.
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Figure 3.4
Operational Flight Scenario for Propellant Reclamation.
3.1.2 Propellant Demand
Resupply of consumables for spacecraft, particularly propellants has been
recognized by NASA as providing tremendous benefits in terms of satellite life and life
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cycle costs. Because of this recognition, the necessary technologies for liquid transfer in
orbit are being developed.8 An infrastructure is being designed which will provide the
means for providing consumables resupply to user spacecraft. There are several spacecraft
sitting on the ground waiting to be launched, in the production phase, or in the funded
design phase which are dependent on servicing and consumables resupply for their
operation. 9s Some of these spacecraft are indicated in Table 3.1.
8 Aydelott, J.C., NASA Lewis Research Center, and Rudland, R.S., Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace,
Technology Requirements to be Addressed by the NASA Lewis Research Center Cryogenic Fluid
Management Facility Program, NASA-TM-87048, 1985, pp. 1-3.
9 Waltz, D., TRW Space & Technology Group, Military Space Systems Division, Design and Support of
Serviceable Spacecraft, NASA GFSC Satellite Servicing Workshop III, Session III - Serviceable Spacecraft
Designs, 9-11 June 1987.
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Life Alt Inc
[Yrs] [nmi] [deg]
Mass Launch Consumables
[lb] Date (Type)
Advanced X-Ray
Astrophysics
Facility (AXAF)
Earth Observing
System (EOS)
Gamma Ray
Observatory (GRO)
Gravity Probe-D (GP-D)
Large Deployable
Reflector (LDR)
Proteus Platform
Shuttle Infrared
Telescope Facility
(SIRTF)
Upper Atmosphere
Research Satellite
(UARS)
Liquid He,
15 324 28.5 18,950 1992 Argon, Zenon,
co2
10 381 98.25 22,030 1992 Cryogens
5 270 28.5 31,000 1990 Hydrazine
1 520 90.0 4,000 1990's Liquid Helium
10 500 28.5 121,170 1997 Superfluid
Helium
10 216 28.5 2,203 1992 Hydrazine
Cryogens,
5 378 28.5 8,812 1994 Superfluid
Helium
2 320 57.0 11,000 1991 Solid
Hydrogen
Table 3.1
Satellites utilizing consumables resupply.10
The evidence of these satellite programs which are waiting to be launched or are
under way is testimony to the fact that consumables resupply in space will be a reality.
Several estimates have been made as to the propellant supply requirements of satellites and
the space station over the decades to come.11 Most of the estimates are consistent and as a
10 Data from:
Rockwell International Corporation, Space Platform Expendables Resupply Concept Definition Study,
Final Report, NASA-CR-178819, December 1985, page 33.
Committee on Advanced Space Technology, Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board, Commission on
Engineering and Technical systems, National Research Council, Space Technology to Meet Future Needs,
National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1987, pp. 20-42.
11 Rockwell International Corporation, Space Platform Expendables Resupply Concept Definition Study.
Final Report, NASA-CR-178819, December 1985, pp. 28-35.
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representative sample of expected demand for consumables resupply, Figure 3.5 is a
NASA estimate based on projections of several other sources.12
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Figure 3.5
Orbital Fluid Resupply quantities demanded per year.13
As demand develops in the mid-1990's, the primary fluids required are
bipropellants and monopropellants (hydrazine) and water. The demand for bipropellants is
for twenty to thirty thousand pounds per year, declining after the turn of the century.
Monopropellants and water are needed at the rate of about forty thousand pounds per year
from 1994 on. These demands are significant, but at a total of between sixty and one
hundred thousand pounds per year would require only one or two shuttle equivalent flights
per year. Particularly the demand for cryogenics is but a few thousand pounds a year. The
type of heavy lift ELV that would be used for propellant reclamation will almost surely use
cryogenic rockets.
12 Griffin, J.S., NASA, Johnson Space Center, Background and Programmatic Approach for the
Development of Orbital Fluid Resupply Tankers, AIAA Paper 86-1601, 1986, pp. 4-5.
13 Griffin, J.S., NASA, Johnson Space Center, Background and Programmatic Approach for the
Development of Orbital Fluid Resupply Tankers, AIAA Paper 86-1601, 1986, Page 4.
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The most significant demand for fluids in orbit comes from the reusable orbital
transfer vehicle. This vehicle will provide transportation for payloads from low earth orbit
to high energy orbits, primarily geosynchronous. The OTV will almost certainly be a
cryogenic vehicle in order to maximize its performance, although other propellants have
been considered, including electrical propulsion for some missions which are not time-
sensitive. On a typical flight the OTV may use 40,000 lb or cryogenic propellants to
deliver a 13,500 lb payload to geosynchronous orbit. With even ten flights per year this is
a significant requirement for cryogenic propellants in orbit. When comparing the demand
for cryogenic propellants from the OTV with the demand for liquid consumables and
propellant from other sources, the OTV demand is overshadowing. This can be seen in
Figure 3.6 which is the same data as that in Figure 3.5 with the demand from the OTV
added.
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Figure 3.6
Orbital fluids resupply requirement including OTV demand. 14
14 Griffin, J.S., NASA, Johnson Space Center, Background and Programmatic Approach for the
Development of Orbital Fluid Resupply Tankers, AIAA Paper 86-1601, 1986, Page 4.
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The demand for propellants in orbit increases significantly with the advent of the
reusable space based orbital transfer vehicle, which occurs in 1999 in this case. The
estimates from this NASA source are for civil missions only, and when military missions
with the possibility of SDI deployment are also considered, the demand can increase
dramatically to more than a million pounds a year. An example of this can be seen in
Figure 3.7 which shows three General Dynamics estimates. These estimates are based on
the NASA-MSFC OTV mission model (Rev. 9) which includes five scenarios that were
used in STAS. The data is for a modular space based orbital transfer vehicle (SBOTV)
which uses cryogenic hydrogen and oxygen, and aerobraking.
3500
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Figure 3.7
OTV propellant requirements. 15
The three scenarios for this propellant demand estimate are as follows: scenario A is
the low estimate for both civil and DoD use. Scenario B is the baseline scenario which has
an increase in civil GEO activities and an increase in DoD use. The third scenario, C is a
15 General Dynamics Space Systems Division, Orbital Transfer Vehicle Concept Definition and System
Analysis Study. Final Report, NASA-CR-179055, December 1986, pp. 2.1-2.4.
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further increase in civil use, particularly in GEO, no increase in DoD use from scenario B,
and the introduction of Nuclear waste disposal using OTVs which accounts for the majority
of the increase. A summary of these scenarios by mission is shown in Table 3.2.
Mission group S
Experimental GEO Platform
Operational GEO platforms
GEO shack elements
Manned GEO sortie
GEO shack logistics
Unmanned planetary
Unmanned lunar orbit
Unmanned lunar surface
Lunar orbit station
Manned lunar sorties/logistics
Multiple GEO payload delivery
Large GEO satellite delivery
GEO satellite retrieval
Nuclear waste disposal
DoD (generic)
Reflights
Subtotal
Total
;cenario A
1
0
0
0
0
14
0
0
0
0
84
10
2
0
176
287
5
292
O
Scenario B
1
0
2
16
37
14
3
5
0
0
84
10
2
0
240
414
8
422
Scenario C
1
0
2
22
51
25
4
1
1
8
88
19
2
391
240
855
17
872
Table 3.2
OTV mission model comparison.'6
The demand for propellants in orbit is evident, as is the domination of OTV
refueling in the demand. There is little question that OTVs will one day be developed and
operational in space. There are however, many questions remaining as to where the
16 General Dynamics Space Systems Division, Orbital Transfer Vehicle Concept Definition and System
Analysis Study. Final Report, NASA-CR-179055, December 1986, page 2.3.
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propellant for resupply will come from and how it will get there. The next generation of
ELVs provides a resource supply that matches well with the demand, and can be provided
at a low cost relative to other sources.
3.2 Orbital Reuse of Entire ELV
Once an ELV has delivered its payload, it is orbiting the earth with all of its tanks,
avionics, propulsion systems, and remaining propellant. There are uses for such vehicles
in orbit which can be realized if certain elements of the future infrastructure are in place.
Two primary uses are evident. The first is to use the orbital ELV as a propellant depot
facility, and secondly as a large upper stage for large payload high energy missions.
3.2.1 Demand
The demand for an orbiting propellant storage depot is clearly established by the
requirements of the new space infrastructure. 17 The specific characteristics of the demand
are not well known, but the general characteristics are. These characteristics will of course
be determined by the types of spacecraft that will be accessing an orbital propellant facility,
their rates of access, and the amount of propellants they require. Propellant requirements
have been estimated in section 3.1 to be on the order of a few hundred thousand pounds
per year beginning in the mid to late 1990s. The primary user spacecraft will be reusable
orbital transfer vehicles, probably requiring 25,000 to 50,000 pounds of propellant per
17 Office of Technology Assessment, United States Congress, Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future
in Space, OTA-STI-241, November 1984, pp. 49-82.
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mission.18 Sizing studies for an orbital propellant depot have indicated that its propellant
storage capability should be 100,000 pounds, which is a size consistent with orbital
delivery in the shuttle cargo bay.19 Larger sizes are possible, when delivered by a launch
vehicle with large lift capability other than the shuttle.
The need for large upper stages is dependent on the type of missions being planned
and the size of the payloads that will be used for those missions. High energy missions
envisaged include 20:
* Geosynchronous transfer
* Planetary probes
* Deep space probes
* Lunar manned missions
* Lunar unmanned (exploration or cargo/supply) missions
* Mars manned missions
* Mars unmanned (exploration or cargo/supply) missions
* High energy plane changes
These missions will be served in large part by the reusable orbital transfer vehicle.
For missions that require large payloads and high AVs, a vehicle with larger capabilities
may be required. Studies have addressed the issue of the occasional large, high AV
18 General Dynamics Space Systems Division, Orbital Transfer Vehicle Concept Definition and System
Analysis Study. Final ReDort, NASA-CR-179055, December 1986, page 2.2.
19 Schuster, J.R., Bennett, F.O., Liggett, M.W., and Torre, C.N., General Dynamics Space Systems
Division, and Brown, N., NASA MSFC, Evaluation of On-Orbit Cryogenic Propellant Depot Options For
the Orbital Transfer Vehicle, Paper 88c, 6th Intersociety Cryogenics Symposium, 2-7 November 1986,
Miami Beach, Florida, pp. 1-4.
2 0 Pioneering the Space Frontier: The Report of the National Commission on Space, Bantam Books, New
York, May 1986, pp. 12-15.
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payload by using multiple staging of OTVs or of attaching several propellant modules to a
core OTV.21 These solutions are feasible, and so is the use of orbital ELVs.
3.2.2 Supply
Orbital ELVs will have the basic components necessary to provide the service of a
propellant depot facility: storage tanks, propellant transfer capability, propulsion system,
avionics, and capability for guidance and control. There is little question of the availability
of ELVs in orbit for this type of utilization. If ELVs are built and flown, they will be in
orbit. There are two concerns about use of ELVs as propellant depots. First is their limited
insulation and inherent design for short term propellant storage and second is their size,
which is for roughly 800,000 pounds of propellant.
Adequate insulation to prevent boiloff of the cryogenic propellants being stored in
orbit is critical. Without adequate insulation, heating rates to propellant tanks can create
serious boiloff problems.2 2 Methods have been studied for eliminating boiloff losses by
incorporating refrigeration or reliquifaction technologies. Passive systems can reduce
boiloff to less then 0.2 percent per month through incorporation of multilayer insulation
(MLI) and vapor-cooled shields (VCS).23 The standard insulation of a launch vehicle has a
21 General Dynamics Space Systems Division, Orbital Transfer Vehicle Concept Definition and System
Analysis Study. Final Report, NASA-CR-179055, December 1986, pp. 3.1-3.5
22 Rockwell International, Space Transportation Systems Division, Space Transportation System (STS)
Propellant Scavenging System Study Final Report, Volume I, Technical Report, NASA-CR-171848-Vol-
1, January 1985, pp. 57-64.
23 Schuster, J.R., Bennett, F.O., Liggett, M.W., and Torre, C.N., General Dynamics Space Systems
Division, and Brown, N., NASA MSFC, Evaluation of On-Orbit Cryogenic Propellant Depot Options For
the Orbital Transfer Vehicle, Paper 88c, 6th Intersociety Cryogenics Symposium, 2-7 November 1986,
Miami Beach, Florida, pp. 5-9.
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much lower performance than do these specially designed systems for long term cryogenic
storage. Therefore if the ELV were to be used as an orbital propellant depot, it would
require additional insulation. The insulation could be integrated with the vehicle on the
ground, or once the vehicle is in orbit. Ground applications of additional insulation would
have to be able to withstand the ascent of the launch vehicle, and would diminish
performance of the ELV due to their added weight. Space operations for application of
additional insulation would be a time consuming task for EVA, and would likely not be
tailored to automation.
The size of the ELV tanks, with an 800,000 pound capacity is much larger than is
required for the expected demand. Because of this oversize, boiloff problems would be
exacerbated. Surface area of the tanks would be much larger than that of a more optimally
sized facility therefore taking on more solar radiation. The tankage and structural mass
which must be cooled to cryogenic temperatures would also be greater. Because of the
complications associated with conversion of an ELV to use as an orbital propellant depot,
this mode of utilization is not feasible for the demand which is being assumed.
Utilization of orbital ELVs as high energy upper stages is less complicated than that
of long term propellant storage and is quite feasible. A particular scenario for use of the
ELV in this manner is described in Figure 3.7. The payload for this scenario is one that
required substantial AV for a high energy mission, and is a large payload that requires the
full payload capability of the launch vehicle. The ELV ascends with its payload to orbit,
then to rendezvous with a propellant depot. Propellant from the depot is transferred to the
ELV tanks until there is sufficient propellant to achieve the AV required for the mission
(this may require propellant from more than one depot, depending on the size of the depot).
When the ELV is properly filled, it proceeds from LEO to wherever the payload is
destined. In doing so it acts essentially as both the first and second stage for the rocket,
thereby reducing the need for a separate upper stage.
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Figure 3.8
Scenario for reuse of entire ELV as high energy upper stage.
ELVs have the potential to be used for this purpose for smaller payloads as well,
but for smaller payloads they become less and less efficient. This is because of their huge
size. If an ELV from the previous scenario is delivering a 12,000 pound payload one way
to GEO it will require 206,000 lb of propellant. If the same task is being performed by a
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reusable OTV with aerobraking, the propellant requirement will be only 41,500 pounds and
this is a round trip with 2,000 pounds returned to LEO.24
Orbital reuse of entire ELVs is possible as high energy upper stages and as
propellant depots. Due to the expected nature of the demand for such services however, it
will be practical to use entire ELVs only as high energy upper stages for large payloads.
The expected time period for the onset of such missions is the turn of the century.25 Prior
to that time, the infrastructure will be getting established in preparation for support of these
advanced missions.
3.3 Orbital Reuse of ELV Components
An ELV is composed of several different subsystems such as propulsion, avionics,
tankage, and structure. Any spacecraft is composed of these basic subsystems. For
spacecraft that are to be built in space, or to be repaired through maintenance operations
there is a need for components to these basic subsystems. If there is modularization and
standardization of components between the various space systems, then there is potential
for reuse of components from ELVs in orbit.
Spacecraft components have been used for multiple purposes previously, but never
before has the work been done in space. Some reuses of components include: rechargeable
Nickel-Cadmium batteries used in British UoSAT satellites were surplus NASA cells from
24 General Dynamics Space Systems Division, Orbital Transfer Vehicle Concept Definition and System
Analysis Study. Final Report, NASA-CR-179055, December 1986, page 2.2.
25 Pioneering the Space Frontier: The Report of the National Commission on Space, Bantam Books, New
York, May 1986, Page 15.
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the ITOS program; a Polar Bear (Beacon Explorer/Auroral Research) satellite was made
from a surplus Transit navigation satellite that had spend eight years in a museum; ICBMs
such as the Atlas and Titan II being refurbished as ELVs; seats and instrument panels
reused in Gemini and Apollo programs; Skylab built from Saturn IVB rocket stage; sharing
of parts between shuttle orbiters; use of Progress freighters by the Soviets as garbage
trucks - they have taken garbage from Salyut and MIR with them after they leave the space
station to burn up in the atmosphere; spare RTGs from Galileo to be used on the proposed
Comet Rendezvous/Asteroid Flyby (CRAF) mission; and many other examples.2 6
The basic scenario involved for orbital reuse of ELV components is for the ELV to
rendezvous with a spaceport which has the capability of disassembling the ELV into its
component parts. The disassembly could be an automated process or involved manned
operations through EVA, or potentially in pressurized work habitats. The disassembled
components could then be placed in an inventory from which they would be taken as a need
arose, or they could be disassembled in response to a need.
There have been numerous studies which have addressed orbital uses for the
external tank (ET) of the space shuttle, and many of the uses for the tankage and structure
of an ELV are similar to those under consideration for the ET. One of the most complete is
the study done by Gimarc for the Space Studies Institute. Some of the uses envisaged by
this study for ET components in orbit are shown below.27
* Cryogenic storage
* Storage of water and gases
26 Lorenz, Ralph D., "Born Again! Second-hand Spacecraft are Sometimes Given a New Lease of Life",
Spaceflight, Volume 30, March 1988, pp. 93-95.
27 Gimarc, Alex J., Report on Sace Shuttle External Tank Applications, Space Studies Institute,
Princeton, New Jersey, 1 December 1985.
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* Storage containers for orbital debris
* Storage containers for orbital assets
* Habitation modules
* Hangars or service platforms for spacecraft
* Manned Space Station / Platform
* Landing / re-entry module
* Orbital wake shield
· Variable gravity facility using tethers
* Momentum exchange using tethers
* Structural base for observational satellites
These uses are equally applicable to an ELV and its components in orbit, and in fact
they would likely be easier to achieve with an ELV. The primary reason for this is that the
ET is just a set of tanks, whereas an ELV has its own propulsion system, guidance
capability, and attitude control system. The ET, to rendezvous with a facility for
disassembly and use would require the dedicated use of the shuttle orbiter, or some other
orbital maneuvering system.
There is in fact a company which has plans to convert ETs into an orbiting
laboratory. External Tanks Corporation (ETCO) has been conducting discussions with
NASA for the project and is seeking private investment to finance their venture. They
project annual profits of more than $ 30 million in the 1990s after operation of the
laboratories has begun.2 8 NASA is interested in the project and has indicated that it is
within the current state of the art. However they have pointed out several difficulties
associated with it:
* Reduction of the shuttle payload capability.
* Propellant requirements to prevent early reentry of the ET.
28 "Company Seeks Funds for Orbiting Laboratory", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 12 January
1987, pp. 102-103.
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* Additional propulsion and guidance equipment to orient the
tank properly.
* Accessibility of the orbiting tank.
* Probability of micrometeoroid or space debris damage to the
tank or potential impact of the tank with useful satellites.
* Cost of tank modifications and operations.29
If conceived during the design process, uses for ELVs such as those envisioned for
the ET could be incorporated in the design. They could eliminate some of the difficulties
that are being faced in ET redesign for orbital use such as additional fittings, handholds and
grips, hatch relocation, and tank interface.30
The use of components from ELVs for constructing space habitats has been done
previously, but the spacecraft was constructed on ground rather than in space. The Skylab
spacecraft, the first space station, was constructed from the empty tanks of the third stage
of the Saturn V ELV. The use of the empty tanks for the structural shell of Skylab, as well
as common hardware from other programs was summarized in a NASA publication which
chronicled the Skylab program:
Many factors influenced the final design
configuration of Skylab. However, one of the most
important was an economic necessity to use components and
equipment, where possible, that had been developed for
other programs.3 1
29 "Company Plans Conversion of Shuttle Tanks to Orbiting Research Platforms", Aviation Week &
Space Technology, 29 February 1988, page 38.
3 0 Price, Robert L., Martin Marietta Aerospace, "A Plan to Make Space Shuttle External Tanks Reusable",
Space-faring gazette: A Journal for Space Development, Vol. 3 No. 7, July 1987, pp. 1,8,12.
31 Belew, L.F., George C. Marshall Space Flight Center, Skylab. Our First Space Station, Scientific and
Technical Information Office, NASA, Washington D.C., 1977, Page 17.
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The concept of commonality between system components and modular design has
been studied and implemented in the space shuttle and space station programs as a cost
saving method. Commonality of spacecraft subsystems and elements is a key to utilization
of ELV components in orbit. The type of commonality required to effect this type of
utilization must be farsighted. This point was made in a recent paper on commonality
which stated the number one rule to follow when implementing commonality:
Implement commonality early in the program to effect major
cost savings.3 2
The avionics and propulsion systems of an ELV have the potential to be of use to
other spacecraft in orbit. If they are designed in conjunction with other spacecraft
programs and commonality is in the minds of the designers, then these systems could be
composed of modular building blocks. The modules could be designed to have a 'plug in'
and 'plug out' capability, which would allow easy disassembly from the source vehicle (an
ELV) to the user spacecraft. This design approach could make ground assembly operations
easier, and would lend itself to automation both in space and on the ground.
In laying out the infrastructure of a future space operations system, commonality
should not only be considered for hardware items, but for functions within the
infrastructure. The utilization of ELVs in orbit has the potential to provide both types of
commonality.
32 Waiss, R.D., Boeing Aerospace Co., Cost Reduction on Large Space Systems Through Commonality,
AIAA Paper 87-0585, AIAA 25th Aerospace Sciences Meeting, 12-15 January 1987, Reno, Nevada, Page
2.
86
3.4 Orbital Reuse of ELV Materials
Space based manufacturing facilities have been studied which would require large
amounts of material in orbit.3 3 Such facilities could be used for manufacture of solar
power satellites and other large projects. However, the cost of placing in orbit the material
necessary for such projects is prohibitive. This is why they turn to extraterrestrial bodies
for material resources, such as the moon and the asteroids. Technology development of
space based manufacturing will surely be done with smaller scale projects. Terrestrial
resources will likely be used early in the development as opposed to extraterrestrial
resources.
There are two primary requirements involved in beginning extraterrestrial
manufacturing. The first is in providing the manufacturing facility itself, and the second is
in providing materials for the manufacturing process. There have been numerous papers
on advanced manufacturing facilities in LEO, utilizing lunar resources, or asteroid
resources, either of which is in raw form.34 These manufacturing facilities must first create
useable material from the raw resources, then transform the material to whatever application
is desired. These proposals are exciting and ambitious, but admittedly beyond the
immediate horizon. The President's National Commission on Space has indicated that the
expected time period for onset of such activities is 2010 to 2020. The Commission recently
recommended that:
The augmented technology program we propose for
NASA specifically include vigorous development of the
33 MIT, Space Systems Laboratory, Extraterrestrial Processing and Manufacturing of Large Space Systems,
NASA-CR-161293, September 1979.
34 Space Manufacturing 4. 5. & 6, Proceedings of the Fifth, Seventh, and Eighth Princeton/AIAA/SSI
Conference, 18-21 May 1981, 8-11 May, 1985, and 6-9 May 1987.
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technologies for robotic and tele-operated production of
shielding, building materials, and other products from
locally-available raw materials.35
The ELV can provide those raw materials to a space manufacturing facility as an
intermediate step, in the short term, prior to the use of materials from the Moon, Mars, or
asteroids. This intermediate step can provide valuable experience and knowledge, leading
to those ambitious goals in a phased approach as seen in Figure 3.8.
ELV Material
Resource Utilization
Extraterrestrial
Resource Utilization
Materials Processing/
Manufacturing Facility
1990 2000 2010 2020 2030
Figure 3.9
A phased approach to resource supply for space manufacturing.36
The ELV, if used as a resource in this intermediate role, can eliminate the process of
creating useable materials from raw materials by providing useable materials directly to the
manufacturing facility. This is a simplifying step which requires one rather than two stages
of transformation. This could be done by including the materials as part of the traditional
3 5 Pioneering the Space Frontier: The Report of the National Commission on Space, Bantam Books, New
York, May 1986, Page 105.
36 Comstock, D.A., Improving Efficiency of Expendable Launch Vehicles in the Future Space
Transportation System, Space Manufacturing 6, Nonterrestrial Resources, Biosciences, and Space
Engineering, Proceedings of the Eighth Princeton/AIAA/SSI Conference, 6-9 May 1987, pp. 283-290.
88
payload manifest of missions servicing the manufacturing facility. Alternatively through
ELV utilization, the manufacturing materials are provided in the transportation vehicle
itself. This would effectively improve the performance of the transportation system by
including its structure and other on-orbit mass as part of its payload. We can then take
advantage of the energy that goes into placing not only the payload but the delivery vehicle
in orbit.
The potential synergy between these two systems can arise from designing the
launch vehicle in conjunction with the manufacturing facility. The launch vehicle should be
designed to use materials which are desirable for the types of products proposed for the
manufacturing facility. This may result in a design that is slightly off-optimal from a pure
launch vehicle engineering standpoint, but which is much closer to optimal from the
perspective of the overall system. Conversely, manufacturing techniques should be
developed which can utilize the components and materials from the launch vehicle.
The types of uses for the ELV materials by an orbiting manufacturing facility are
similar to uses that have been studied for ET use. Some of these uses are shown in Table
3.3. The majority of the materials to be used would come from the tankage and structure of
the launch vehicle, which will likely be aluminum alloy.
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* Intact tankage
* Reworked or modified tankage
* Sectional tankage
* Reworked tankage materials
* Metals recovery
* Non-metallic volatiles
* Compositionally indifferent materials
* Metallic structures
* Non-metallic structures
* Composite structures and systems
* Non-metallic volatile products
Table 3.3
Materials & Structures opportunities afforded by recoverable ETs in orbit.37
37 Workshop on Utilization of the External Tanks of the Space Transportation System, cosponsored by the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the California Space Institute, San Diego, CA 8-9
March 1982.
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CHAPTER 4 RELEVANT POLICY ENVIRONMENT
There are several motivations to the space program, many of which are political.
They vary in level of importance according to individual or group and the political
circumstances of the time. In his book Pride and Power, Van Dyke summarized the
motivations for a space program as follows:
* Military Security: "Immediate Missions" in Space
* Military Security: Potentialities
* Peace
* Progress in Science and Technology
* Economic and Social Progress
* National Prestige
* National Pride: The Achievement Motive
* Special Interests and Ulterior Motives
Each of these motives has played a role in shaping space policy in the past and will
continue to do so in the future. As the space program matures, visions of where it is going
change for reasons that can be derived from a lack of technological capability, but largely
the space program has been driven by policy decisions. Decisions at the highest levels of
government have provided the impetus and the funding to realize the many
accomplishments that have already been made. These decisions have largely been made for
political reasons, many of them international in scope. A primary factor has been the space
race with the Soviets. A significant area of departure from the pattern of government
dominance over space policy, is the development of a commercial space industry.
Regulatory policies will remain, but in part the direction of space development will be in the
1 Van Dyke, Vernon, Pride and Power: The Rationale of the Space Program, University of Illinois Press,
Urbana, 1964.
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hands of the private sector. However, until a significant commercial space industry is
established, the government will remain the dominant policy maker for all space activities.
This chapter will address the relevant policy concerns which have a significant
impact on the new infrastructure, and set up a framework for addressing the questions
raised in Chapter 1.
4.1 ELV RESURGENCE
The ELV in the U.S. was recently an endangered vehicle. ELVs enjoyed
preeminence in the Soviet space program, and service with ESA, the Japanese and the
Chinese. However, these programs did not possess the space shuttle, which promised to
make ELVs obsolete. Until the Challenger disaster it was NASA policy that the Space
Shuttle provide all earth to orbit transportation capabilities for the space infrastructure of the
United States. However in the wake of the Challenger disaster, this policy has been
replaced with a policy advocating a mixed fleet of shuttle and ELVs. This is to provide
assured access to space and to fulfil demand for launch services which the shuttle cannot
match alone. Following the path opened by new legislation, a commercial launch vehicle
industry is beginning to emerge. In addition, there are new launch vehicle programs which
address the need for lower cost and higher capability.
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4.1.1 A SHIFT IN POLICY
After the Apollo program, the civil space program in the U.S. needed another goal
to set its sights on. President Nixon appointed a Space Task Group (STG) which was to
define this new goal.2 In September 1969, the STG recommended that the country pursue
one of three programs: a manned Mars mission, a Space Station, or a Space Shuttle.3
NASA was in a period of decreasing funding, and congressional support for substantial
new space programs was low. The shuttle was a building block for a space station and the
space station was a building block for a manned Mars mission. The shuttle program was
the only choice which had a chance of getting funded, and it needed approval not only from
Congress, but from the DoD and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) as well.
NASA was basing its justification for the shuttle program on the savings that could be
realized by the shuttle, claiming that it would not only pay for itself but would someday
make a profit. In 1976, Dr. James Fletcher as Administrator of NASA prophesied to
congressional committees the routine operation of 60 shuttle launches per year with an
order of magnitude cost reduction over then current launch costs.4 As history has shown,
this dream never became reality. The Shuttle has launched at most 9 times in a year, the
actual costs are higher than expendables, although the price charged to customers for
launch services is less. There were doubts in Congress as NASA was making its claims,
as Congressman Joseph Karth said:
2 Roland, A., "Priorities in Space for the USA", SPACE POLICY, May 1987, pp. 104-111.
3 Space Task Group, The nost-Anollo Space Program: Directions for the Future. Space Task Group Report
to the President, September 1969.
4 Simon, Michael C., Keeping the Dream Alive: Putting NASA and America Back in Space, Earth Space
Operations, San Diego, California, July, 1987.
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NASA must consider the Members of Congress a bunch of
stupid idiots. Worse yet, they may believe their own
estimates - and then we really are in bad shape. 5
While these comments seem harsh if not extreme, they are indicative of the
problems inherent in obtaining funding for any high cost, high risk, high technology
program. In order for Congress to accept the high risk and cost associated with such a
program, the perceived benefits must be substantial. NASA needed the shuttle program
and in their zeal to win over supporters with the potential virtues of the new space
transportation system, they laid claim to capabilities that even NASA engineers felt could
not be accomplished.6
Cost projections for shuttle operations were much less than ELV costs. Visions of
the shuttle as an inexpensive reusable system painted a picture of space transportation in
which ELVs were obsolete. When NASA made the policy decision to rely totally on the
shuttle for earth to orbit transportation, they began to reduce funding from their ELV
programs. The trends in ELV funding can be seen in figure 4.1.
5 Hechler, K., The Endless Space Frontier: A History of the House Committee on Science and Aeronautics.
1959-1978, AAS History Series, Vol. 4, American Astronautical Society, San Diego, CA, 1982, page
246.
6 Tischler, A.O., "A Commentary on Low-Cost Sace Transportation", Astronautics & Aeronautics,
August 1969, pp. 50-64.
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1965 1970 1975 1980 1985
Figure 4.1
NASA funding of R&D for ELVs.7
This funding profile is consistent with the former NASA policy, which was aimed
at phasing out ELVs leading to total reliance on the shuttle for space transportation. The
production of launch vehicles in the U.S. has undergone a significant reduction as a result
of this policy. As shown in Figure 4.2, launch vehicle production had almost been reduced
to nothing by 1986.
7 Budget of the United States Government, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1960-
1989.
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U.S. Space launch vehicle production.8
The DoD was not as optimistic as NASA regarding the operational capabilities of
the shuttle. They were wary of relying on a single system for assured access to space.
Resolute in maintaining assured access, they continued the practice of ELV procurement for
satellite launch. Military concerns for control as well as availability of launch capability are
high, as Air Force Secretary Hans Mark said in 1985:
The real issue is operational control of the launch vehicles...
Under current arrangements, if the space shuttle becomes the
only launch vehicle for putting U.S. payloads in space, then
the Air Force loses all control of launch vehicle capability...
It is unacceptable that the people in charge of the most
8 Note: Upper stages and weapon systems (Atlas E,F, Thor, Titan I, II) not included.
CETS, NRC, Assessment of Candidate Expendable Launch Vehicles for Large Payloads, NASW-3511,
September 1984, page 8.
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important space payloads we fly do not have operational
control over their own space launch vehicles.9
In 1984 the Air Force began their complementary expendable launch vehicle
(CELV) as a hedge against limited annual shuttle flight rates and capacity, particularly for
polar launches. Martin Marietta won the CELV competition with their Titan IV in February
1985. The contract is worth $ 2.1 billion for 23 launches beginning in 1988 and
continuing at a rate of 5 or 6 per year.l 0 In addition the Air Force is converting at least 14
Titan II ICBMs that have recently been retired from service into ELVs.
The space science community was displeased with the NASA policy of total
reliance on shuttle as well. In May 1986, the Space Science Board of the National
Research Council emphasized that in the mid-1960s the U.S. launched five to six science
missions a year, and since the Voyager launches of 1977 not any major science payloads
had been flown. The board also said that the policy mandating use of the shuttle has
"deprived the nation of launch vehicles for major scientific payloads for almost a decade
[and has] been devastating for space science." 11
The explosion of shuttle mission 51-L on 28 January 1986 left no doubt but that
total reliance on the space shuttle sacrificed assured access. NASA therefore had to adopt
the concept of a mixed fleet of launchers. A few months after the accident, NASA
9 A quote from the following article:
Gordon, J.K., "USAF Foresees Need for Launch Vehicle to Replace Shuttle in 1990s", Aviation Week &
Space Technology, 29 July 1985, page 18.
10 Wilson, A., "Titan Grows Stronger", SPACE, September-October 1987, pp. 8-11.
1 1A quote from the following article:
Foley, Theresa M., "House Panel Considers Canceling Shuttle/Centaur Due to Safety Concerns", Aviation
Week & Space Technology, 23 June 1986, pp. 18-19.
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associate administrator for space science, Burton Edelson, said that NASA will use the
shuttle exclusively "for manned spaceflight, for Spacelab-type missions and space
station". 12 The use of shuttle as a commercial launch vehicle was ended officially on 15
August 1986 when President Reagan issued a new policy. He stated that "NASA will no
longer be in the business of launching private satellites". This policy was established after
lobbying by Martin Marietta, General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas and the
Transportation Department. All of these interests urged the new policy on the basis that
continued use of the shuttle for launching commercial satellites would limit the prospects of
a commercial space launch industry. 13
The costs of shuttle flight in relation to its annual launch rate are seen in Figure 4.3.
The data is taken from a 1983 Rockwell study, and indicates that if indeed the flight rates
are high, launch costs drop significantly.
12 A quote from the following article:
Foley, Theresa M., "NASA Planning Use of Expendables To Launch Science Spacecraft", Aviation Week
& Space Technology, 23 June 1986, pp. 18-19.
13 Foley, T.M., "Reagan Bars Shuttle From Competing For New Satellite Launch Contracts, Aviation
Week & Space Technology, 25 August 1986, page 22.
98
500
400
oo
300
200
100
100
0
0 10 20 30 40 50
Annual Launch Rate
Figure 4.3
Effect of annual launch rate on shuttle flight costs.14
Launch rates for the shuttle will likely never reach the levels forecast early in the
program. There have been no shuttle launches for over two years, and once flights resume
the flight rate will be low in relation to early projections. The House Committee on
Appropriations requested an assessment of shuttle flight rates and utilization following the
Challenger accident. In the assessment done by the Committee on NASA Scientific and
Technological Program Reviews of the National Research Council, it was determined that:
Three Orbiters can sustain a rate of 8 to 10 flights per year
after an initial buildup period of approximately 2 years
providing: (1) no Orbiter is lost or becomes inoperable, (2)
adequate logistics support exists, and (3) no problems exist
that require extensive downtime. A surge rate of 12 flights
14 Rockwell International Space Transportation and Systems Group, Economic Comparison: Shuttle-Only
Fleet vs Shuttle/Commercial ELV Mixed Fleet, 17 May 1983.
99
per year should be possible for short periods of time for
simple payloads and flight plans.
With a 4-Orbiter fleet the sustainable flight rate would be 11-
13 per year with a surge rate of 15 flights per year only if
appropriate ground support facilities are acquired.15
There is a need for a mixed fleet of launch vehicles in order to provide an assured
access to space for this country, and to meet the demand that is in excess of shuttle
capability. This fact was recognized in the NRC assessment of shuttle flight rates and
utilization, and is recognized by NASA. ELVs are again considered essential to the U.S.
space program. Some of the reasons for having ELVs in addition to the shuttle in a mixed
fleet concept are indicated below.
* Assured access to space
* Meeting launch demand
* Potential for cost reduction
* Better schedule guarantees
* Potential heavy lift capability
* Simplification with unmanned systems
Recently there has been established in the United States a viable commercial launch
industry which will sell the services of launch vehicles having proven records in hundreds
of launches over 30 years. These expendables will continue to play important roles in the
U.S. space program, particularly in light of the shuttle disaster.16 However, they possess
relatively small payload delivery capabilities and are expensive to launch with costs to LEO
15 National Research Council, Post-Challenger Assessment of Space Shuttle Flight Rates and Utilization,
National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., October 1986, page 15.
16 Rector, W.F.III, Scherer, L.R., General Dynamics Space Systems Division, Expendable Launch
Vehicles as a Complement to the Space Shuttle, Space Commerce '86, 16-20 June 1986, Montreux,
Switzerland, Conference Proceedings, pp. 428-431.
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of about 3,000 dollars per pound. The vehicles are the commercial Atlas, Delta, and Titan.
They are all products of ballistic missile development and have all served the U.S. space
program in a number of capacities.
In a recent report by the NRC outlining future technology needs of the space
program, several space transportation needs were brought forth. Among these needs are:
* Modern expendable launch systems of small and medium
capacity
- Payload weight: 20,000 to 50,000 lbs to LEO
- Reliable
- Low operational cost
- Improved payload-to-lift mass
* Unmanned heavy-lift launch capability to LEO
- Payload weight: greater than 100,000 lbs
- Payload envelope: as unrestricted as feasible
- Cost: substantial reduction over current systems (full or
partial reusability will be determined by economic trade-off)
* Reusable orbital transfer system to raise payloads from LEO
to higher altitude sun-synchronous or geostationary orbit and
return them
- Geostationary payload weight: greater than 20,000 lb
- Payload envelope: as unrestricted as feasible
- Robotics: capable of interfacing with an intelligent front-
end for routine servicing operations17
There are currently new programs in the U.S. for development of a new class of
launch vehicle to provide a lift capability which exceeds those of current ELVs. The new
launch vehicle will be of shuttle class or larger payload capability, to provide low cost
17 Committee on Advanced Space Technology (CAST), Aeronautics and Space Engineering Board (ASEB),
Commission on Engineering and Technical Systems (CETS), National Research Council (NRC), Space
Technology to Meet Future Needs, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1987, page 18.
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transportation for a variety of missions. Such missions may include manned missions to
the planet Mars, the return of men to the Moon to establish a lunar base, and the potential
deployment of strategic defense weaponry in Earth orbit. One of the biggest objectives of a
new launch vehicle is the significant reduction of Earth to orbit transportation costs. There
are three primary areas which can be addressed in the cost reduction of placing payloads in
space. These three areas are operations, production, and use.
4.1.2 COST REDUCTION
Operations is a significant cost item in the launch of payloads into space and
involves the launch operations and flight operations. Currently many hundreds and
thousands of highly trained and skilled personnel are required to launch a rocket. Many of
these people sit attentively in front of computer monitors which show the vital
characteristics of various systems on the launch vehicle. The observers monitor the
information which is being provided to ensure that come launch time, everything is within
the acceptable operational bounds. If one of the people finds some system operating in an
unacceptable manner, then the launch is delayed while the problem is corrected. Hundreds
of these people continuously monitor the vital statistics of the launch vehicle prior to
launch. These people are in a dedicated function while they are performing this task, and
each day or week that the launch vehicle is delayed, their pay is accumulating against the
cost of the launch. The use of artificial intelligence and expert systems is being seriously
explored as a remedy to this situation. Through automated monitoring of vital launch
vehicle and payload parameters using artificial intelligence, the degree of direct human
interaction that is required can be significantly reduced. The computer systems could be
programmed to monitor the vital statistics of the launch vehicle and payload , within the
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predetermined acceptability levels, providing notification to a proper authority when the
bounds of acceptable operation are exceeded.
The next area of cost reduction is production. There are many highly skilled
technicians involved in the production of launch vehicles. Production methods are
complicated and time consuming, as are quality assurance procedures of inspection and
testing. The launch vehicles which provide the backbone of the transportation capability in
the U.S. have been around for three decades. There have been evolutionary improvements
in their production process over these three decades, but they are still basically produced in
the same manner that they were in the late 1950's and early 1960's. Advancements made
in production technology have not revolutionized launch vehicle production as they have
automobile and other production. Many people feel that revolutionary new production
technologies for launch vehicles are not only possible but highly desirable. Some of the
production improvements include automated welding and real time automated inspection of
welds 18 , filament winding of large composite tanks, computer integrated paperless
factories which significantly reduce the overhead costs of production, and advances in non-
destructive evaluation techniques which allow for faster and more accurate quality
assurance through automated processes. Production costs can also be reduced significantly
through implementation of commonality in the design.19
18 Malin, V., "Designer's Guide to Effective Welding Automation - Part I: Analysis of Welding Operations
as Objects for Automation", Welding Journal, November 1985, pp. 17-27.
Malin, V., "Designer's Guide to Effective Welding Automation - Part II: Flexibility and Economics",
Welding Journal, June 1986, pp. 43-52.
Malin, V., "Problems in Design of Integrated Welding Automation - Part I: Analysis of Welding-Related
Operations as Objects for Welding Automation", Welding Journal, November 1986, pp. 53-60.
Malin, V., "Problems in Design of Integrated Welding Automation - Part II: Integrated Welding
Automation", Welding Journal, January 1987, pp. 36-44.
19 Waiss, R.D., Boeing Aerospace Co., Cost Reduction on Large Space Systems Through Commonality,
AIAA 25th Aerospace Science Meeting, 12-15 January 1987, Reno, Nevada, AIAA Paper 87-0585.
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The third area which can have a significant impact on cost, and perhaps the most
significant one is utilization. There are two primary categories which are involved in
utilization. The first one has to do simply with how many of the launch vehicles are being
used to place payloads in orbit. This has a very significant effect on both the operations
and production costs by increasing the volume.2 0 With operations, the costs of building
and maintaining the launch facility and personnel are amortized over more launches thereby
reducing the costs associated with each one. Regarding production, as more vehicles are
produced learning curve improvements are made and the fixed costs of production such as
facilities and overhead can be amortized over many more vehicles. This reduces the
average cost of each vehicle. The second area of utilization has to do with the function of
the launch vehicle and the role it performs in the space infrastructure. Historically launch
vehicles have provided only the role of transportation from Earth to orbit. However, in the
new infrastructure there will be the potential for launch vehicles to take on the additional
roles which were described in Chapter 3. If the costs of having launch vehicles perform
these functions is less than having other elements of the infrastructure provide them, then
the launch vehicle will in effect reduce the cost of the overall infrastructure.
4.1.3 NEW ELV PROGRAMS
There are two launch vehicle development programs under serious consideration for
the new space transportation role. The first is the Shuttle-C program under the sponsorship
of NASA, with some Air Force involvement. The Shuttle-C is a shuttle derived vehicle
(SDV) which replaces the orbiter with a payload canister. There have essentially been two
20 Koelle, H.H., "The Future Big Boosters", The Journal of the British Planetarv Institute, Vol. 39, No. 8,
1986, pp. 331-338.
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configurations studied for an SDV. The first has been espoused by Rockwell and Martin
Marietta, and is a side-mounted cargo module which would be positioned much the same as
the orbiter is currently. The propulsion system would be attached to the end of the cargo
module. The second configuration has been studied by Boeing, and is known as the in-line
configuration. This configuration has the cargo container stacked on top of the ET in a
conventional launch vehicle configuration. The propulsion in this case is attached to the aft
end of the ET. Several studies for increasing the lift capability of the STS for cargo
mission- -ave been undertaken since the beginning of the shuttle program.21
The current contracts for the Shuttle C are sponsored by NASA's Marshall Space
Flight Center. Martin Marietta, Rockwell International and United Technologies are the
contractors in a study which began in August of 1987. NASA estimates that from $1 to
$1.5 billion will be required for DDT&E of a 100,000 pound capability Shuttle C, and that
it may begin operations by 1993.22
The second primary program is the Advanced Launch System (ALS). The ALS is a
new launch vehicle with a payload capability on the order of 100,000 lb to LEO, which
utilizes the advances in technology since the shuttle and other ELVs were developed. The
stated objective of the ALS program is to reduce the costs of earth to orbit transportation by
an order of magnitude over current launch costs. The ALS program is under the prime
sponsorship of the Air Force. The SDIO is significantly involved in the program, and one
21 Many studies have been done on this subject. Three representative studies are given below.
Rockwell International, Space Division, Shuttle Growth Study, Concept Preliminary Definition and
Evaluation, NASA Contract NAS8-23015, May 1977.
Martin Marietta Corporation Denver Aerospace Michoud Division, Shuttle Derived Vehicles (SDV)
Technology Requirements Study, NASA-CR-170702, May 1982.
Boeing, In-Line Unmanned Launch Vehicle System Cost Study, Final Report, Contract F04701-82-C-
0151, October 1984.
22 Colucci, F., "Shuttle C Loads Up", SPACE, Vol 4 No 2, March-April 1988, pp. 20-23.
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of its biggest supporters. This new class of launch vehicle is viewed as critical to provide
assured access to space and to provide the lift capability required if SDI is to be deployed.
NASA is also interested in the ALS program, and has provided funding for propulsion
system development.
NASA would like to see the ALS developed, but feels that the Shuttle-C program
can provide a good interim vehicle which will be required to meet demand until the ALS
becomes operational. The ALS has been clearly designated a non-man-rated launch
vehicle, whereas NASA would like to develop the Shuttle C with a man-rated capability.
This places burdens on the Shuttle C design which would not exist otherwise. Space
station launch requirements are cited as one of the primary reasons the Shuttle-C is needed
as an interim vehicle. The NRC recently reported that if a Shuttle-C vehicle were available
for use in space station deployment, it could reduce the time to full operational capability of
the station by 12 to 18 months. However, the report went on to say that:
it is presently unclear what additional uses such a vehicle
would have after the four or five flights needed for
deployment of the Block I Space Station because it is likely
to face competition from a more economical vehicle from the
Advanced Launch System Program.23
The ALS is currently being studied by Boeing, General Dynamics, Hughes,
Lockheed, Martin Marietta, McDonnell Douglas, and United Technologies under one year
contracts to the Air Force. Ultimately it is the goal of the ALS to reduce earth to orbit
transportation costs by an order of magnitude. This goal will be accomplished through a
phased approach, utilizing an interim and an objective configuration. The interim vehicle
23 National Research Council, Report of the Committee on the Space Station of the National Research
Council, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., September 1987, page 21.
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will take advantage of existing technologies and develop a core vehicle which can use solid
rocket motors for thrust augmentation. The interim vehicle will incorporate revolutionary
approaches to launch vehicle production and operations, including such things as paperless
factories (everything on computers), automated fabrication and welding with real time
automated inspection, collocated manufacturing and launch facilities, and incorporation of
artificial intelligence and expert systems for launch processing and checkout. It is estimated
that the interim core vehicle can be operational by 1993 if full scale development begins in
1989.
The objective system of the ALS will add a fully reusable flyback booster,
eliminating the need for the solids and increasing the lift capability of the core. The flyback
booster is similar in concept to those studied for use with the shuttle. Because of funding
and technology concerns, the flyback booster for the shuttle was eliminated in favor of the
SRBs. The ALS contractors feel that the technology level for hot structures, propulsion
systems, and other technologies associated with a flyback booster have improved
considerably since the early shuttle studies. The objective system will follow the interim
ALS system by five years, beginning operational service in 1998. Part of the rationale
behind having the ALS program divided into an interim and objective phase is to distribute
the funding over two peaks, and to ensure at least a vehicle with the capabilities of the
interim system.24
U.S. policy appears clear in its commitment to a new class of vehicle to augment
the shuttle in its role as the nation's space transportation system. The question of whether
the Shuttle C or the ALS will be developed remains open. The situation between these two
launch vehicles is similar in many respects to that between the B-1 bomber and the
24 Colucci, F., "ALS: The Cost Cutter", SPACE, Vol 3 No 4, September-October 1987, pp. 18-21.
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advanced technology stealth bomber. While everyone would like the advances inherent in
the higher technology project, the waiting period may be unacceptable. Developing a
vehicle that will be obsolete when the new vehicle arrives is an argument against the lower
technology program. The B-1 has been developed and the advanced technology bomber is
under development.2 5 It is too early to tell what will come of the ALS and Shuttle C
dilemma.
The Air Force and NASA are participating in both studies, and the results of the
studies are to go to a joint DoD/NASA steering committee. Funding for the Shuttle-C was
deleted in the FY 1989 budget by the OMB in favor of an advanced solid rocket motor for
the shuttle. However, NASA told Shuttle C contractors that it intends to award a second
phase contract to all three of them.26 If the Shuttle C is developed, the interim ALS vehicle
probably will not be, and vice versa. Regardless, the plan appears to lead to the
development of an objective ALS vehicle as a follow on to either early capability vehicle.
It is hoped that the joint steering committee will arrive at a development strategy by the end
of 1988.27
4.1.4 SHUTTLE CENTAUR CANCELLATION
From its inception, the space shuttle was to carry in its cargo bay high energy upper
stages. This upper stage would carry liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen propellants to
25 Kotz, Nick, "Money, Politics, and the B-1 Bomber", Technology Review, April 1988, pp. 30-40.
26 "Agencies Discuss Impact of ALS On Shuttle-C Cargo Launcher", Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 29 February 1988, page 25.
27 Colucci, F., "Shuttle C Loads Up", SPACE, Vol 4 No 2, March-April 1988, pp. 20-23.
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propel large payloads to GEO and provide the necessary AV for interplanetary missions.
Known as the space tug in early studies, the shuttle compatible vehicle eventually became a
derivative of the Centaur upper stage used for Atlas and Titan ELVs. The first applications
for the Shuttle/Centaur as it came to be known were the Galileo and Ulysses missions that
were scheduled to fly in May of 1986. The DoD was planning to use Shuttle/Centaur for at
least seven launches, including Block 2 Milstar advanced military communications
spacecraft and Defense Support Program (DSP) missile early warning satellites.28
After the Challenger disaster, concern for safety has been paramount in the minds
of all involved in the space program. There had been serious concern and much attention
given to the safety of the Shuttle/Centaur in the shuttle's cargo bay prior to 28 January
1986. Although the Centaur had performed reliably for 20 years with unmanned ELVs,
integration with the manned shuttle introduced unique safety issues. The liquid oxygen and
liquid hydrogen in the vehicle had the potential for a devastating explosion. Primary safety
issues were fueling the Centaur in the orbiter payload bay, shuttle launch loads and
particularly shuttle launch aborts.29 These safely issues led NASA to cancel the program
on 19 June 1986. More than $470 million had been spent by NASA and the Air Force on
Shuttle Centaur development, and $411 million by NASA for flight hardware. However, it
is likely that some of the hardware developed can be used on unmanned ELV programs.3 0
28 "NASA Cancels Shuttle/Centaur Because of Safety Concerns", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 23
June 1986, page 16.
29 Covault, C., Foley, T., "Shuttle Centaur Flight Safety Issues Threaten Launch Planning", Aviation
Week & Space Technology, 12 May 1986, page 18-19.
30 "NASA Cancels Shuttle/Centaur Because of Safety Concerns", Aviation Week & Space Technologv, 23
June 1986, page 16.
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The cancellation of Shuttle/Centaur in conjunction with the loss of the Challenger
has caused a delay of at least six years in the Galileo mission. The upper stages which
exist as replacements to the Shuttle/Centaur are not as powerful and their missions will
require trajectory delays in addition to launch delays. The Galileo will at best have a 3.5
year launch delay and a 2.5 year trajectory delay. 31
The implications of this NASA policy place serious doubts on the ability of the
shuttle to provide cryogenic propellants to orbiting propellant depots. Studies on
techniques for transportation of cryogenic propellants to orbit have concentrated on use of
storage tanks in the shuttle cargo bay, or in an aft cargo carrier (ACC).3 2 ,33 If the shuttle
is to carry cryogenic propellants to orbit, the safety issues which led to cancellation of the
shuttle Centaur will have to be addressed.
The use of the shuttle as a transportation vehicle for cryogenic propellants to orbit
was included in the infrastructure diagram in Figure 3.1 as option A. Following
cancellation of the shuttle Centaur program, the option provided by the shuttle for
propellant transportation is in serious question. The new class of ELV as discussed in the
previous section provides a solution to this dilemma. The ELV can provide propellant to
orbit in either of the scenarios presented by infrastructure B or C.
31 Dornheim, M.A., "Galileo Mission Will Be Delayed Six Years by Shuttle/Centaur Loss", Aviation
Week & Space Technology, 30 June 1986, pp. 18-19.
32 Fester, D., Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace, Earth-to-Orbit Propellant Transportation Overview,
NASA document N85-17002, 1985.
33 Rockwell International, Space Transportation Systems Division, Space Transportation System (STS)
Propellant Scavenging System Study. Final Report. Volume 1. Technical Report, NASA-CR-171848,
January 1985, page 2.
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NASA concerns for safety are primarily with the crew. Unmanned vehicles are not
subject to the same safety criteria as are "man-rated" vehicles. While ELVs have been used
for manned missions, including the Atlas and Titan which are currently in use, none are
currently man-rated. There are no plans to make the ALS a man-rated vehicle.
4.2 SPACE POLICY MAKERS
The roles of policy making for space have been fairly distinct in the past, with
government the dominant if not exclusive participant. Military programs have been
assigned to the appropriate branch of the service, predominantly the Air Force, under DoD
and Congressional oversight. Civilian programs have been the domain of NASA, under
budget approval and oversight of the Congress. The launch tragedy that destroyed the
Challenger has prompted stronger involvement in space policy by government agencies
other than NASA and DoD. These tendencies were apparent prior to January 1986, but
strengthened afterwards. Agencies with program and/or policy interests in the civilian
space program include the Departments of Transportation, Commerce, Agriculture,
Energy, Interior, and State, the Federal Communication Commission, and the National
Science Foundation. 3 4 With the space program in a state of disarray, corporate and
academic leaders are also making policy recommendations.
34 Smith, Marcia, The First Quarter Century of Spaceflight, Futures. October 1982, Pages 353-373.
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4.2.1 NASA / DOD
There was a conscious separation of civil and military space programs by President
Eisenhower in the 1950s. The policy of separation between civil and military space
programs was formalized when the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 created
NASA. In section 102(b) of the act, NASA is given responsibility for aeronautical and
space activities with the exception that:
...activities peculiar to or primarily associated with the
development of weapons systems, military operations, or the
defense of the United States (including the research and
development necessary to make effective provision for the
defense of the United States) shall be the responsibility of,
and shall be directed by, the Department of Defense...35
Any disputes over jurisdiction between NASA and DoD are to be settled by the
National Aeronautics and Space Council, which is composed of the Vice President who is
chairman, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the NASA Administrator, and the Chairman
of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC). It is also the responsibility of the Council to
"advise and assist the President, as he may request, with respect to the performance of
functions in the aeronautics and space field." In the original version of the act, Section 204
created a Civilian-Military Liaison Committee which was to serve as a link between the
activities of the civil and military space programs, and as a forum for dispute resolution.
The committee was abolished in 1965, with its functions transferred to the President.
In response to the mutual interests of civil and military space programs, a Space
Technology Interdependency Working Group was jointly initiated in December 1973 by the
35 United States Congress, National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Public Law 85-568, 29 July
1958.
112
Air Force Systems Command (AFSC), and NASA. The purpose of this group was to
exchange status briefings of programs that were of mutual interest to military and civil
space. There are a number of committees and liaison offices which function to facilitate
communication and cooperation between the civil and military space programs. Some of
these are: the Senior Interagency Group / Space (SIG/Space), the Aeronautics and
Astronautics Coordinating Board (AACB), NASA's Military Liaison Office, and the Space
Transportation System (STS) Liaison Office at the Air Force Space Division.3 6 Mutual
interests in space technology between civil and military programs led to a formal
AFSC/NASA Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This memorandum was signed on
25 May 1982, creating a Space Technology Interdependency Group (STIG). The purpose
of the MOU is to:
"establish the relationships and responsibilities of the STIG.
The STIG is charged with identifying candidate programs
and encouraging joint AFSC/NASA dependent and
interdependent technology programs and monitoring the
status of these programs to help ensure successful
implementation and completion." 3 7
The scope of the civil and military space programs can be summarized by the
budget comparison in Figure 4.4. Starting out at roughly the same level of funding, the
civil program rapidly grew during the manned exploration period of Mercury, Gemini and
Apollo to a peak in the mid 1960s. Funding for the civil program then decreased sharply t-
a roughly constant level from the mid 1970s to the present. Military spending remained
36 CAST, ASEB, CETS, NRC, Space Technology to Meet Future Needs, National Academy Press,
Washington, D.C., 1987, page 18.
37 AFSC/NASA Memorandum of Understanding: Space Technology Interdependency Group (STIG), 25
May 1982.
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essentially constant through the 1960s. As the civil program spending slowed in the early
1970s, military spending declined as well. Military presence in space was essential for
surveillance, communications, and early warning in the late 1970s and spending was on the
rise. By 1982, Military spending had passed civil spending and the gap continues to grow.
This gap will likely continue to grow as SDI progresses. This should be the case unless
the program is cut or NASA is successful in securing large amounts of funding for a major
program such as return to the Moon or a manned Mars mission.
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Figure 4.4
space program funding in constant FY88 dollars.38
38 Budget of the United States Government, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1960-
1989.
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4.2.2 DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
In response to the development of a commercial space launch industry, the
Congress passed into law the Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984 on 9 October 1984.
The purpose of this bill is:
"to establish a framework within which expendable
launch vehicles (ELVs) and their associated facilities and
launch services may be licensed for commercial launches."39
The Department of Transportation (DOT) was designated by President Reagan as
the Federal Government's lead agency for commercial launch activities in November 1983,
and this was more formally followed in February 1984 with Executive Order 12465. This
formalized DOT as the Federal focal point for private sector space launches, and it tasked
DOT with aiding commercial operators to identify and satisfy the requirements of other
Federal agencies regarding commercial space activities. The Commercial Space Launch Act
furthered this role by designating DOT as "the lead Federal agency to facilitate and expedite
the issuance and transfer of commercial space launch licenses". In response to these tasks,
the DOT created the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (OCST).
The DOT has been coming under criticism for not effectively dealing with the
problems associated with a commercial launch industry. The OCST had been operating for
nearly three years without in-house technical experts when Madeline Johnson, who was
head of the office resigned on 30 September 1986. The Commercial Space Transportation
Advisory Committee (COMSTAC), which includes representatives from the ELV industry
and the financial and insurance community, had recommended to former Secretary Dole the
39 United States Code Conressional and Administrative News. 98th Congress - Second Session. 1984,
Legislative History of Public Law 98-532, The Commercial Space Launch Act, Pages 5328-5346.
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hiring of engineers familiar with ELVs into the office. The office is facing difficulties
implementing the changes necessary to bolster its effectiveness in promoting commercial
space transportation. It had requested an increased budget of $2.27 million for FY 87 but
its budget was frozen at the 1986 level of $575,000.40 The OCST request for FY 88 is $4
million, a significant increase from past years, with the intent of increasing staffing and
performing regulatory research pertaining to the ELV industry.4 1 The funding profile for
the office can be seen in Figure 4.5, with the Presidential budget requests for FY 88 and
89.
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Office of Commercial Space Transportation Funding Profile.42
40 "Management of Commercial Space Transportation Office May Be Reorganized", Aviation Week &
Space Technology, 29 September 1986, Page 16.
41 "Companies Submit Commercial ELV License Requests", Aviation Week & Space Technology. 16
March 1987. Page 26.
42 Budget of the United States Government. FY 1986-1989, U.S. Government Printing Office,
Washington, D.C., 1984-1987.
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Courtney Stadd was appointed Director of the OCST in early 1987 to replace
Johnson, and has made improvements in the operations of the office. As can be seen from
the figure, the funding for the office is gradually increasing. The OCST has recently
received several mission review and launch license requests, indicating the rising
expectations of the commercial launch industry.4 3 As the industry grows, so will the
OCST.
4.2.3 OTHERS
Corporate and academic leaders are concerned about the policy of the U.S.
regarding space development, and in a recent forum they made some recommendations.
The forum's report is titled "Space, America's New Competitive Frontier". In the report
some of the recommendations include:
* Reduced space transport costs.
* More time in space for microgravity research.
* Promotion of multi-industry consortia or joint ventures.
* Greater protection for intellectual property.
* A more coherent approach to government-industry relations.
The report states that
There is reason to be concerned about the adequacy of
general federal funding for basic science. Furthermore,
43 Foley, Theresa M., "First U.S. Commercial Sales of ELVs Expected in 1987", Aviation Week & Space
Technology. 9 March 1987, Page 113.
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there is a need for better linkages between science and
applications across the board.44
Evidence of the shift from DoD and NASA dominance in U.S. space policy is
found in the latest National Space Policy, released 11 February 1988 by the White House.
The policy was written by the interagency White House Economic Policy Council, with
heavy influence from the Commerce, Transportation and Treasury departments.45
4.3 FUNDING
Funding the the space program in the U.S. has been almost entirely from the
Federal Government. The two significant recipients of federal funding are NASA for the
civil space program and the DoD for the military space program. The DoD budget for the
defense space program exceeded that of NASA for the civil program in 1982 for the first
time. DoD spending for space is mostly program oriented development and operations,
with the exception of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the
Stragtegic Defense Initiative (SDI). NASA has more funding available for research and
technology development than does the DoD and their role as chartered by the NAS Act of
1958 is to develop generic space technology for all U.S. space interests. 46 There has been
limited private sector funding for space research and technology development in the past,
but as commercial ventures begin to develop the potential for private funding of space
4 4
"Corporate, Academic Leaders Recommend Space Agenda for Next 10 Years", Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 16 June 1986, page 89.
45 Foley, Theresa M., "U.S. Opens Low-Earth Orbit To Commercial Development", Aviation Week &
Space Technology, 22 February 1988, page 21.
46 CAST, ASEB, CETS, NRC, Space Technologv to Meet Future Needs, National Academy Press,
Washington, D.C., 1987, page 45.
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grows considerably. These three primary sources of funding for the space program will be
addressed in the following sections.
Total funding for space in the U.S. is shown in Figure 4.6. Private funding is not
shown but to date it has been very small in comparison to government spending on the civil
and military space programs. It is interesting to note from the figure that the total spending
for space has gone through tremendous changes, and is now at the level it was in the mid
1960s when the civil space program was so strong. However, the ratios have changed and
the majority of the funding is going to the military now.
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Figure 4.6
U.S. space program by civil and military programs
in constant FY88 dollars.47
The level of funding appears to correspond to the degree of focus of the respective
programs. The focus of the civil program was very sharp during its funding peak, namely
47 Budget of the United States Government, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1960-
1989.
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to place a man on the Moon and to return him safely to Earth. Military applications in space
are focused now. Various satellite programs for communications, navigation, surveillance
and early warning, and the launch vehicle programs necessary to maintain and improve on
existing satellite systems provide this focus. The SDI also provides a strong focus for
military space. Conversely, during the funding sag between the two peaks, the focus of
either program was not as clearly defined as it was at the peak.
4.3.1 CIVIL
Funding for the civil space program in the U.S. rises and falls with the political
climate. This is true to some degree with any program, but the space program is
particularly vulnerable in that it is viewed as discretionary spending. Unlike social
programs and defense, it is not viewed as vital to the operation and security of the country.
The Committee on Advanced Space Technology of the National Research Council (NRC)
challenged this view in a recent report when they said:
Space activities should be more than a discretionary element
of U.S. government and private efforts: a sustained effort is
essential to national defense and economic well being.
Communications, navigation, and Earth observations
(meteorological, oceanic, and land) are supported
operationally by space systems of the public and private
sectors. 4 8
The historical funding patterns for NASA are indicated in Figure 4.7. The NASA
budget is shown in constant FY88 millions, and as a percentage of the Federal budget.
48 CAST, ASEB, CETS, NRC, Space Technology to Meet Future Needs, National Academy Press,
Washington, D.C., 1987, page 13.
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Figure 4.7
NASA funding history.49
The budget grew rapidly in response to the race for the moon with the Soviets.
Peaking in 1966 at over 23 billion, the annual budget declined rapidly to a level between
seven and eight billion. It has been at this level since 1974, the year prior to the last Apollo
flight. An upward shift in the funding level for FY88 is proposed in the current budget, to
fund the new shuttle orbiter and the space station. The proposed budget plan has the
annual NASA funding level stabilizing at approximately $10 billion in the early 1990s.
NASAs funding history for the space research and technology portion of their budget is
indicated in Figure 4.8.
49 Historical Tables: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1989, Executive Office of the
President, Office of Management and Budget, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1987.
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Funding history for NASA Space Research and Technology.50
Space research and technology funding parallels closely the patterns seen in the
overall NASA budget, but the rises proposed in the future are more pronounced.
4.3.2 MILITARY
Military funding for space is less volatile and less susceptible to major changes due
to political shifts than is civil funding. The military program enjoys a role of necessity for
applications such as surveillance and communications. If a decision is made to deploy
SDI, military operations in space will increase considerably, as will the budget. The rise in
military spending for space is illustrated in Figure 4.9.
50 Historical Tables: Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1989, Executive Office of the
President, Office of Management and Budget, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1987.
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Military space funding history in constant FY88 dollars.51
It is evident from the figure that military spending in space is increasing steadily to
high levels. The increase begins with the Reagan administration, and is reflective of the
Presidents strong commitment to defense, to the military space program and to the
development of the Strategic Defense Initiative.
4.3.3 PRIVATE SECTOR
Direct funding from the private sector will be made for research and development,
and for construction, launching and operation of orbital systems. However, the level of
funding will be relatively low in relation to government funding until the feasibility of
commercial space operations has been better established.
51 Budget of the United States Government, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1960-
1989.
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As the commercial space industry grows, a significant amount of indirect funding
will also be provided by the private sector. Profits from commercial space activities will
provide tax revenue which can eventually offset federal expenditures for a civil space
program.. An OTA study addressed this issue as shown in Table 4.1.
Government space expenditure net cost
Tax Revenues A constant $7 billion/ $7 billion (1983)
Years growth @ 15%/year year (1983) increasing at 1%/year
0 (1983) 0.5 6.5 6.5
5 (1988) 1.0 6.0 6.4
10 (1993) 2.0 5.0 5.7
15 (1998) 4.1 2.9 4.0
20 (2003) 8.2 (1.2) 0.3
25 (2008) 16.0 (9.5) (7.5)
Table 4.1
Effect on tax revenues from space commerce on net Federal civil space expenditures.52
4.5 COMMERCIALIZATION OF SPACE
The exploration and development of space began purely as a government sponsored
program. The costs were high and the paybacks were not profitable in a monetary sense.
As the program progressed, some technologies emerged which had good potential for
52 United States Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Civilian Space Stations and the U.S. Future
in Space, OTA-STI-241, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., November 1984, pp. 220-
221.
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commercialization. The Reagan administration has made several policy implementations
aimed at developing the commercialization of space. Two of the biggest commercialization
efforts have been for remote sensing and ELVs. On 11 February 1988, President Reagan's
new National Space Policy was released. The policy has the resolute aim of developing
more commercial operations in space. Regarding general commercial activities, the policy
states that the government will purchase "commercially available space goods to the fullest
extent feasible," and will not conduct operations on its own that impede commercial space
activities. 53
In a 1986 address before the International Conference and Exhibition on the
Commercial and Industrial Uses of Outer Space, Congressman Don Fuqua, Chairman of
the House Committee on Science and Technology, stated:
The general idea of space commercialization was visionary in
the early seventies, with credibility as a concept but not, by
any means, as a workable arrangement. Like any new idea,
it has come through the tumbling and polishing process that
brings to bear the practicalities imposed by the various
participants in its eventual implementation.
We are beginning to see a gradual increase in the number of
industries that are willing to move from the talking stage of
"commercial uses of space" to a strategy for the
experimentation and testing of a product or technology. It is
important to understand that this evolutionary process moves
at a different rate in each and every situation. The
communications satellite industry has surely led the pack.
There also seems to be considerable potential for specialized
pharmaceuticals and certain materials.
53 Covault, Craig, "Space Policy Outlines Program To Regain U.S. Leadership", Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 22 February 1988, page 20.
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Despite commercial development in particular areas,
however, I believe there has been a general frustration and
disappointment in the private sector that the ideas and visions
that seemed to be racing full-speed ahead in the talking stage
now appear to be parked on an interim plateau.
I think some of this dissillusionment comes from a
discrepancy between the pace of the process versus the level
of expectation. I would urge the industrial community not to
abandon its initial optimism.5 4
Commercialization of products and services in space has many barriers which make
it much more difficult to establish than earth based commercialization. There are five
primary barriers to space commercialization that can be characterized as forms of risk.
They are:
* Technical Risk: uncertainties regarding new technological
developments with no guarantee of success.
* Institutional Risk: changes in government regulations and
policies, and long lead times for agreements and approvals.
* Government Market Risk: funding patterns can change, and
when the government is primary customer, the market for
goods and services can collapse.
* Commercial Market Risk: uncertainty over what the
competition will be, and the stability of unproven markets.
* Access Risk: space transportation systems are not 100%
reliable, and a launch failure could be a serious setback.
54 Fuqua, Don, U.S. Congress, Space Commercialization Legislation, Space Commerce '86, 16-20 June
1986, Montreux, Switzerland, Conference Proceedings, page 151.
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Launch commitments are not necessarily firm, and dates may
slip considerably. 55
There are several methods the government has initiated to mitigate the risks
associated with commercial ventures in space. Among the methods are:
* Research and Development Tax Credit: this credit provides
the ability to deduct most of the investment against ordinary
income, and allows future returns to be treated as long-term
capital gains.
* Technical Exchange Agreement (TEA): technical information
is exchanged between companies and NASA and parties
cooperate on ground based research and analyses. Each
party funds their own role.
* Industrial Guest Investigator (IGI): parties share scientific
interest. Company assigns scientist at company expense to
collaborate with NASA principal investigator on space flight
experiment. Both parties benefit.
* Joint Endeavor Agreement (JEA): Company does studies,
planning, research, development, and applications
demonstrations, and agrees to make results to U.S. industry
on reasonable terms. NASA provides Shuttle flight time,
and some protection to JEA partner. No funds change
hands. 56
55 Oderman, M.R., The Center for Space Policy, Inc., The Transition to Space Commerce, Space
Commerce '86, 16-20 June 1986, Montreux, Switzerland, Conference Proceedings, pp. 67-80.
56 Viriglio, G., "Economic Aspects of Space Industrialization", Earth-Oriented Applications of Space
Technology, Vol. 6, No. 1, 1986, pp. 61-63.
127
4.5.1 REMOTE SENSING COMMERCIALIZATION
In February 1983 President Reagan authorized the process which would lead to the
transfer of the civil land remote sensing satellite program (LANDSAT) to the private sector.
Secretary of Commerce Malcolm Baldrige established the Interagency Board on Civil
Operational Earth-Observing Satellite Systems (IB-COESS) to oversee the competitive
process. IB-COESS was tasked with setting the policy framework for the request for
proposal (RFP). The Departments of Commerce, State and Defense, as well as NASA
were represented on IB-COESS. A Source Evaluation Board (SEB) was created to issue
the RFP and evaluate the proposals, seven of which were received by 10 March 1984.
Three of the proposals were recommended by the SEB and Secretary Baldridge authorized
negotiations with two of them, Eastman Kodak Company and EOSAT (Earth Observing
Satellite Company), a joint venture of Hughes Aircraft Company and RCA Corporation.
EOSAT was selected.57
The Congress was preparing the necessary legislation for the transfer of LANDSAT
to the private sector during the proposal and selection process. On 17 July 1984, the Land
Remote Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984 took effect. Among the findings in Title I
Section 101 of the act were that:
· The private sector, and in particular the "value-added"
industry, is best suited to develop land remote-sensing data
markets
* There is doubt that the private sector alone can currently
develop a total land remote-sensing system because of the
high risk and large capital expenditure involved
57 Marshall, H., U.S. Department of State, "US Space Commercialization - Effects on Space Law and
Domestic Law", SPACE POLICY, May 1985, page 205.
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* Cooperation between the Federal Government and private
industry can help assure both data continuity and United
States leadership
* certain Government oversight must be maintained to assure
that private sector activities are in the national interest and
that the international commitments and policies of the United
States are honored5 8
There is a recognition by the government that private industry is better suited than
government to pursue commercial development of space programs. However, there is also
the recognition that support from the government is needed, and that oversight may be
required to ensure policy compliance. This oversight is of particular importance to the State
Department, which has the authority to ensure that commercial remote sensing activities are
conducted in accordance with international agreements and international space law.
4.5.2 ELV COMMERCIALIZATION
A second major thrust for commercialization has been for expendable launch
vehicles. Legislative initiatives to commercialize ELVs began in 1981, and on 16 May
1983, President Reagan issued a policy directive on commercialization of ELVs. This
policy declared that the U.S. government would facilitate commercial operation of ELVs by
the private sector. The policy applied to launch vehicles previously developed for
government use (Atlas, Delta, Titan) as well as for newly developed commercial vehicles.
On 30 October 1984, the Commercial Space Launch Act was passed into law,
designating the Department of Transportation as the focal point of the U.S. government for
58 United States Congress, Land Remote-Sensing Commercialization Act of 1984, Public Law 98-365, 17
July 1984, (italics added).
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commercial space transportation. Among the findings of the Congress in Section 2 of the
Act were that:
* private applications of space technology have achieved a
significant level of commercial economic activity, and offer
the potential for growth in the future, particularly in the U.S.
* the private sector in the U.S. has the capability of developing
and providing private satellite launching and associated
services that would complement the launch associated
services now available from the U.S. government
* provision of launch services by the private sector is
consistent with the national security interests and foreign
policy interests of the United States and would be facilitated
by stable, minimal, and appropriate regulatory guidelines
that are fairly and expeditiously applied
· the United States should encourage private sector launches
and associated services and, only to the extent necessary,
regulate such launch and services in order to ensure
compliance with international obligations of the U.S. and to
protect the public health and safety, safety of property, and
national security interests and foreign policy interests of the
United States. 59
There are a number of agreements that any commercial launch venture must make
with the government prior to a launch. The first is for the government to authorize use by
the company of the launch vehicle commercially. The technology involved in any of the
three primary commercial launch vehicles is owned by the government. In addition, any
commercial launch must use government facilities, because no others exist and independent
construction would be prohibitive.
59 United States Congress, Commercial Space Launch Act of 1984, Public Law 98-575, 30 October 1984,
(italics added).
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Conditions for use of the launch facilities and the liabilities of launch are issues of
concern with the new industry. The Air Force recently released a draft agreement for
commercial use of the expendable launcher facilities, which was not well received by the
launch industry. An open industry review of the draft was held, at which the specific
complaints were aired. Some of the major complaints registered by the Commercial Space
Transportation Advisory Committee (COMSTAC) were:
· The agreement is biased to the parochial interests of the
government.
* The commercial operator would be exposed to very high risk
due to unlimited requirements for third party liability
insurance.
* Lack of definition of clear costing principles of services
provided by the government.
* The agreement overburdens the government with monitor
and control responsibilities.
* The agreement places demands for data disclosure which
may compromise company proprietary data.
* The agreement places severe burdens on new entrants.
· The agreement does not address schedule priority for
commercial users sharing government facilities.60
These difficulties have been settled, and General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas
and Martin Marietta have come to agreement with the government over use of launch
facilities for commercial launch. McDonnell Douglas hopes to launch the first commercial
launch vehicle in the U.S. in October 1988.61 Costs are still relatively high for commercial
launch services, but competition is expected to drive the cost down and create an
60 "Industry Group Criticizes Air Force Draft Agreement on ELVs", Aviation Week & Space Technology,
16 February 1987, page 23.
61 "Industry Observer", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27 February 1988, page 11.
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environment more oriented to the user. Concerns of launch service buyers that are being
addressed by manufacturers include contract terms, launch delays, payment plans, liability,
and scheduling.62
The commercial market for space launch vehicles is international in scope. There
are many countries involved in selling launch services in addition to the United States.
Included in the competition for commercial space launches are the Soviet Union, China, the
European Space Agency, and within the next few years, Japan. Since its inception in
1975, the European Space Agency (ESA) has been developing a launch capability that
would establish the independence of a European space program from the U.S. and the
Soviet Union. The Ariane launch vehicle was the fruit of this effort. First launched on 24
December 1979 an Ariane 1 made the first commercial flight for ESA on 23 May 1984.
The Chinese are rapidly entering the commercial launch market with a range of
launch vehicles capable of delivering nearly 10,000 pounds to LEO.63 The Great Wall
Industry Corporation is the official representative of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
in the commercial launch arena. They have secured several launch agreements from U.S.
customers.6 4
The Soviet Union has established a civilian space agency called Gavkosmos which
will manage their own, as well as cooperative commercial space ventures. They have an
62 "Satellite Customers Call For Change in Launch Policies", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 27
February 1988, page 23.
63 Brodsky, Robert F., et. al., "Foreign Launch Competition Growing", Aerospace America, July 1986,
page 38.
64 "China Wins Launch Reservations for Three More U.S. Satellites", Aviation Week & Sace
Technology, 24 November 1986, page 20.
"Chinese Make Inroads on Commercial Launch Market", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 9 March
1987, page 134.
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operational launch system consisting of eight types of vehicles, which they use to routinely
conduct about 100 space launches per year. The vehicle being marketed is the Proton (SL-
12 and SL-13) launch system. Soviet efforts in commercial space launches are targeted at
Eutelsat and third world countries. They are offering substantial discounts and insurance
packages to developing countries. Western payloads are also being sought, but concerns
over technology transfer is preventing shipment to the USSR of satellites containing U.S.
parts which are considered sensitive. However, the Soviets are making customs
exemptions by offering that the payloads could be shipped in sealed containers to the Soviet
launch site. No agreements have yet been reached.65
The Japanese are aggressively pursuing the commercial launch market. They are
positioning themselves to compete for a share in the global space market with the same
efficiency they brought to the automobile and electronics markets. With strong backing
from the Japanese government, research agencies and manufacturers in Japan have
developed a fleet of launch vehicles. From their Tanegashima Space Center, the Japanese
have launched 14 large vehicles since 1975. They are currently using their H-1 launch
vehicle for domestic launch services, and plan to market their H-2 vehicle for commercial
launches when it becomes operational in 1992.66
India has a developing space program with potential as a competitor in the space
transportation market, but on a more modest scale than the other nations. The Indian Space
65 "Soviets Discuss Proton Payload Exemptions", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 12 January 1987,
page 33.
66 "Japan Preparing New Spaceport Facilities for H-I, H-2 Rockets", Aviation Week & Space Technology,
14 July 1986, page 51.
133
Research Organization has flight tested satellite launch vehicles which are expected to enter
service within the decade, and has plans for a GEO launch vehicle in the 1990's.6 7
4.5.2 FUTURE COMMERCIALIZATION PROSPECTS
There are a number of areas which offer potential for commercialization in space.
Administration policies have facilitated the commercialization of remote sensing and launch
vehicles, and have helped to open the door for a partially commercial space station.
Commercialization areas are many. Those with potential for private investment are
summarized in Table 4.2, by the applications, the systems and services to be provided, and
estimates as to when they might begin to attract private investment.
APPLICATIONS SYSTEMS / SERVICES DATE
* Transportation
* Communications
* Expendable launchers
* Upper Stages
* 2nd generation Shuttle
* Orbital Transfer Vehicles
* Solar Sails
* 30/20 GHz System
* Large communications platforms
* Remote servicing
* 2nd/3rd generation 30/20 GHz Systems
· now in service
* now in service
* 2000
* 2000
* 2010
* 1988
* after 1990
* after 1995
* 2000
67 Mama, H.P., "Launch Vehicle Developments", SPACEFLIGHT, Volume 28, December 1986, page
433.
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* Remote sensing
(active and passive)
* General land remote sensing
* Special purpose platforms for minerals
exploration, land use planning, crop
assessment
* Weather (special purpose warning
systems)
* Geostationary platforms
* now in service
* after 1985
* after 1990
* 2000
* Materials
processing/
manufacturing
* Furnaces, processing modules
* Large scale construction in space
* Lunar-based mining/processing
* Small multipurpose platforms for
manufacturing, testing (LEO)
* GEO platform (communications,
remote sensing)
* Large space structures
* currently
* after 1990
* 2010
* Space power
* Navigation
* Small photovoltaic systems
* Large photovoltaic systems
* Thermal-electric systems
* Advanced photovoltaic systems
* Advanced thermal, nuclear systems
* Small, special purpose system
Table 4.2
Potential commercialization areas for private investment.68
The next significant area for commercialization is the space station. In his new
national space policy released on 11 February 1988, President Reagan is
68 Williamson, R., Office of Technology Assessment, "Commercialization of Space - the Investment
Opportunities", SPACE POLICY, May 1985, pp. 210-211.
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* Structures
* 1985
* 2010
* 2020
* currently
* 1995
* 1995
* 2000
* 2010
* 1990
proposing actions to encourage private-sector investment,
including directing NASA to rely to the greatest extent
feasible on private sector design, financing, construction and
operation of future station requirements.6 9
An offshoot of the new space policy is the development of commercial space
platforms in LEO which provide a manned presence to augment space station and shuttle
operations. Two companies have been pursuing this type of development for the past few
years. 70 Space Industries is developing an Industrial Space Facility (ISF) which is a free-
flying platform, man-tended by the space shuttle. Space Industries is a partnership
between Space Industries, Inc., and Wespace, a Westinghouse subsidiary. Boeing also
plays a limited role in the partnership. Lockheed and Eagle Engineering are involved in the
design of the ISF. Spacehab, Inc., is developing the spacehab module which is to be
carried in the shuttle bay to provide increased manned habitation volume for either the space
shuttle or the space station. Spacehab is associated with McDonnell Douglas, Aeritalia
(Italian), and United Technologies.7'
The new space policy lays a framework whereby these commercial facilities can be
given guaranteed leasing agreements from the government. Although the policy is clear in
not providing direct government subsidies, provisions for guaranteed leasing arrangements
allow private financing ventures to attract investors. This approach is known as the
6 9 A White House source, quoted in the following article:
Covault, Craig, "Space Policy Outlines Program To Regain U.S. Leadership", Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 22 February 1988, page 21.
70 Maclennan, D., "Space for Rent", Saceflight, Vol. 30, April 1988, pp. 138-140.
71 Foley, Theresa M., "U.S. Space Platform Firms Aim for 1991 Service Start", Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 29 February 1988, pp. 36-41.
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"anchor tenant" concept, and is being incorporated by NASA in a recent request by
Marshall Space Flight Center for access to a leased space platform. Congress has provided
$25 million to NASA in the 1988 budget to be placed in an escrow account and held for
payment of lease obligations until service is delivered.7 2
4.6 INTERNATIONAL SPACE POLICY
The first words in the NAS Act of 1958 state that "The Congress hereby declares
that it is in the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted to
peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind." The act goes on to state that the
objectives of the new agency shall include
The preservation of the role of the United States as a leader
in aeronautical and space science and technology and in the
application thereof...
Cooperation by the United States with other nations and
groups of nations in work done pursuant to this Act and in
the peaceful application of the results thereof...73
There is inherent in these two objectives a conflict between competition and
cooperation that is manifest in U.S. international space policy. The space programs of the
U.S. and the Soviet Union have been pitted against each other since the Soviets launched
Sputnik in 1958. The space race was an individual sport and for a long time, only these
72 "NASA Space Platform Specifications Resemble Industrial Space Facility's", Aviation Week & Space
Technology, 29 February 1988, page 29.
73 United States Congress, National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, Public Law 85-568, 29 July
1958.
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two superpowers were players. Competition was a motivating political factor behind the
funding for U.S. civil space program. Nonetheless, these two competing superpowers
cooperated to create the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) which took place in 1975.
The U.S. and the Soviet Union have concerns regarding multilateral cooperation
and technology transfer in addition to their bilateral concerns. There has generally in the
past been a strong willingness on the part of the superpowers to share their space programs
with other nations. However, there is a limit to that sharing and the U.S. and the Soviet
Union want to reserve their right to exploit the resources of space. The concept of space as
being the "common heritage of mankind" is similar to the concept for the ocean resources.
The two major space powers however, never ratified the UN space treaty, primarily over
the issue of exploitation of lunar resources.74 This unwillingness to sign the treaty is
reflective of the concerns these two nations have over the potential for exploitation of space
and the issue of competition for those resources, and in the space race.
It is important to realize that while several other nations besides the U.S. and the
Soviet Union are entering space, the level of their expenditure on space in both real terms
and percent of GNP fall far behind these two leaders. Figure 4.10 indicates the
expenditures of the five nations which had the highest funding, as well as the European
Space Agency (ESA).
74 Jasentuliyana, N., "The UN Space Treaties and the Common Heritage Principle", SPACE POLICY,
November 1986, page 296.
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Figure 4.10
National Space Budgets Compared - 1984 (US Billion $FY84).75
The domination of the U.S. and the Soviet Union in space expenditures, hence
space programs, is clear. This dominanation is not only in the real terms of actual dollars
spent, but in relative terms as percent of GNP spent on space. This point is made by
Figure 4.11. The percentage of GNP spent by the space superpowers on their space
programs is roughly an order of magnitude more than any other nations.
75 United States and Soviet Union Budgets include military space budget, but exclude classified military
and intelligence programs. Soviet budget is the estimated cost the United States would incur to duplicate
the Soviet program. Source:
Office of Technology Assessment, International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities.
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., OTA-ISC-239, July 1985, page 65.
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4.6.1 COMPETITION
Competition in space to date has been almost exclusively between the United States
and the Soviet Union, with the Europeans, Japanese, and Chinese entering the scene in the
past decade. There are three primary facets to competition between national space
programs: Political, Military, and Economic. Competition in the political arena was
initiated by the launch of Sputnik in 1957 by the Soviet Union. For reasons of national
prestige and political statements, the United States was compelled to match and exceed
Soviet accomplishments. The ensuing space race saw enormous resources being devoted
76 Soviet figure is OTA estimate. Other figures from SEST/Euroconsult 1984-85.
Office of Technology Assessment, International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space Activities.
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., OTA-ISC-239, July 1985, page 66.
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to the space programs of each country, as evidence of the tremendous force behind political
motivation.
Military motivations were somewhat juxtaposed with political motives in the early
days of the space program, as placing satellites in orbit was testimony of the ability to also
place nuclear warheads between continents. However the two soon diverged, and this was
reflected by the creation of NASA in 1958 to separate the civil space program which was
highly politically motivated from the military space program. Military reasons for space
development and utilization are many. Among them are:
* Strategic weapons
* Geodesy
* Navigation
* Weather forecasting
* Reconnaissance
* Missile launch warning
* Communications
* Strategic Defense
The space programs of the Soviet Union and the United States shared fairly similar
goals until after the Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) mission in 1975. They each were
focusing on manned operations, with a considerable launch capacity for such operations.
However, in the post ASTP period, the space programs of the two countries began to
diverge. They each shared a similar destination, the exploration and exploitation of space
highlighted with a manned mission to Mars, but they were in pursuit of that destination on
different courses.
The ASTP mission was in fact the last manned mission for the U.S. space effort
until the first launch of the space shuttle in 1981. The emphasis of the U.S. program had
undergone a shift from the single use launch vehicles such as the Mercury, Gemini, and
Apollo to the multi-use, multi-functional and purportedly more economic space shuttle.
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Due to their budged constraints and political pressures, NASA tends to place all their eggs,
so to speak, into one basket. For the time period after the Apollo program, of which the
ASTP was the last mission, all of NASA's eggs were in the basket marked space shuttle.
The goal of the American space program was to utilize a very economic means of
space transportation that would eventually make space transport routine. The vehicle
would have many capabilities, would be able to provide manned presence in space when
needed, would be able to deploy many satellites, and could be reused. The key to the
economic promise of the space shuttle was its reusability.
The next large program on the U.S. agenda is the well publicized and somewhat
controversial space station. The goal of the space station is to achieve a permanent manned
presence in space. At the space station, research of various types will be conducted on
various topics, from space manufacturing to human physiology and the way humans are
adversely or positively affected by weightlessness. The space station is in the development
phase, and optimistic estimates place its initial operational capability to be in the mid to late
1990s.
The Soviets meanwhile, in the post-ASTP space program, were continuing their
manned operations in a big way. They continued to place men in space for extended
periods of time, they were gathering data and conducting extensive studies on the effects of
prolonged human weightlessness. They continued to build their presence in space and
today they have the MIR space station which has nearly achieved the plateau of achieving a
permanent manned presence in space.
The Soviet space program has currently taken an unquestioned lead over U.S.
manned flight operations, and the USSR's rapid pace in unmanned launches and
development threatens to overcome the West's technological lead in space. Launch failure
of the space shuttle, Titan, Delta, Atlas, and Ariane vehicles have allowed the Soviet space
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program to gain a greater advantage over Western operations than at any other time since
the launch of Sputnik 1 in 1957. The Soviet manned program represents the most visible
challenge to Western space leadership. 77
After achieving some of the goals they have set out for in manned space operation,
the Soviets are beginning to look to the future, for development of inexpensive and
reusable transport systems. They need cheap transportation to this space station they have
in low earth orbit.
The paths of the U.S. and Soviet space programs, after their divergent courses of
the post ASTP period, are beginning to converge. The U.S. is now in pursuit of a
permanent manned presence in space, and the Soviets are in pursuit of economic, reusable
space transportation. Each of these pursuits have already been mastered to some degree by
the other. The potential for cooperation between these two great space powers is apparent,
however with motives of military and political competition, each will continue in isolation
to pursue the goals which the other has already achieved.
The differences in the U.S. and Soviet space programs can be represented
graphically by comparing the satellite launch rates of the two countries. Figure 4.12
presents the satellite launch rates, dividing each nations satellites into military and civil
categories. The annual launch rates for civil, military, and the total launch rate for each
nation are indicated in the figure.
77 "Soviet Union Takes Lead in Manned Space Operations", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 9 March
1987, Page 129.
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YEARLY SATELLITE LAUNCHES OF THE USA AND USSR
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Figure 4.12
Annual Civil and Military satellite launch rates for the U.S. and the
00 0% 0% 0%
Soviet Union.78
Competition between nations in space is beginning to emerge from purely political
and military areas into the economic realm. The potential for economic development of
space activities is apparent in the communications, remote sensing, and space transportation
areas. The economic motivations for national space programs as summarized in a recent
OTA report, are many:
Space research will contribute to the general advancement of
national scientific development
78 Sheldon, Charles S., and Smith, Marcia S., Space Activities of the United States. Soviet Union and
other Launching Countries / Organizations, U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service
(CRS), CRS Report no. 82-45, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 26 February 1982.
Jane's Spaceflight Directory 1987, Jane's Publishing Inc., New York, 1987.
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* Efforts in space technology will contribute to building and
maintaining a strong national technology base
* Applications of space technology such as remote sensing or
satellite communications will contribute to national economic
growth
* Useful products will spin off from space technology
* Leadership in space technology will benefit other industries
in international competition by promoting perceptions of the
nation as being at the forefront of modern technology in
general
* The space program will foster the development of space-
related industries with competitively exportable products
* The export of space-related goods or services will help open
up new markets for other high technology exports79
Private companies and governments are involved in the commercial space arena,
and in some cases in direct competition with one another. An example is for launch
services where the space programs in the Soviet Union, China, and the European Space
Agency (ESA) are competing with private companies in the U.S. satellite launches. The
foreign governments subsidize their launch costs and the insurance packages they are
offering with their launch services. Private companies are crying foul, claiming that this
type of competition is unfair. Arianespace recently initiated an insurance pool which will
provide $73 million in insurance coverage for launch, greatly easing the pressure on its
customers to find insurance. Ariane is charging an 11-13 percent premium for this service,
although their demonstrated failure rate is about twice that. This is bringing outcries from
insurers and launch firms in the U.S. Regarding this policy, James Barrett, President of
International Technology Underwriter, has said:
79 Office of Technology Assessment, International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space
Activities. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., OTA-ISC-239, July 1985, page 70.
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How can they possibly justify the rates they are charging?
We believe that to be unfair use of a government's resource
to compete with private industry.80
Barrett's view is widely shared. It is not a new complaint and it has no easy
solution. A recent trade case illustrates the complexities of the problem. Transpace
Carriers, the private U.S. firm which was marketing the Delta launch vehicle manufactured
by McDonnell Douglas, filed a complaint under Sec. 301 of the Trade Act of 1974,
asserting the Europeans used unfair methods of competition in the sale of commercial
satellite launch services on Ariane. Following a year of government investigation, a
Presidential Determination Memorandum of July 1985 found that, while Arianespace does
not operate under purely commercial conditions, this is largely a result of the history of the
launch services industry, which is marked by almost exclusive government involvement. It
concluded that conditions did not require affirmative U.S. action at the time.8 1
4.5.2 COOPERATION
International cooperation in space has been successful in many areas in the past.
There are many ways in which nations cooperate in space activities, and they have been
organized in a sort of flow chart by the OTA as shown in Figure 4.13.
80 "Satellite Owners Reenter Insurance Market", Aviation Week & Space Technology, 26 January 1987,
page 79.
81 "Legal Aspects", Aerospace America, December 1986, Page 52.
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Figure 4.13
Patterns of Global Governmental Outer Space Activities.82
82 Office of Technology Assessment, International Cooperation and Competition in Civilian Space
Activities. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., OTA-ISC-239, July 1985, page 34.
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Issues of international space law are growing in importance with the development
of new multinational space projects. There are three components which must be considered
when addressing space law. They are an international juridical framework, individual
national legal policies and regulations, and the political climate of the administration in each
of the respective nations.83 A number of international agreements involving space have
been negotiated.8 4 Among them are:
· 1967 Outer Space Treaty: establishes that governments are
responsible for all launches from their territory 85
* 1968 Astronaut Assistance and Return Agreement: provides
for assistance to astronauts, notification of accidents, and the
rescue and return of spacecraft personnel and space objects
86
* 1972 Convention on International Liability for Damage
Caused by Space Objects: establishes the rule of absolute
liability for a launching state for losses suffered by persons
(other than its nationals) and property from reentering space
objects 87
83 Dula, A., Space Law for Business Profits, Space Commerce '86, 16-20 June 1986, Montreux,
Switzerland, Conference Proceedings, pp. 97-118.
84 Hazelrigg, G.A., Hymowitz, M.E., "Space Commercialization: Lessons from History", Space Policy,
May 1985, pp. 187-201.
85 Treaty of Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space.
Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, 27 January 1967 [1967], 18 UST 2410, TIAS 6347.
86 Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts. and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 22 April
1968 [1969], 19 UST 7570, TIAS 6599.
87 Policy and legal issues involved in the commercialization of space, Committee Print, Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, U.S. Senate, 23 September 1983, page 10.
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1975 Convention on the Registration of Objects Launched
into Outer Sace: requires a launching state to enter each
launching in an appropriate registry 88
The space station has long been touted by President Reagan as an opportunity for
collaboration between western nations in space. However there are many snags that are
prolonging negotiations between the European, Japanese, Canadian space agencies and
NASA. Among the most significant concerns are technology transfer, intellectual property
rights and management control.8 9
The International Telecommunications Satellite Organization (INTELSAT) has been
a model example for space commercialization and international cooperation. INTELSAT is
a global commercial telecommunications satellite system owned by at least 109 member
nations. The United States played a big role in the development of INTELSAT. During its
first six year of operation INTELSAT was operated by the Commercial Satellite
Corporation (COMSAT), a U.S. firm. Since 1977 however, INTELSAT has been
operated by an international secretariat. Under its operating agreement, INTELSAT states
that each signatory shall have an investment share equal to its percentage of all utilization of
the INTELSAT space segment by all signatories. The U.S. has a 23.1 percent share
through COMSAT, and the U.K. holds the next highest share at 12.9 percent.9 0
88 Convention of the Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, 14 January 1975 [1976], 28 UST
695, TIAS 8480.
89 Cox, A.R., "US Status in Space Eroded", Spaceflightl, Volume 30, February 1988, pp. 83-85.
90 Office of Technology Assessment, International Cooeration and Competition in Civilian Space
Activities. U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., OTA-ISC-239, July 1985, page 49.
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The United Nations is sponsor to many initiatives aimed at promoting and
developing international cooperation in outer space. The UN has formed a Committee on
the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) which is the focus of such activities.9 1
91 United Nations Association of the United States of America (UNA-USA), The Next Giant Lea in
Space: An Agenda for International Cooperation, UNA-USA Publications, 1986.
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CHAPTER 5 PROPELLANT RECLAMATION TECHNOLOGY REQUIREMENTS
The task of transferring propellant between tanks in orbit is much more difficult
than propellant transfer on earth. There are two primary reasons for this. First is the
absence of gravity which necessitates an alternative force to provide propellant motion.
The second is the vacuum of space which necessitates a sealed system with no allowance
for leakage. Another significant problem is created with the use of high energy cryogenic
propellants with the extremely low temperatures required to keep them in liquid state.
In recognition of the need to develop enabling technologies for cryogenic and
storable propellant transfer in orbit, several research programs have been performed' and
others are under way. Interest in this problem is widespread within NASA as well as with
the DoD and the SDIO. A summary of ongoing programs is shown below in Table 5.1.
1 General Dynamics Convair Division, Orbital Refill of Propulsion Vehicle Tankage, NASA-CR-159722,
February 1980.
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PROGRAM AGENCY
* Orbital Spacecraft Consumables Resupply System (OSCRS) JSC
* Superfluid Helium Tanker Resupply (SFHT) JSC
* Cryogenic Fluid Management Flight Experiment (CFMFE) LERC
* Long Term Cryogenic Storage Facility Systems Study MSFC
* Superfluid Helium on Orbit Transfer (Shoot) GSFC
* Space Assembly, Maintenance, and Servicing Study (SAMS) DoD, NAS)
* Long Term Cryogenic Fluid Storage (LTCFS)
* Space Station Satellite Servicing (Package 3)
* Satellite Servicing Project
SDIO
LERC
GSFC
GSFC
Table 5.1
Programs addressing orbital propellant transfer.2
There are several objectives which NASA has defined for the development of an
orbital fluid resupply tanker. These objectives can be realized through incorporation of not
only the right technologies, but the right combination of technologies and systems.
NASA's overall programmatic objectives are:
* Safety
* Minimum Cost
* Reliability
* Minimum Turnaround Time and Manifesting Flexibility
* Minimize the Number of Different Tanker Designs
* Minimize Fluid Spills and Venting.3
2 Microgravitv Fluid Management Symposium, NASA Conference Publication 2465, NASA Lewis
Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, 9-10 September, 1986.
3 Griffin, J.W., NASA JSC, Background and Programmatic Approach for the Development of Orbital
Fluid Resupply Tankers, AIAA Paper 86-1601, AIAA / ASME / SAE / ASEE 22nd Joint Propulsion
Conference, 16-18 June 1986, Huntsville, Alabama, pp. 6-7.
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NASA has had interest in rbital propellant supply and transfer for a number of
years. Cryogenic fluid transfer experiments in orbit were planned over a decade ago, but
have yet to fly.4 In order to transfer propellant from a spent launch vehicle to an orbiting
propellant depot there are several technologies involved, which are dictated by the process.
There are basically two classes of transfer processes, the first being for storable propellants
and the second for cryogenic propellants. There are several processes which may be
employed to achieve propellant transfer for each.
5.1 STORABLE PROPELLANTS
The processes for transfer of storable propellants are best understood and are in
routine use by the Soviet program and have been used in flight experiments in the U.S.
There are basically four methods which can be employed for transfer of storable propellants
and those are outlined below:
* Adiabatic Ullage Compression
* Ullage Exchange
* Vent / Fill / Repressurize
* Drain / Vent / Fill / Repressurize
Adiabatic ullage compression, also known as ullage recompression is a relatively
simple method that can be used for resupply of spacecraft tankage using either diaphragm
or simple surface tension propellant management devices (PMD) and blowdown expulsion.
The process is basically to force propellant from the servicer tanks into the spacecraft
4 McDonnell Douglas Astronautics Company, Filling of Orbital Fluid Management Systems, NASA-CR-
159405, August 1978.
General Dynamics Convair Division, Filling of Orbital Fluid Management Systems, NASA-CR-159404,
July 1978.
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receiver tanks. The major limitation to this resupply method is the compressive heating
effect on the hydrazine as it is being transferred. Slow transfer rates must therefore be
employed in order to avoid rapid decomposition of the hydrazine, or the possibility of
adiabatic detonation. The primary advantages of adiabatic ullage compression are its
mechanical and operational simplicity, and the fact that it does not need pressurant gas
resupply. This resupply technique will be used on the Gamma Ray Observatory (GRO) for
resupply missions.
Ullage exchange is used on spacecraft tankage which have surface tension devices
utilizing regulated pressure. This process requires a closed circulation loop and is only
feasible on bipropellant systems or non-diaphragm monopropellant systems. A constant
pressure process is used in which the propellant is pumped from the servicer to the user
spacecraft tanks. As the resupply propellant enters the user spacecraft tanks, it displaces
ullage which is sent back to the servicer tanks. An assumption in this process which is as
yet unproven is that no ullage bubbles become trapped within the user spacecraft tanks,
which would leave them partially unfilled.
The Vent / Fill / Repressurize method can be used for spacecraft tankage using
either diaphragm or surface tension devices. The initial step in the process is pressure
reduction in the receiving tank by venting. Then propellant from the servicer tanks can be
transferred at low pressure, eliminating the compressive heating problems associated with
high pressure methods. There are several unproven aspects associated with this method.
The first is that vapor / liquid separation is achievable which is simple with diaphragm
tanks but as yet unproven for surface tension tanks. Another assumption is that venting of
pressurants can occur without expulsion of any propellant. Another problem associated
with this method is determination of the amount of propellant required for resupply, so that
the proper ullage volume is left for repressurization.
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The final method is the Drain / Vent / No-Vent Fill / Repressurize method which is
used for tankage with compartmented surface tension devices for use in propellant
management. These systems are complicated and must be drained prior to refilling in order
to assure elimination of ullage voids. A benefit of starting with an empty tank for the filling
process is knowing what the starting conditions are and thus how much propellant should
be transferred. This process begins with the draining of propellants from the user
spacecraft into the servicer tanks. Then user tanks are then vented of remaining pressurants
and residual propellants to create a vacuum in the tanks. Then a no-vent fill can be done
from the servicer tanks to the user spacecraft tanks, knowing how much propellant is
required. After filled with the proper amount of propellants, the user spacecraft tanks are
then repressurized to the appropriate level. 5 ,6
Each of these techniques has drawbacks as well as advantages, which have been
summarized in tabular form. In addition, the particular transfer methods have applicability
for certain tankage configurations. The benefits associated with each of these four
techniques can be seen in Figure 5.1.
5 Eberhardt, R.N., Tracey, T.R., and Bailey, WJ., Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace, Orbital Spacecraft
Resupply Technology, AIAA Paper 86-1604, AIAA / ASME / SAE / ASEE 22nd Joint Propulsion
Conference, 16-18 June 1986, Huntsville, Alabama.
6 Chandler, F.O., Rockwell International, Expendable Resupply Fluid System Design Issues, AIAA Paper
86-1758, AIAA / ASME / SAE / ASEE 22nd Joint Propulsion Conference, 16-18 June 1986, Huntsville,
Alabama.
155
Figure 5.1
Advantages of various methods of resupply for storable propellants.7
The disadvantages of each of the systems can then be seen in Figure 5.2.
7 Eberhardt, R.N., Tracey, T.R., and Bailey, WJ., Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace, Orbital Sracecraft
Resupply Technology, AIAA Paper 86-1604, AIAA / ASME / SAE / ASEE 22nd Joint Propulsion
Conference, 16-18 June 1986, Huntsville, Alabama.
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ADVANTAGES RESUPPLY METHODSt
1 2 3 4
1 No Overboard Venting Required
2 Small Quantities Transferred 
3 State of the Art Gaging Accuracy is Adequate / / /
4 Only One Fluid Interface Required x
5 No Pressurant Resupply Required l
6 Empty Servicer Catch Tanks Not Required / l/
7 Vent Products Contained within Servicer for v
Ground Disposal
8 Minimal Adverse Effect of Dissolved Gas
9 Resupply Complicated Compartmented Tankage4 
10 Low Servicer Pressure l 4
11 Quantity of Products to be Vented Overboard -4
Less Than Vent/Fill
12 Does Not Require Active Elements, e.g., Pump, l l 
Liquid/Vapor Separators
13 State of the Art Approach for NTO x4
14 Not Limited by Spacecraft Tankage PMD Type x4
t Resupply Methods: 1 Ullage Compression
2 Ullage Exchange
3 Vent/Fill/Repressurize
4 Drain/Vent/Fill/Repressurize
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
DISADVANTAGES RESUPPLY METHODS t
1 2 3 4
1 Compressive Heating Effects
2 Hydrazine Decomposition Design Concern
3 Propellant Transferred at High Pressure (350 psia)
4 Limited to Blowdown Systems Only
5 Pump Required for Fluid Circulation
6 Required Excessive Electrical Power
7 Drive Ullage into Servicer Tanks (Open Tech Issue)
8 Requires Propellant Drain Back into the
Servicer to Reestablish Ullage
9 Pressurant/Ullage Requires Reservicing
10 Not Applicable to Diaphragm Tankage
11 Two Propellant Interfaces Required
12 Ullage Venting Without Major Propellant
Entrainment (Open Technology Issue)
13 Real-Time Overboard Disposal of Propellant-
Contaminated Vent Products
14 Empty Catch Tank(s) Required on the Servicer
15 Tight Gaging Accuracy Required
t Resupply Methods: 1 Ullage Compression
2 Ullage Exchange
3 Vent/Fill/Repressurize
4 Drain/Vent/Fill/Repressurize
I
Figure 5.2
Disadvantages of various methods of resupply for storable propellants.8
The Soviets initiated the task of refuelling in space on a regular basis with the
refuelling of the Salyut 6 space station with the world's first space tanker. The tanker,
Progress 1, was first launched on 20 January 1978 and was completely successful in
refueling the space station. Orbital refueling of Soviet space stations with Progress tankers
is now routine.
8 Eberhardt, R.N., Tracey, T.R., and Bailey, W.J., Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace, Orbital Spacecraft
Resupplv Technology, AIAA Paper 86-1604, AIAA / ASME / SAE / ASEE 22nd Joint Propulsion
Conference, 16-18 June 1986, Huntsville, Alabama.
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The process of refuelling the Salyut can be performed either by the crew or
remotely by ground control. The Salyut uses a bipropellant system for its propulsion and
attitude control system (known as ODU). This system uses nitrogen tetroxide (NTO) as
the oxidizer and unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) as the fuel. The connections
between the fuel and oxidizer lines of the Progress tanker and the Salyut station are made
during docking. The tanks used are pressurized internal bladder tanks with the pressure
being provided by gaseous nitrogen. The basic process used for the refuelling is that the
pressure in the Salyut tanks is decreased as the pressure in the Progress tanks are
increased. This effectively forces propellant out of the Progress tanks into the Salyut
tanks. The fuel and oxidizer are transferred at different times for safety reasons, with the
fuel being transferred first.9
NASA has performed flight experiments aboard the shuttle on propellant transfer,
but as yet has no operational propellant transfer system. The first experiment was the
orbital refueling system (ORS) which began in late 1982 and culminated with a successful
flight on STS-41G in October 1984. The experiment involved the connection of hydrazine
lines between a simulated tanker and a simulated Landsat type propulsion system.
Standard couplings used for ground transfers were also used for the experiment. The crew
performed the connection with special tools in an extravehicular activity (EVA) in the
shuttle bay. Hydrazine was transferred between the tanks 6 times to gather data on control
of hydrazine heating in the adiabatic ullage compression process. 10
9 Mills, P., REFUELLING SALYUT SPACE STATIONS BY PROGRESS TANKERS, Journal of the
British Interplanetary Society, August 1985, pp. 381-384.
10 Griffin, J.W., NASA JSC, Background and Programmatic Approach for the Development of Orbital
Fluid Resupply Tankers, AIAA Paper 86-1601, AIAA / ASME / SAE / ASEE 22nd Joint Propulsion
Conference, 16-18 June 1986, Huntsville, Alabama.
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The Storable Fluid Management Demonstration (SFMD) was launched aboard STS
Mission 51-C on 24 January 1985. The experiment was mounted in the shuttle middeck,
and used transparent tanks which permitted direct observation of the fluid phenomena by
the astronaut operator. Tank refill, liquid expulsion, and static and dynamic low-g liquid
behavior were demonstrated during 16 hours of testing. The SFMD was a joint venture
between Martin Marietta who provided the hardware, and NASA and the Air Force who
provided the integration and launch.l l
5.2 CRYOGENIC PROPELLANTS
The transfer of cryogenic propellants is more complicated than the transfer of
storable propellants because of the low temperatures involved and the concerns of limiting
boiloff. Several techniques have been explored for cryogenic propellant transfer including
capillary, positive expulsion, fluid vortexing, tank rotation, dielectrophoretic, and magnetic
transfer (oxygen only). Of these techniques, the most favorable one is capillary action
using screens as propellant acquisition devices. Its potential as a technique for cryogenic
propellant acquisition and transfer was identified early, and its advantages are low weight
and simplicity.12 This technique has achieved a mature development status, and has been
proven to be reliable. 13
11 Tegart, J., Kirklant, Z, Martin Marietta Aerospace, On-Orbit Propellant ResupDlv Demonstration -
Flight Results, AIAA/SAE/ASME/ASEE 21st Joint Propulsion Conference, 8-10 July 1985, Monterey,
California, AIAA Paper 85-1233.
12 Stark, J.A., General Dynamics Corporation, Low-G Fluid Transfer Technology Study, NASA-CR-
135020, May 1976.
1 3 Schuster, J.R., Bennett, F.O., Liggett, M.W., and Torre, C.N., General Dynamics Space Systems
Division, and Brown, N., NASA MSFC, Evaluation of On-Orbit Cryogenic Propellant Depot Options for
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NASA's lead center for microgravity fluid management is Lewis Research Center in
Cleveland, Ohio. They are developing the Cryogenic Fluid Management Flight Experiment
(CFMFE) which is an orbital test bed for demonstration of critical technologies and
verification of analytical tools.14 There are many experimental objectives to be met by the
CFMFE, which will fly three missions in the shuttle. The first flight will be in 1991,
followed by the second mission in 1993 and the third in 1995. These dates were set after
the Challenger disaster, but may be affected by a new shuttle manifest plan. 15 Until the
shuttle is operational again, development and testing of technologies for microgravity
cryogenic fluid management will continue on the ground.l6 The CFMFE is run by the
Cryogenic Fluid Management Project Office (CFMPO) at NASA Lewis, and is the primary
focus of their efforts. NASA Lewis has been addressing the technologies associated with
low gravity fluid management for the past 25 years, and have issued a number of contracts
which have developed new technologies and analytical tools.
Technologies associated with low gravity cryogenic fluid management can be
grouped into three categories: fluid storage, supply, and transfer. Fluid storage deals with
thermal control and pressure regulation systems necessary for cryogenic storage.
Cryogenic fluid supply deals with the acquisition of liquid and the necessary conditioning
the Orbital Transfer Vehicle, Paper 88c, 6th Intersociety Cryogenics Symposium, 2-7 November 1986,
Miami Beach, Florida.
14 Aydelott, J.C., NASA LeRC, Rudland, R.S., Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace, Technology
Requirements to be Addressed by the NASA Lewis Research Center Cryogenic Fluid Management Facility
Program, NASA-TM-87048, 1985.
15 DeFelice, D.M., NASA LeRC, Cryogenic Fluid Management Flight Experiment, Microgravity Fluid
Management Symposium, NASA Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, 9-10 September 1986, NASA
Report N87-21150, Page 119-124.
16 Liggett, M.W., General Dynamics Space Systems Division, Longsworth, R.C., APC Cryogenics, Inc.,
Low-Earth LH2 Propellant Storage Facility Ground Test Program, AIAA 22nd Thermophysics Conference,
8-10 June 1987, Honolulu, Hawaii, AIAA Paper 87-1560.
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of that liquid prior to transfer. The objective of an acquisition system is to position the
liquid contents of a storage tank at the tank outlet such that vapor free extraction can occur.
Liquid acquisition devices (LADs), liquid settling, and pressurization systems are part of
the supply technologies. Transfer technologies involve the transport of a single phase
liquid from a supply tank to a receiver tank. 17
For the CFMFE, liquid hydrogen is the base fluid for the experiments because it is
one of the primary cryogenic fluids planned for orbital use in the future, and because it has
more demanding properties than liquid oxygen which is the other primary propellant. It
has a lower temperature, density, and more challenging surface tension characteristics than
liquid oxygen. With the development of systems for storage, supply and transfer of liquid
hydrogen, the technologies incorporated will be readily transferred to other cryogenic
systems with less demanding requirements.l8
No-vent fill is the preferred method of transfer for cryogenic propellants in low-
gravity conditions. The process involved is composed of three phases. Initial conditions
assume that the receiver tank is in vacuum condition, with a certain pre-fill temperature
which can be somewhat above the required temperature of the cryogenic fluid. The
cryogenic fluid is in a sub-cooled condition prior to the transfer process. As the cryogenic
fluid begins to enter the receiver tank, it initially flashes to a vapor state because the tank
pressure is below the vapor pressure of the liquid. It continues to flash to vapor until the
pressure in the tank matches the vapor pressure of the liquid, but continues to vaporize until
17 Meserole, J.S., Boeing Aerospace Company, Fluid Acquisition and Transfer Overview, Microgravity
Fluid Management Symposium, NASA Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, 9-10 September 1986,
NASA Report N87-21146, Page 57-65.
18 DeFelice, D.M., and Aydelott, J.C., NASA Lewis, Thermodynamic Analysis and Subscale Modeling of
Space-Based Orbit Transfer Vehicle Cryogenic Propellant Resuplvy, AIAA Paper 87-1764, AIAA / SAE /
ASME / ASEE 23rd Joint Propulsion Conference, 29 June - 2 July 1987, San Diego, CA.
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the tank wall temperature is reduced to the liquid temperature and the excess thermal energy
in the tank walls have been removed.
After these conditions have been met fluid begins to accumulate in the tank,
marking the beginning of phase two. As fluid continues to enter the tank, the vapor is
displaced and begins to compress. The pressure of the vapor in the tank continues to rise
to the point where the tank pressure equals the vapor pressure at the liquid-vapor interface.
At this point, the vapor begins to condense back into liquid form. This condition marks the
third phase of the no-vent fill. Fluid transfer continues to the point where the tank pressure
reaches its maximum operational value, at which point transfer can only continue as vapor
condenses thereby reducing the vapor pressure.
There are many technologies which will be required for orbital management of
cryogenic propellants. Table 5.2 outlines many of the technology requirements for the
components of the propellant supply infrastructure, and indicates which future experiments
will address those technologies. The resupply tanker referred to in the table could be either
the separate tanks carried to orbit by the shuttle (infrastructure A), or by an ELV
(infrastructure B), or the integral tanks of the ELV (infrastructure C). The resupply tanker
must deliver the propellant and transfer it to the orbital propellant depot. The orbital
propellant depot must receive the propellants from the resupply tanker, store them until they
are needed, then transfer them to the user spacecraft (OTV). The OTV must receive
propellant from the propellant depot and then use the propellant to perform its mission.
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Future Requirements Future Experiments
Resupply OTV Propellant CFMFE LTCFS
Tanker
Passive Thermal Technologies
Dual Stage Support X X
Para-Ortho Conversion X X
Thick MLI X X X X
TVS X X X X X
Thermal Coatings X X X
Soft Outer Shell X X X X
Hard Outer Shell X X X
Fluid Transfer
Capillary Acquisition X X X X X
Low-G Quantity Gaging X X X X
Mass Flow Meters X X X X
Low Heat Leak Values X X X
Low Heat Leak X X X
Transfer Lines
Cryogenic Disconnects X X X X
External Pressurization X X X X
HPG Pressurization X X
Metal Hydride Comperssor X
Active Refrigerator
Long Lifetime Refrigerator X X
Reliquefaction X X
Cryogenic Heat Exchanger X X
Refrigerator to S.S. X X
Thermal Bus HEX
Table 5.2
Definition of technology hardware requirements for orbital cryogenic fluid management 19
Table 5.3 is similar to Table 5.2 but outlines the technology issues associated with
development of long term cryogenic fluid storage and transfer for orbital operations.
Included among these issues are fluid management, logistics, and phenomena which occur
in the orbital environment.
19 Riemer, David H., Space Station Experiment Definition: Long Term Cryogenic Fluid Storage,
Microgravity Fluid Management Symposium, NASA Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, 9-10
September 1986, NASA Report N87-21144, Page 40.
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Future Requirements Future Experiments
Resupply OTV Propellant CFMFE LTCFS
Tanker
Investigated Phenomena
Long-Term Stratification Effects X X
Sofr OS Performance Degradation X X X
Thermal Coating Degradation X X X
Micro-Meteoroid Protection X X X
Fluid Management
LAD Refill X X X X
Transfer Line Cooldown X X X X X
ET Scavenging X Possible
Receiver Tank Cooldown X X X X X
Receiver No-Vent Fill X X X X
Refill of Partially Full Tank X X X
Propellant Settling X X
Boiloff Collection X X
Slosh Suppression X X X
On-Orbit Logistics
System Safing X X X X X
Space Station Interfacing X X X X
Space Station Operations X X X X
On-Orbit Leak Detection X X X Possible
Table 5.3
Definition of technology issues for orbital cryogenic storage and transfer.20
20 Riemer, David H., Space Station Experiment Definition: Long Term Cryogenic Fluid Storage,
Microgravity Fluid Management Symposium, NASA Lewis Research Center, Cleveland, Ohio, 9-10
September 1986, NASA Report N87-21144, Page 41.
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CHAPTER 6 PROPELLANT RECLAMATION SIMULATION - OPSIS
In order to address the impact that propellant reclamation might have on the supply
of propellants and their cost in the future space infrastructure, a computer model was
developed. Called the Orbital Propellant Supply Infrastructure Simulation (OPSIS), the
simulation provides information on the cost and propellant supply effects of various
scenarios which can be provided as input. The simulation can be broken down into three
primary parts: input, execution, and output. The basic relationship between these elements
of the simulation can be seen in Figure 6.1 on the following page.
The simulation was developed and run on the Academic Micro-VAX in the
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics at MIT. The programming language used is
Fortran 771, and a copy of the code is included in Appendix B. Outputs were taken from
the VAX and transferred to a Macintosh Plus. Cricketgraph was used with the Macintosh
to tabulate the data and generate the graphs. The system used for the simulation is shown
in Figure 6.2.
Hardware VAX Macintosh Plus
Software * OPSIS - * ·*Cricketgraph
* LVGEN
Figure 6.2
Hardware and software used for simulation and presentation.
1 Etter, D.M., Structured Fortran 77 For Engineers and Scientists, second edition, The Benjamin /
Cummings Publishing Company, 1987.
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Figure 6.1
OPSIS input and output relationship.
6.1 INPUT
The input to OPSIS is required to provide the data for three basic elements of the
simulation. The first part is the characterization of the launch vehicle, the second the
definition of the mission model, and the third involves the cost parameters associated with
the various elements of the infrastructure. The input files are generated with the use of
software besides OPSIS such as the LVGEN program, and from outside sources and
entered. When running OPSIS the user is asked the name of the input file to be used. The
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simulation then accesses that input file for the information needed to run the program. The
OPSIS executable code and the input files must be in the same directory in the VAX system
in order to be accessed.
6.1.1 LAUNCH VEHICLE
Inputs which describe the launch vehicle are generated by the launch vehicle
generator program (LVGEN) which was developed along with OPSIS as an analytical tool
for the assessment of propellant reclamation. This program can size new launch vehicles
when basic performance parameters are given, or take data from existing launch vehicles or
designs and convert it to the proper format for use as input to OPSIS. The launch vehicle
is defined within OPSIS in matrix form and is provided as input in that form. It is a two
dimensional matrix, with N+1 columns representing the N stages of the launch vehicle and
the N+1 column representing the overall launch vehicle. There are thirteen rows which
represent the mass properties and performance characteristics of the launch vehicle and they
are indicated in Table 6.1.
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Definition
Total Launch Vehicle weight from this stage up
Mass ratio of vehicle for this stage up
Delta Velocity of this stage
Propellant used by this stage
Unused nominal ascent propellant for this stage
Total weight of this stage only
Total propellant weight of this stage only
Residual propellant weight of this stage only
Reserve propellant weight of this stage only
Payload weight of this stage
Vacuum specific impulse of this stage
Mass fraction of this stage
weight of required propellant transfer hardware
Dimensions
[lb]
[feet/second]
[lb]
[lb]
[lb]
[lb]
[lb]
[lb]
[lb]
[sec]
[lbI
Table 6.1
Row identification for launch vehicle definition matrix.
An example of an input for the baseline vehicle being used in the simulation is
shown in Table 6.2. The vehicle is an Advanced Launch System (ALS) type of vehicle
with a nominal payload capability of 100,000 lb, a single stage of cryogenic liquid oxygen
(LOX) and liquid hydrogen (LH2) propellants, some solid rocket motors for thrust
augmentation at lift-off, and an integral orbital maneuvering system (OMS) for orbital
rendezvous maneuvers and satellite deployment.
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ROW
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
I
Column 1
(Stage 1)
(Solids)
2492291.00
2.15
6487.29
1331099.5
13445.45
1427100.00
1344545.00
13445.45
0.00
1065191.00
264.00
0.93
0.00
Column 2
(Stage 2)
(Liquid Core)
1065191.00
4.77
22552.13
841839.63
17180.40
965191.00
859020.00
8590.20
8590.20
100000.00
448.70
0.87
1562.00
Column 3
(Total Vehicle)
2492291.00
29039.42
2172939.25
30625.85
2392291.00
2203565.00
22035.65
8590.20
100000.00
0.91
1562.00
Table 6.2
Launch Vehicle Definition Matrix baseline input values.
6.1.2 MISSION MODEL
The next primary set of input data for OPSIS is the characterization of the mission
model. The mission model is particular to the launch vehicle that is being used for the
simulation. It defines for each year the launch vehicle is in operation the number of
missions that are flown and the average load factor of the launch vehicle. The Mission
Model is characterized in the form of a two dimensional matrix as was the launch vehicle.
The matrix has three columns, the first representing the year of operation, the second
provides the number of missions which are flown for that year, and the third defines the
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Rows
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
average load factor of missions for that year. The number of rows in the matrix is simply
the number of years in which the launch vehicle is operational.
The values used as input for the mission model matrix are based on projections of
launch rates over the next thirty to forty years for the particular type of launch vehicle
which is being used for the simulation. These data vary significantly as do any data on
projections of future events. The baseline values which are used are a generally
conservative consensus of what is expected as the usage rate for a new ELV. The number
of years being used as the baseline value for program life is twenty years, from 1995 to
2014. The number of missions actually flown per year will vary between year to year, but
for purposes of comparison in the sensitivity studies an average value of ten missions per
year will be used as the baseline. The load factor has been estimated to be on the order of
60 to 80 percent on the average for a vehicle of this type. To be on the conservative side a
baseline value of .80 for the load factor will be used.
Different values will be used in sensitivity studies, and any combination of these
parameters can be input into OPSIS for evaluation. An example of the basic input matrix
for the mission model is shown in Table 6.3.
YEAR NUMBER OF AVERAGE LOAD
FLIGHTS FACTOR
1995 10 .8
1996 10 .8
2013 10 .8
2014 10 .8
Table 6.3
Mission Model Definition Matrix baseline input values.
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6.1.3 INFRASTRUCTURE ELEMENTS AND COSTS
The third area of input for the simulation involves the costs parameters associated
with each of the elements required of the infrastructure for propellant reclamation and
supply in orbit. The infrastructure elements required are as previously defined in Section
3.1.1. They are broken down further to separate the costs of the SRBs of the ELV from
the liquid portion. The costs of the infrastructure will be separated into five elements,
which are:
* Solid Rocket Booster
· Liquid Rocket
* Transportation Tank
* Storage Depot Facility
* Additional ELV Hardware
Costs for the various systems being modeled will be derived using parametric cost
estimating relationships (CERs). The relationships are derived from correlation of
hardware mass with cost, and are typically straight line curve fits on a semi-logarithmic
graph. The CERs that will be used here are mathematically represented as:
COST = (Constant) x ((Weight) raised to an exponent)
All costs are in fiscal year (FY) 1988 dollars unless otherwise indicated. Costs
from other sources in other than FY 88 dollars have been converted to FY 88 dollars with
the composite deflator index used in the Federal Budget.2 The costs are divided into two
primary categories, the first being recurring and the second non-recurring. Recurring costs
2 Historical Tables. Budget of the United States Government. Fiscal Year 1989, Executive Office of the
President, Office of Management and Budget, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1988.
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are essentially those which arise for each flight. These include costs such as production of
hardware for non-reusable systems, refurbishment of reusable systems, propellant cost,
mission control manpower requirements, etc.
Non-recurring costs are those which do not arise for each flight, but rather only
once or occasionally. Included in non-recurring costs are such things as Design,
Development, Test, and Evaluation (DDT&E), ground support equipment (GSE), and
production of reusable hardware. The total Life Cycle Cost (LCC) is a summation of
recurring costs for all flights, and all non-recurring costs. Both recurring and non-
recurring costs are represented parametrically in exponential form as indicated above.3
Non-recurring costs are distributed evenly over the number of systems being produced on a
per-flight basis, and the average recurring cost is the summation of each unit recurring cost
divided by the number of units.
There is a large difference between the actual recurring costs of the first and the last
flights due to the effect of learning on labor reduction. The learning curve is used to
represent this and the slope of the learning cure, r, is the factor used in the calculations.
From the effect of learning, the cost of production for unit 2n is r times the production cost
of unit n. The definitions of the variables associated with the parametric CERs are shown
below.
Co = Non-recurring costs for DDT&E
C1 = First vehicle production cost
Ccum = Cumulative recurring cost of producing N vehicles
Cave = Average recurring cost per vehicle
Cdis = Distributed non-recurring cost per vehicle
Ctotave= Total average cost per vehicle
3 Miller, R.H., Stuart, D.G., and Azarbayejani, A., FACTORS INFLUENCING SELECTION OF
SPACE TRANSPORTATION OPTIONS, IAF Paper 86-108, 37th Congress of the International
Astronautical Federation, Innsbruck, Austria, October 4-11, 1986, Permagon Press, 1986.
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qo = Exponent in non-recurring parametric relationship
ql = Exponent in recurring parametric relationship
WE = Weight empty of hardware element
Fo = Constant in non-recurring parametric relationship
Fl1 = Constant in recurring parametric relationship
N = Total number of elements produced
r = Slope of learning curve
p = Napierian form for r
The non-recurring costs are represented parametrically by equations 6.1-6.3
indicated below.
Co - (WE) qo (6.1)
Co = Fo (WE) qo (6.2)
Distributed non-recurring cost for each of N vehicles:
Cdis = CO / N (6.3)
Recurring costs are indicated by equations 6.4 - 6.8 which are very similar to the
equations for non-recurring cost with the exception of the learning effect. The learning
curve reflects the relative improvement in labor efficiency with time. The effect of learning
on recurring costs is represented by the equation for Ccum. This relationship gives an
accurate representation of the integration of the cost reduction due to learning over the life
of the program.4
C1 - (WE) ql (6.4)
C 1 = F1 (WE) ql (6.5)
Average recurring cost for each of N vehicles:
Cave = Ccum / N (6.6)
4 Woodcock, Gordon R., SPACE STATIONS & PLATFORMS: Cost & Cost Estimating, Orbit Book
Company, Inc., 1986.
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Ccum = C1 [ (N+0.5) (+l) 1.5 (p+l) + 1 ] (6.7)
(p+l)
p =[ln(r)/ln(2)] (6.8)
Through summation of the total recurring and non-recurring costs and division by
the number of flights, the total average cost per flight can be determined as shown in
equation 6.9.
Ctotave = [ F o (WE) qo ] /N + {F1 (WE) ql [ (N+0.5) (p+l) - 1.5 (p+l) + 1 ]} (6.9)
N (p+l)
Variables for the CERs of each of the hardware elements required for the space
infrastructure have been determined on the basis of estimates found in literature, historical
figures, and correspondence. The definition of these CER variables is an uncertain task as
the future is inherently uncertain. Nonetheless they serve to represent the expected costs of
the systems elements which are being addressed. Certain basic variables vary slightly
between sources. However, they have been assigned values which are held constant
throughout the simulation to provide consistency. These assigned variable values are
representative of values which are employed in CERs for aerospace systems.5 The
variables which will be held constant are the exponent of non-recurring costs, the exponent
of recurring costs, the slope of the learning curve, and its Napierian form. The values for
these variables which are used in the simulation are as shown below.
5 Miller, R.H., EFFECT OF DEMAND ON OPTIMUM LAUNCH VEHICLE SIZE, Journal of
Spacecraft and Rockets, Volume 16, Number 4, July-August 1979, Page 287.
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qo= 0.5
ql = 0.8
r = 0.9
p = -0.152
The variables which remain to be identified for each of the hardware systems being
costed are the constants for the recurring and non-recurring CERs, and the number of
elements being produced. The number of elements being produced is a function of the
mission model and will be derived from the annual utilization rate and the duration of use.
The constants Fo and F1 are derived from available data on cost estimates for similar
systems from NASA and various aerospace contractors.
The generic form of input for each of the infrastructure element cost parameters
consists of a row of seven elements. The first two are number of hardware items produced
and the dry weight of the hardware. In most cases this data is calculated internally within
OPSIS but for some it is provided as input. The third and fourth elements of the row are
constants used in the CERs, Fo and F1 , respectively. The fifth, sixth, and seventh
elements are the exponents in the CERs and the slope of the learning curve. They are qo,
q1, and r, respectively. These constants will be addressed and defined for each of the
elements going into the model, in the following sections.
6.1.3.1 SOLID ROCKET BOOSTER (SRB)
The costs of SRBs are significantly different from the costs of the liquid rocket.
The cost parameters use the empty weight of the system as the figure of merit for cost
estimation, and the cost of a solid rocket motor casing is substantially less per unit weight
than the cost of a liquid rocket. For this reason, the SRB costs have been broken out as a
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separate item from the liquid rocket costs. The established cost of the SRBs used on the
space shuttle is 16.2 million per booster.6 The relationship between production life cycle
costs and costs for DDT&E for solid rockets has been established as approximately eight
percent.7 Using the 16.2 million per booster as the cost of the theoretical first unit (TFU)
for recurring costs, the values determined for use in the CERs are as shown below.
CO = 360,000xWE.5
C1 = 1,100xWE.8
TIhe input for SRBs to OPSIS is in the form:
N WE Fo F1 qo ql r
calc. calc. 360,000 1,100 .50 .80 .90
6.1.3.2 LIQUID ROCKET
The liquid rocket is a very complicated machine with many components of varying
complexity and cost. For this case however, the cost of the rocket will be taken to be
related to the aggregate weight of the system hardware. This includes the tankage,
avionics, propulsion system, and support structure. Cost figures taken from several
sources including NASA8 , Martin Marietta Corporation 5, and General Dynamics
6 Martin Marietta Corporation, Denver Aerospace, Michoud Division, Shuttle Derived Vehicles (SDV)
Technology Reauirements Study. Phase II Final Report. Volume III. Program Cost and Work Breakdown
Structure/Dictionary, NASA-CR-170701, May 1982.
7 Gaunt, David C., Hercules Incorporated, Understanding Costs of Solid Rocket Motors, AIAA Paper 86-
1638, AIAA / ASME / SAE / ASEE 22nd Joint Propulsion Conference, 16-18 June 1986, Huntsville, Al.
8 NASA Space Launch System Studies. NASA Cargo Vehicle Studies, Briefing of 8 April 1987.
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Corporation9 have been used to derive the constants in the CERs. The values derived for
the recurring and non-recurring CERs are seen below.
Co = 5,000,000 x WE.5
C 1 = 5,000xWE. 8
The input for the Liquid Rocket to OPSIS is in the form:
N WE Fo F 1 qo ql r
calc. calc. 5,000,000 5,000 .50 .80 .90
6.1.3.3 TRANSPORTATION TANK
If the propellant supply is transported to orbit as part of a payload, whether it be
dedicated or simply as filler payload, a transportation tank will be required to hold the
propellant. The transportation tank will then transfer its propellant to the storage tank in
orbit. Studies have been done which address this type of scenario and cost figures have
been estimated. 1 0° Transportation tanks can be either reused or disposed of in the
simulation. However, if the tanks are disposed the costs are very high. When reusable
tanks are: used, the number of tanks to be built must be established. This is done by
estimating the turnaround time of the tanks in terms of flights per year for each tank.
Dividing the total number of flights per year by this number will give the number of tanks
required, if rounded up. Refurbishment costs are added to this at a percentage of
9 General Dynamics Space Systems Division, Space Transportation Architecture Study. First Special
Report, NASA Contract NAS8-36615, 9 May 1986.
10 Rockwell International Corporation, Space Platform Expendables Resupply Concept Definition Study.
Volume II. Technical Report. NASA-CR-178821, December 1984.
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production costs for each flight. The baseline value that is used in the simulation is ten
percent of production cost for refurbishment. The basic CERs for the costs associated with
a transportation tank for propellant storage during ascent are seen below.
CO = 870,000 x WE.5
C1 = 16,500xWE-8
The input for Transportation Tank to OPSIS is in the form:
N WE Fo F1 qo ql r
calc. calc. 870,000 16,500 .50 .80 .90
6.1.3.4 STORAGE FACILITY
The storage facility for propellants in orbit will receive propellants from earth to
orbit transportation vehicles, store them for a period of time, then transfer the stored
propellants to orbital transfer vehicles. The facility will likely be co-orbital with the space
station, to facilitate OTV use of space station as a base. Storage facilities are under design
and cost estimates have been made. Based on these cost estimates, the factors used in the
cost equations are as follows.
CO = 1,465,000 x WE.5
C 1 = 4,500xWE 8
The number of storage facilities required is a function of their capacity, the annual
propellant being supplied, and the turnover rate which is expected. To get the number of
storage facilities required, the following relationship is used.
Number = (Truncation of ((Annual Supply)/(Capacity x 2))) + 1
178
The capacity of the facility is doubled to signify that it has an annual turnover rate of
two. This relationship provides the number of storage facilities which must be built for
use. The expected life of an orbital storage facility such as this is expected to be 30 years,
so that replacement is not an issue over the time period being considered here. 11
The input for the propellant storage facility to OPSIS is in the form:
N WE Fo F1 qo ql r
calc. calc. 1,465,000 4,500 .50 .80 .90
6.1.3.5 ADDITIONAL HARDWARE
Additional hardware will be required on a launch vehicle to enable it to transfer
propellant from its tanks to an orbital storage facility. The hardware will consist of
propellant acquisition devices which consist of wire mesh screens, additional plumbing
including tubing, interfaces, and pumps. These items are similar in nature to the items
which compose the storage facility, in that they are required to perform the same functions
of propellant acquisition and transfer. Therefore the costs associated with the propellant
storage facility will also be used for the additional ELV hardware as shown below.
CO = 1,465,000x WE .5
C1 = 4,500xWE.8
11 Schuster, J.R., Bennett, F.O., Liggett, M.W., and Torre, C.N., General Dynamics Space Systems
Division, and Brown, N., NASA MSFC, Evaluation of On-Orbit Cryogenic Propellant Depot Options for
the Orbital Transfer Vehicle, Paper 88c, 6th Intersociety Cryogenics Symposium, 2-7 November 1986,
Miami Beach, Florida.
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The mass of the hardware necessary for propellant acquisition and transfer will
increase with the size of the vehicle, but there are certain fixed items as well. Therefore the
mass estimating relation for the additional hardware elements required will be of the form:
Mass = Fixed Value + (Constant x Booster Empty Weight)
Based on data from studies for development of cryogenic propellant transfer, the
baseline values for these are indicated below, which results in the final equation as
shown. 12
Fixed Mass
Constant
= 500 [lb]
= 0.01
Additional Mass = 500 + 0.01(Empty Mass)
The input for additional ELV equipment
N WE Fo F1
calc. calc. 1,465,000 4,500
to OPSIS is in the form:
qo
.50
ql
.80
The data are input in a form which allows for sequential reading of the data for each
of the infrastructure elements. They are used internally in the program to provide the basic
inputs needed in generation of the cost matrix for the simulation which defines the cost
parameters for each of the infrastructure elements as well as the calculated costs for each of
them based on the particular scenario being used. The characteristics of the cost matrix will
be discussed in the output section.
12 Rockwell International Space Transportation Systems Division, Space Transportation System (STS)
Propellant Scavenging System Study Final Report. Volume I. Technical Report, NASA -CR-171848,
January 1985.
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A summary of the primary input variables is seen in Table 6.4.
VARIABLE IDENTIFICATION
NAME
Mlv Launch Vehicle Definition Matrix
N s Number of Stages
Wlv Launch Vehicle Weight
MR Mass Ratio
AV Delta Velocity
Wpu Useable Propellant Weight
Wn Non-Useable Propellant Weight
vWs Total Stage Weight
Wilt Total Propellant Weight
wPr Residual Propellant Weight
W~pv Reserve Propellant Weight
Wp/l Payload Weight
~Isp as rSpecific Impulse
WP Mass Fraction
Wx Weight of extra Propellant Transfer Hardware
Mmm Mission Model Definition Matrix
Y Years of Program Duration
L Load Factor
R Annual Launch Rate
Mc Cost Definition Matrix
Fo Fixed Cost Constant
F 1 Recurring Cost Constant
qO Fixed Cost Exponent
ql Recurring Cost Exponent
r Slope of Learning Curve
Table 6.4
Summary and Definition of Primary Input Variables.
An example input file is seen in Table 6.5.
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ALS100K
12
2492291.00 1C2.i5
6487.29
1331099.50 E
13445.45
1427100.00
1344545.00 E
13445.45
0.00
1065191.00 1
264.00
0.93
500
ALS20
20
1995
1 396
1997
1 998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
o006
2007
°00 3
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
6
ALSSOLII
0. 0.
A LSLIOUI 
0. 0.
ALSEXTRA
0. 0.
0.0
TANK
0. 20
S TORAGE
0. 27
1L00000.
OTV
065191.00
4.77
22552.13
841839.63
17180.40
)65191 .00
859020.00
8590.20
8590.20
.00000.00
448.70
0.87
0.01 0.90
3
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
7
2492291.00
0.00
29039.42
2172939.25
30625.85
2392291.00
2203565.00
22035.65
8590.20
100000.00
0.00
0.91
.8
.8
.8
.8
.8
.8
8
.8
.8
.8
.8
.8
.8
.8
.8
.8
.EJ
.8
.8
.8
250E3 750. 0.5 0.8
5E6 5000. 0.5
1.465E6 4.5E3 0.5
00. 0. 0. 0.5
770.
5 10000.
LOTV
2 20000.
1.465E6 4.5E3
23E6
23E6
0.5
2E4 0.5
2E4 0.5
0.8
0.8
0.9
0.9
0.9
0.8 0.9
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.9
0.9
0.9
THIS FILE IS CALLED ALS2010.DAT
Table 6.5
An example input file for OPSIS.
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6.2 EXECUTION
The calculations involved in the simulation are performed by OPSIS and four
subroutines. OPSIS is the main program which drives the subroutines. There are two
level 1 subroutine and two level 2 subroutines. The basic relationship between OPSIS and
the subroutines is seen in Figure 6.7.
OPSIS
PRCALC
MANIFEST
COSTS
COSTCALC
Main Program
Level 1 Subroutine
Level 2 Subroutine
Figure 6.3
Overall program architecture for OPSIS.
Each of the elements of the program architecture will be addressed in the following
sections. The basic purpose of each element will be outlined and a simple flow diagram
will indicate the contents and processes involved.
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6.2.1 OPSIS
OPSIS is the main program involved in the simulation. It interfaces with the user,
reads in data from input files and is the driver for the level 1 subroutines. There is an
option to make multiple runs with the simulation rather than having to run the simulation
several times individually. The flow diagram for OPSIS is seen in Figure 6.4.
6.2.2 PRCALC
PRCALC is a level 1 subroutine which is called from OPSIS to calculate the
propellant quantities available from reclamation. It generates a Propellant Reclamation
Matrix (PRM) which contains the data on propellant quantities available, calls the level 2
subroutine MANIFEST to perform the actual calculations, and prints out the contents of
the PRM. A flow diagram for PRCALC is shown in Figure 6.5.
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START
OPSIS
Interactively Read in
Input file and name
Output file
Read in Launch Vehicle
Definition Matrix
Read in Mission Model
Definition Matrix
;~~Cl PRCALC
Call PRCALC
(calculates propellant availabilities)
Call COSTS
(calculates costs)
Figure 6.4
Flow diagram for OPSIS.
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YES Run
te Program
amin
NO
END
OPSIS
START
Subroutine PRCALC
i_
NO
W
/Print out PRM/
Calculate total propellant
delivered to orbit
Print out total propellant RETURN
/ delivered to orbit / 1OPSIS
Figure 6.5
Flow diagram for PRCALC.
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Define '
of Propellant
Reclamation Matrix (PRM)
/r
element
ot Propellant
Reclamation Matrix (PRM)
Calculate Propellant to
Depot element of PRM
Calculate Annual Propellant
to Depot element of PRM
Call MANIFEST
(calculates prop. to depot)
Define Propellant to Depot
element of PRM
YES
YES 
Calculate Annual PropellantI to Depot element of PRM
.
6.2.3 MANIFEST
MANIFEST is a level 2 subroutine that is called from PRCALC for calculation of
the propellant transferred to a storage depot from an ELV. The process involves calculation
of the AV for the various stages of the launch vehicle on the basis of flying with a less than
nominal GLOW when the load factor is less than one hundred percent. The launch vehicle
has a higher mass ratio therefore is capable of higher AV generation.
It is assumed that the total AV for the vehicle is the same as for the nominal
mission. This is a conservative assumption because with a lower GLOW the thrust to
weight will be higher, reducing gravity losses, thereby reducing the total AV requirement.
When the AV of the lower stages is known, the AV requirement of the upper stage can be
calculated along with the amount of propellant required to generate that AV. The propellant
unused in the ascent of the upper stage is the nominal propellant requirement less the
calculated propellant requirement. This propellant is then added to the reserves and
residuals to constitute the total propellant available, then transferred to the storage depot.
There is a factor which is multiplied with the total propellant available to account for
propellants left in the tanks which are not extractable, and for losses incurred in the transfer
process. The baseline value used in the simulation for this factor is 0.9 which says that
ninety percent of the propellant available in the ELV tanks makes it into the tanks of the
storage depot. A flow diagram of the basic calculations involved in operation of the
MANIFE ST subroutine is shown in Figure 6.6.
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START
Subroutine MANIFEST
_..
U
RETURN
to PRCALC
Figure 6.6
Flow diagram for MANIFEST.
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Calculate difference between
actual and nominal GLOW
Establish Manifesting Properties
Definition Matrix
Calculate AV from all stages
but Upper Stage and sum up
Calculate AV required
from Upper Stage
Calculate propellant unused
by Upper Stage
Calculate transferential
propellant to Storage Depot
1
,
4 .
_
6.2.4 COSTS
COSTS is a level 1 subroutine which is called from OPSIS to calculate the costs of
the various components of the propellant reclamation infrastructure. The subroutine reads
in data on cost parameters for each of the infrastructure elements, calls the level 2
subroutine COSTCALC to perform the actual calculations, generates the Cost Matrix which
contains data on costs for each of the elements, and prints out the Cost Matrix. This
subroutine is the longest of the simulation, and its flow diagram is seen in Figure 6.7.
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/Read in parameters for
infrastructure elements to
be included in simulation/
Read in cost parameters
for Solid Rocket Booster
Call COSTCALC
(for solid rocket booster)
Call COSTCALC
(for extra ELV equipment)
NO
190
Call COSTCALC
(for liquid rocket)
Calculate Cost Matrix
elements for total Launch
Vehicle (solid + liquid)
NO
NO ransportati
Tanks included inE
(f frastructure
YES
Read in cost parameters
for Transportation Tanks /
Calculate N and WE
CallCOSTCALC
(for transportation tanks)
NO Depot
included in
infrastructure
YES
/Read in cost parameters
for Prop. Storage Depot /
Calculate N
Call COSTCALC
(for prop. storage depot)
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-
J
NO
/ Read in cost parameters
for Orbital Transfer Vehicle,
Call COSTCALC
(for orbital transfer vehicle)
NO
Call COSTCALC
(for large OTV)
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Figure 6.7
Flow diagram for COSTS.
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6.2.5 COSTCALC
COSTCALC is a level 2 subroutine which is called from the level 1 subroutine
COSTS to perform the actual cost calculations. The equations used for calculation of the
various infrastructure element costs are those which were presented in the section 6.1.3. A
flow diagram of the COSTCALC subroutine is shown in Figure 6.8.
t START 
Subroutine COSTCALC
Calculate Co, C1,
P, Ccum, & Ctotave
Print out Fo, Fl, qo, ql, Co,
C1, P, Ccum, & Ctotave /
RETURN to
COSTS
Figure 6.8
Flow diagram for COSTCALC.
6.3 OUTPUT
The output from OPSIS consists primarily of four matrices, with some additional
calculations made from manipulation of particular matrix elements and presented separately
for convenience. The first two matrices are simply the Launch Vehicle and Mission Model
matrices which were read in as input. They are included in the output to verify the values
which were used internally in the program, and to identify the input values so as to avoid
potential confusion as to the input for a particular run. The other two output matrices are
Propellant Reclamation and Cost, which are essentially outputs of the subroutines
PRCALC and COSTS, respectively. An example of OPSIS output is seen in Table 6.7.
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The output variables of primary interest resulting from the simulation are indicated
in Table 6.6. These are the variables whose values will be presented in Chapter 7.
VARIABLE
NAME
Cpt
Cps
Cpo
Pa
Pt
C 1
Cp/ln
CPr/
IDENTIFICATION
Total Propellant Cost
Propellant Storage Cost
Propellant To Orbit Cost
Annual Propellant Delivered
Total Propellant Delivered
Launch Costs
Nominal Payload Transportation Cost
Actual Payload Transportation Cost
Table 6.6
Summary and Definition of Primary Output Variables.
The output sheets of the various runs are saved and used to supply the results data
which is input into Cricketgraph software on the Macintosh Plus. From the data files in
Cricketgraph, plots of results from the simulation runs are generated and these are included
in Chapter 7 which presents the results of the analysis.
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THIS IS THE OUTPUT FILE OP2010
THIS IS LAUNCH VEHICLE
WHICH HAS 2 STAGES.
2492291.0000
2.1500
6487.2900
1331099.5000
13445.4502
1427100.0000
1344545.0000
13445.4502
0.0000
1065191.0000
264.0000
0.9300
0.0000
1065191.0000
4.7700
22552.1309
841839.6250
17180.4004
965191.0000
859020.0000
8590.2002
8590.2002
100000.0000
448.7000
0.8700
1561.7100
2492291.0000
0.0000
29039.4199
2172939.2500
30G25.8496
2392291.0000
2203565.0000
22035.6504
8590.2002
100000.0000
0.0000
0.9100
1561.7100
THIS IS MISSION MODEL
FOR LAUNCH VEHICLE
YEAR FLIGHT RATE
1995.0000
1996.0000
1997.0000
1998.0000
1999.0000
2000.0000
2001.0000
2002.0000
2003.0000
2004.0000
2005.0000
2006.0000
2007.0000
2008.0000
2009.0000
2010.0000
2011.0000
2012.0000
2013.0000
2014.0000
10.0000
10.0000
10.0000
10.0000
10.0000
10.0000
10.0000
10.0000
10.0000
10.0000
10. 0000
10.0000
10.0000
10.0000
10.0000
10.0000
10.0000
10.0000
10.0000
10.0000
LOAD FACTOR
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
THIS IS THE AMOUNT OF PROPELLANT AVAILABLE ON
EACH FLIGHT AND FOR EACH YEAR OF OPERATION.
1995.00
1996.00
1997.00
1998.00
1999.00
2000.00
2001.00
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
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ALS100OK
ALS20
ALS 1 00K
2002.00
2003.00
2004.00
2005.00
2006.00
2007.00
20)08.00
2 009.00
2 ( 10.00
2011.00
201 . 00
2013.00
2014.00
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
29577.04
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
295770.38
THE TOTAL PROPELLANT DELIVERED OVER THE
LIFE OF THE PROGRAM IS 5915409.00 LB]
TOTAL NUMBER OF VEHICLES IS 200
THESE ARE THE COST CALCULATIONS FOR
FO
250000 .0000
CO
71.830960.0000
CTOTAVE
3735776.2500
F1
750.0000
C1
6433629.0000
QO Q1
0.5000 0.8000
P CCUM
-0.1520 675324288.0000
THESE ARE THE COST CALCULATIONS FOR
FO
5000000.0000
CO
1629194624.0000
(::TOTAVE
35675652.0000
F1
5000.0000
C1
52453540.0000
QO Q1
0.5000 0.8000
P CCUM
-0.1520 5505935872.0000
THESE ARE THE COST CALCULATIONS FOR
FO
1465000.0000
CO
57894564.0000
CTOTAVE
1136932.7500
F1
4500.0000
C1
1614703.7500
QO
0.5000
P
-0.1520
Q1
0.8000
CCUM
169492000.0000
THESE ARE THE COST CALCULATIONS FOR
FO
0.0000
CO
0.0000
CTOTAVE
0.0000
F1
0.0000
C1
0.0000
ALSSOLID
ALSLIQUID
ALSEXTRA
TANK
QO
0.5000
P
-0.1520
Q1
0.8000
CC U M
0.0000
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THESE ARE THE COST CALCULATIONS FOR
F 0
1465000.0000
CO
244132480.0000
CTOTAVE
137418,'84.0000
F1
4500.0000
C1
16146310.0000
00 a1
0.5000 0.8000
P CCUM
-0.1520 30705076.0000
THIS IS THE COST MATRIX FOR THE SIMULATION
WE
82555.0000
106171.0000
188726.0000
1561.7100
2000.0000
27770.0000
Q1
0.8000
0.8000
0.0000
0.8000
0.8000
0.8000
FO
250000.0000
5000000.0000
0.0000
1465000.0000
0.0000
1465000.0000
R
0.9000
0.9000
0.0000
0.9000
0.9000
0.9000
F1
750.0000
5000.0000
0.0000
4500.0000
0.0000
4500.0000
CO
71830960.0000
1629194624.0000
1701025536.0000
57894564.0000
0.0000
244132480.0000
CI
6433629.0000
52453540.0000
58887168.0000
1614703.7500
0.0000
16146310.0000
P
-0.1520
-0.1520
0.0000
-0.1520
-0.1520
-0. 1520
THE COSTS TO ORBIT ARE AS FOLLOWS
EXNONREC EXREC
57394564.0000 169492000.0000
THE COSTS OF STORAGE ARE AS FOLLOWS
EXNONREC EXREC
244132480.0000 30705076.0000
THE TOTAL COSTS ARE AS FOLLOWS
EXNONREC EXREC
302027040.0000 200197072.0000
AVERAGE LAUNCH COSTS
NOMINAL P/L DELIVERY COST
ACTUAL P/L DELIVERY COST
CCUM
675324288.0000
5505935872.0000
6181260288.0000
169492000.0000
0.0000
30705076.0000
PSUM
5915409.0000
PSUM
5915409.0000
PSUM
5915409.0000
39411428.00
394.11
492.64
CTOTAVE
3735776.2500
35675652.0000
39411428.0000
1136932.7500
0.000(
137418784.0000
PROPCOSTC$/LB]
38.4397
PROPCOSTC$/LB]
46.4613
PROPCOSTC$/LB]
84.9010
[$/LAUNCH]
C[/LB]
[$/LB]
Table 6.7
Output file from OPSIS.
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NVEH
200.0000
200.0000
200.0000
200.0000
)20(0.0000
2.0000
QO0
0,.5000
0.5000
( .0000
0.5000
0.5000
0.5000
STORAGE
CHAPTER 7
Cost calculations were made for the B and C infrastructures for propellant costs to
an OTV or other user spacecraft. The costs components are separated into cost to orbit and
storage costs. Cost to orbit is the additional cost of transporting the propellant, beyond
what is required of a nominal launch. Included are DDT&E and production costs of
additional hardware that is required. Cost of storage is the cost of the propellant depot
facility that is in orbit. This facility acts as a receptacle of propellant from the source, as a
storage tank, then as a dispenser to the users, primarily the OTV.
A diagram of the various elements of the infrastructures being considered is shown
in Figure 7.1. This is a simplified version of the infrastructures previously shown in
Figure 3.1. Descriptions of the infrastructures can be found in Chapter 3. Only the earth
to orbit transportation, propellant storage tank, and depot facility are included in this figure,
to represent the elements used in the simulation and cost analysis. In essence, only the
supply side of the infrastructure is shown in this figure.
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RESULTS
Infrastructure
Identification
A
B
C
Earth to
Orbit
Transportation
I
Propellant
Storage
Tank
Depot
Facility
C
Q
Comments
* Shuttle, therefore manned
*Current "baseline" system
* Requires 3 elements
* New ELV, unmanned
* Separate propellant tank
* Requires 3 elements
* Recommended system
* Integral propellant tank
* Requires 2 elements
Figure 7.1
Elements of three infrastructures for orbital propellant supply.
The output variables are functions of a number of input variables. The basic
functional relationships of the primary output variables to input variables are indicated in
equations 7.1-8.
Cpt
Cps
Cpo
Pt
Clnp/
= f(Wpr, Wpv, W x, Y, L, R, F0, F 1, q0 , ql, r)
= f(Wpr, Wpv, W x, Y, L, R, F0, F 1 , q0, ql, r)
= f(Wpr Wpv, Wx , Y, L, R, F, F 1, qo, ql, r)
= f(Wpr, Wpv, Wx, Y, L, R)
= f(Wpr, Wpv, Wx , Y, L, R)
= f(Y, R, F, Fl, q, ql, r)
= f(Y, R, Fo, F1 , qo, q1, r)
(7.1)
(7.2)
(7.3)
(7.4)
(7.5)
(7.6)
(7.7)
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I
Cp/la = f(Y, L, R, Fo , F1 , q, ql, r)
Each of these output variables has been calculated using different values for their
primary input variables while holding all other inputs constant, in order to determine their
sensitivities. The plots of the results from the sensitivity runs are included in section 7.2,
along with calculation of partial derivatives of the output variables with respect to their
input variables.
7.1 Infrastructure Comparisons
There are several different infrastructures which can be considered for the role of
providing propellants to orbit. The one that is generally considered given current thinking
in the industry is infrastructure A. This thesis has introduced several alternative
infrastructures for providing propellants through enhanced orbital utilization of ELVs.
These are infrastructures B, B-1 and C. The cost of propellant is the primary figure of
merit for comparison of these architectures. Another is the amount of propellant supplied
annually. All but the scenario for infrastructure A (Dedicated) take advantage of the unused
lift capability of the launch vehicles due to load factors less than one. However only
infrastructure C provides enough propellant using this lift capability alone to meet the
expected demand. A demand of 250,000 pounds per year is used as a representative
demand, as discussed in Chapter 3. When an infrastructure cannot meet demand through
utilization of excess lift capability, dedicated flights must be provided for propellant supply.
This raises the cost of propellant delivery by the nominal payload delivery rate of the launch
services for each pound of propellant delivered. Figure 7.2 compares costs for six
scenarios using the three basic infrastructures.
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Figure 7.2
Comparisons of propellant delivery costs in FY88$/pound between
infrastructures for at least 250,000 pounds to orbit per year.
Comparisons between infrastructures serve to indicate which can provide the most
cost effective supply of propellants to orbit. The infrastructures under comparison here are
A, B and C. Infrastructure A is the generally accepted infrastructure for propellant supply.
Cost figures for infrastructure A are taken from various industry sources as indicated.
Operationally for infrastructure A, the space shuttle is the transportation vehicle, and a
separate reusable tank is used for transportation of the propellant to orbit. The tank is
stored either in the payload bay or the aft cargo carrier (ACC). The A (Dedicated) column
is for purely dedicated propellant supply missions in which the propellant is the primary
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payload of the shuttle, therefore paying the shuttle launch costs.1 The A (Rockwell) is
from a Rockwell study which used propellant scavenging to take advantage of the shuttles
low load factor. By doing this, the cost is reduced significantly by not having to pay for
the transportation directly and in effect hitching a ride aboard the launch vehicle. The
scavenging of propellants provides 92,600 lb of propellant annually, with the balance being
provided as dedicated payload.2 The A (Mtn Mta) value is from a Martin Marietta study
which uses a transportation scenario similar to the Rockwell study. The cost range for the
Martin Marietta study were from 287 to 435 dollars per pound. This study also used a mix
of scavenging flights and dedicated flights to provide the required propellants.3
Infrastructure B incorporates the future ELV rather than the space shuttle, using a
reusable propellant storage tank for the earth to orbit transportation phase, and an orbital
propellant storage depot which is a separate system from the ELV. The ELV in this
scenario is being used only as a transport vehicle for the propellant. The propellant is not
paying for the transportation service however, because the amount being transferred to
orbit takes advantage of the excess payload capability of the ELV due to a load factor of
less than one hundred percent. However, only 128,000 pounds annually can be supplied
through this approach. The amounts in excess of this must be provided as dedicated
payloads. Infrastructure B incorporates a reusable tank for the earth to orbit transportation
1 Rockwell International Space Transportation Systems Division, Space Transportation System (STS)
Propellant Scavenging System Study Final Report. Volume I. Technical Report, NASA -CR-171848,
January 1985.
2 Rockwell International Space Transportation Systems Division, Space Transportation System (STS)
Propellant Scavenging System Study Final Report. Volume 3: Cost and Work Breakdown Structure,
NASA -CR-171850, January 1985.
3 Fester, D., Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace, Earth-to-Orbit Propellant Transportation Overview, NASA
Report N85-17002, 1985.
Also, SPACEFLIGHT, Volume 28, February 1986, page 80.
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of the propellant which is returned to earth and refurbished for its next mission.
Infrastructure B-1 uses an expendable tank which is disposed of after each mission, along
with the rest of the ELV.
Infrastructure C builds on B, and replaces the separate tank for earth to orbit
transportation of the propellant with the existing tanks of the ELV. This infrastructure has
the capability of delivering up to 295,000 pounds to orbit annually before having to use
dedicated payloads. Additional hardware is added to the ELV tanks to incorporate the
technology necessary for propellant transfer in orbit. This infrastructure is significantly
less costly than the others, at 85 dollars per pound of propellant delivered.
The costs of delivering propellant to orbit can be broken into two basic
components. The first is the earth to orbit cost and the second is the storage cost. Earth to
orbit cost involves the additional hardware that is required for propellant transportation
beyond the standard ELV configuration. For infrastructure B this involves the
transportation storage tank and for infrastructure C it involves the additional hardware
required by the ELV tanks to allow for propellant transfer to the depot.
Storage costs are the costs required for propellant storage facilities in orbit, which
receive propellant from the ELV and store it until it is transferred to a user spacecraft. For
each of the scenarios considered here, the storage facility is the same. Figure 7.3 shows
the overall comparison between infrastructures B and C for cost of propellant in orbit to the
user spacecraft, based on a range of ELV annual flight rates.
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Figure 7.3
Effect of Annual Launch Rate on Propellant Costs
for Infrastructures B and C.
It is seen from Figure 7.3 that the costs of propellant for infrastructure B are
roughly twice those of infrastructure C independent of launch rate. The distribution of
costs within each of the infrastructures along with the total costs are shown in Figure 7.4,
to illustrate the primary differences in cost between the two scenarios.
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Effect of Launch Rate on Storage, To Orbit, and
Total Propellant Costs for Infrastructures B and C.
The costs for infrastructure B are higher for storage, to orbit, and total regardless of
launch rate. The reason that storage costs for B are higher than C is that B is providing less
propellant in orbit, therefore the costs of storage are distributed over less propellant. It is
assumed that the propellant storage depot is of the same design for both, and is sized based
on current sizing estimates at 100,000 capacity.4 ,5 Multiple depots are used if one cannot
accommodate the supply, as was discussed in section 6.1.3.4. To orbit costs are higher
4 Fester, D., Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace, Earth-to-Orbit Propellant Transportation Overview, NASA
Report N85-17002, 1985, page 149.
5 Schuster, J.R., Bennett, F.O., Liggett, M.W., and Torre, C.N., General Dynamics Space Systems
Division, and Brown, N., NASA MSFC, EVALUATION OF ON-ORBIT CRYOGENIC PROPELLANT
DEPOT OPTIONS FOR THE ORBITAL TRANSFER VEHICLE, Paper 88c, 6th Intersociety Cryogenics
Symposium, 2-7 November 1986, Miami Beach, Florida, pp. 1-4.
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for B because a separate tank is required, as opposed to the addition of transfer equipment
to existing tanks.
The differences between infrastructures B and C regarding amount of propellant
delivered to orbit annually can be seen in Figure 7.5. These annual propellant amounts
reflect only the amount of propellant that is delivered by taking advantage of 'free
transportation'. This is the lift capability that is left unused by a load factor of less than one
hundred percent, which can be utilized for propellant reclamation and delivery. Propellant
deliveries can be increased for either scenario by setting aside dedicated payload capability
for propellant transportation, but is not included here. In using dedicated payload
capability for propellant delivery, the costs of the transportation must be included in the
propellant costs. This is done in proportion to the percentage of dedicated payload the
delivered propellant displaces.
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Figure 7.5
Effect of Launch Rate on Annual Propellant
Delivered to Orbit for Infrastructures B and C
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Sensitivity Analysis
The sensitivity analysis is intended to determine the effect of variation of certain
input parameters on the output parameters for the system of propellant reclamation.
Isolated relationships between input and output variables have been established by running
the simulation varying only the input variable in question. The results of these runs are
shown in the figures that follow. In some cases the relationships are linear, and in some
cases they are non-linear. The equation relating the two variables (with all others held
constant) can be determined from the graphs, and is given for each sensitivity following
the appropriate figure. Sensitivity functions are calculated from the equations relating the
isolated variables by taking the derivative of the isolated equation. The sensitivity function
is the partial derivative of the output variable with respect to the input variable.6 The
following example should help to illustrate this point. Take equation 7.1 which is the
relationship for total propellant costs:
Cpt = f(Wpr, Wpv, Wx, Y, L, R, Fo, F1 , qo, ql, r)
When the simulation is run for various values of R holding all other input values
constant, the relationship between Cpt and R can be isolated in the following equation:
Cpt = f(R)
The sensitivity of the output variable Cpt with respect to the input variable R can
then be determined as follows:
6 Frank, P.M., Introduction to System Sensitivity Theory, Academic Press, 1978, pp.6-1 3 .
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7.2
a Cpt d f(R)
A R dR
This is the method that is used to determine the relationships between input and
output variables, and to calculate the sensitivities of those relationships. Once the
sensitivity functions are known, it is easy to calculate changes in system behavior from
parameter deviations, or different parameter assumptions.7, 8
7.2.1 Infrastructure C
Sensitivities for Infrastructure C are determined in the following section. The
sensitivities will be grouped by output variable, determining the relationship between each
primary output variable of concern with certain input variables.
7.2.1.1 Propellant Cost Sensitivities
The relationships between launch rate R and propellant costs are represented in
figure 7.5. Based on the relationships indicated in that figure, the following equations have
been determined through a logarithmic curve fit of the curves in the graph. These are the
equations which relate the output variables for propellant cost to launch rate R holding all
other input variables constant.
7 de Neufville, R., Stafford, J., Systems Analysis for Engineers and Managers, McGraw-Hill Book
Company, 1971, pp. 70-86.
8 Sensitivity Analysis in Engineering, Proceedings of a symposium held at Langley Research Center,
Hampton, Virginia, 25-26 September 1986, pp. 90-91.
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Cpt = 459.18 R-7028 (7.9)
Cps = 406.35 R 9 3 19 (7.10)
Cpo = 105.48 R 4 1 12 (7.11)
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Figure 7.6
Effect of Launch Rate on Propellant Cost
for Infrastructure C
The following sensitivity functions represent the effect of a change in launch rate on
propellant costs. They are derivatives of equations 7.9-11, which were generated from the
data in Figure 7.6.
a Cpt
= -322.71 R 1.7028 (7.12)
aR
a Cps
= -378.68 R'1' 9 3 1 9 (7.13)
aR
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(7.14)=a CPO-1.4112= -43.37 R 
aR
The relationships between load factor L and propellant costs are represented in
figure 7.7. Based on the relationships indicated in that figure, the following equations have
been determined through a second order polynomial curve fit of the curves in the graph.
These are the equations which relate the output variables for propellant cost to load factor L
holding all other input variables constant.
Cpt
Cps
Cpo
(7.15)156.15 - 413.12 L + 408.30 L2
(7.16)81.39 - 210.01 L + 209.69 L2
(7.17)74.76 - 203.12 L + 198.61 L2
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Figure 7.7
Effect of Load Factor on Propellant Cost
for Infrastructure C
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The following sensitivity functions represent the effect of a change in load factor on
propellant costs. They are derivatives of equations 7.15-17, which were generated from
the data in Figure 7.7.
a cptat
a ps
aL
a L
(7.18)
=- 413.12 + 816.60 L
(7.19)
= - 210.01 + 419.38 L
(7.20)
- 203.12 + 397.22 L
The relationships between program duration Y and propellant costs are represented
in Figure 7.8. Based on the relationships indicated in that figure, the following equations
have been determined through a logarithmic curve fit of the curves in the graph. These are
the equations which relate the output variables for propellant cost to program duration Y
holding all other input variables constant.
Cpt = 773.73 Y - 7 3 4 1
Cps = 929.23Y 1
Cpo
(7.21)
(7.22)
(7.23)
= 123.34 Y -3887
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Figure 7.8
Effect of Program Duration on Propellant Cost
for Infrastructure C
The following sensitivity functions represent the effect of a change in program
duration on propellant costs. They are derivatives of equations 7.21-23, which were
generated from the data in Figure 7.8.
aca CPt
= -568. OY y-1. 734 1 (7.24)
aY
acps
= -929.23 Y -2 (7.25)
aY
a Cpo
-= -47.90 -1.3887 (7.26)
aY
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Propellant Delivered Sensitivities
The relationship between launch rate R and annual propellant delivered Pa are
represented in Figure 7.9. Based on the relationships indicated in that figure, the following
equation has been determined through a linear curve fit of the curve in the graph. This is
the equation which relates the output variable of annual propellant delivered to launch rate
holding all other input variables constant.
= 29,580 R
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(7.27)
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Figure 7.9
Effect of Launch Rate on Annual Propellant Delivered
for Infrastructure C
The following sensitivity function represents the effect of a change in annual launch
rate on annual propellant delivered to orbit. It is a derivative of equation 7.27, which was
generated from the data in Figure 7.9.
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7.2.1.2
aPa
= 29,580
aR
(7.28)
The relationships between load factor L and annual propellant delivered Pa are
represented in Figure 7.10. Based on the relationship indicated in that figure, the following
equation has been determined through a linear curve fit of the curve in the graph. This is
the equation which relates the output variable of annual propellant delivered to load factor
holding all other input variables constant.
= 907,900 - 765,200 L (7.29)
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Figure 7.10
Effect of Load Factor on Annual Propellant Delivered
for Infrastructure C
The following sensitivity function represents the effect of a change in load factor on
annual propellant delivered to orbit. It is a derivative of equation 7.29, which was
generated from the data in Figure 7.10.
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a
aP
a
= 765,200
aL
(7.30)
The relationships between program duration Y and total propellant delivered Pt are
represented in Figure 7.11. Based on the relationship indicated in that figure, the following
equation has been determined through a linear curve fit of the curve in the graph. This is
the equation which relates the output variable of total propellant delivered to program
duration holding all other input variables constant.
Pt
9
D 8
la 7
;1 6
5
3
2
= 295,700 Y
10 15 20 25
Program Years
(7.31)
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Figure 7.11
Effect of Program Duration on Total Propellant Delivered
for Infrastructure C
The following sensitivity function represents the effect of a change in program
duration on total propellant delivered to orbit. It is a derivative of equation 7.31, which
was generated from the data in Figure 7.11.
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a Pt
= 295,700
a Y
(7.32)
The relationships between annual launch rate R and total propellant delivered Pt are
represented in Figure 7.12. Based on the relationship indicated in that figure, the following
equation has been determined through a linear curve fit of the curve in the graph. This is
the equation which relates the output variable of total propellant delivered to annual launch
rate holding all other input variables constant.
Pt
C
I 0
A
= 591,600 R (7.33)
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Figure 7.12
Effect of Annual Launch Rate on Total Propellant Delivered
for Infrastructure C
The following sensitivity function represents the effect of a change in annual launch
rate on total propellant delivered to orbit. It is a derivative of equation 7.33, which was
generated from the data in Figure 7.12.
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7.2.1.3 Launch Cost Sensitivities
The relationships between annual launch rate R and launch cost CL are represented
in Figure 7.13. Based on the relationship indicated in that figure, the following equation
has been determined through a logarithmic curve fit of the curve in the graph. This is the
equation which relates the output variable of launch cost to annual launch rate holding all
other input variables constant
CL
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= 99.2 (10 6 ) R -.3 76 1 (7.35)
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Figure 7.13
Effect of Launch Rate on Launch Costs
for Infrastructure C
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The following sensitivity function represents the effect of a change in annual launch
rate on launch cost. It is a derivative of equation 7.35, which was generated from the data
in Figure 7.13.
acL
= -37.3 (106) R -1.3761 (7.36)
aR
The relationships between program duration Y and launch cost CL are represented
in Figure 7.14. Based on the relationship indicated in that figure, the following equation
has been determined through a logarithmic curve fit of the curve in the graph. This is the
equation which relates the output variable of launch cost to program duration holding all
other input variables constant.
CL
55
oo00oo
0
Q
C.)
;-L
50
45
40
35
30
- 114.6 (106) Y -.3536 (7.37)
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Figure 7.14
Effect of Program Duration on Launch Costs
for Infrastructure C
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The following sensitivity function represents the effect of a change in program
duration on launch cost. It is a derivative of equation 7.37, which was generated from the
data in Figure 7.14.
acL
= -40.52 (106) y -1.3536 (7.38)
aY
7.2.1.4 Payload Delivery Cost Sensitivities
The relationships between launch rate R and payload delivery costs are represented
in Figure 7.15. Based on the relationships indicated in that figure, the following equations
have been determined through a logarithmic curve fit of the curves in the graph. These are
the equations which relate the output variables for payload delivery cost to launch rate R
holding all other input variables constant.
CP/Ln = 991.87 R (7.39)
CP/La = 1,239.84 R-.3761 (7.40)
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Figure 7.15
Effect of Launch Rate on Payload Costs
for Infrastructure C
The following sensitivity functions represent the effect of a change in annual launch
rate on payload delivery costs. They are derivatives of equations 7.39-40, which were
generated from the data in Figure 7.15.
cP/Ln
= -373.04 R -1.3 7 6 1 (7.41)
aR
CP/La
= -466.30 R -1.37 61 (7.42)
aR
The relationships between program duration Y and payload delivery costs are
represented in figure 7.16. Based on the relationships indicated in that figure, the
following equations have determined through a logarithmic curve fit of the curves in the
graph. These are the equations which relate the output variables for payload delivery cost
to program duration holding all other input variables constant.
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Figure 7.16
Effect of Program Duration on Payload Costs
for Infrastructure C
The following sensitivity functions represent the effect of a change in program
duration on payload delivery costs. They are derivatives of equations 7.43-44, which were
generated from the data in Figure 7.16.
a Cp/Ln
= -405.39 Y -1.3536
a = -506.74 Y
= -506.74 Y -1.3536
aY
(7.45)
(7.46)
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The relationships between load factor L and payload delivery costs are represented
in figure 7.17. Based on the relationships indicated in that figure, the following equations
have determined through a logarithmic curve fit of the curves in the graph. These are the
equations which relate the output variables for payload delivery cost to load factor holding
all other input variables constant.
CP/Ln =
CP/La =
800
I,0UUL~
L}
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Figure 7.17
Effect of Load Factor on Payload Costs
for Infrastructure C
The following sensitivity functions represent the effect of a change in load factor on
payload delivery costs. They are derivatives of equations 7.47-48, which were generated
from the data in Figure 7.17.
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a cpn
= 0 (7.49)
aL
= -394.11 L -2 (7.50)
aL
7.2.2 Infrastructure B
The relationship between launch rate R and annual propellant delivered Pa for
infrastructure B are represented in Figure 7.18. Based on the relationships indicated in that
figure, the following equation has been determined through a linear curve fit of the curve in
the graph. This is the equation which relates the output variable of annual propellant
delivered to launch rate holding all other input variables constant.
Pa = 12,800 R (7.51)
224
4UUUU
300000
200000
= 100000
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Launch Rate
Figure 7.18
Effect of Launch Rate on Annual Propellant Delivered
for Infrastructure B
The following sensitivity function represents the effect of a change in annual launch
rate on annual propellant delivered to orbit. It is a derivative of equation 7.51, which was
generated from the data in Figure 7.18.
aPa
= 12,800 (7.52)
aR
The relationship between launch rate R and total propellant delivered Pt are
represented in Figure 7.19. Based on the relationships indicated in that figure, the
following equation has been determined through a linear curve fit of the curve in the graph.
This is the equation which relates the output variable of total propellant delivered to launch
rate holding all other input variables constant.
Pa = 256,000 R (7.53)
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Figure 7.19
Effect of Launch Rate on Total Propellant Delivered
for Infrastructure B
The following sensitivity function represents the effect of a change in annual launch
rate on annual propellant delivered to orbit. It is a derivative of equation 7.53, which was
generated from the data in Figure 7.19.
Pt
= 256,000 (7.54)
a R
The relationships between launch rate R and propellant costs for infrastructure B are
represented in figure 7.20. Based on the relationships indicated in that figure, the
following equations have determined through a logarithmic curve fit of the curves in the
graph. These are the equations which relate the output variables for propellant cost to
launch rate R holding all other input variables constant.
Cpt = 1,054.00 R - 7 19 3 (7.55)
Cps = 985.18 R 9 7 7 0 (7.56)ps985.18 R-97
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Cpo = 223.67 R 3941 (7.57)
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Figure 7.20
Effect of Launch Rate on Propellant Costs
for Infrastructure B
The following sensitivity functions represent the effect of a change in launch rate on
propellant costs. They are derivatives of equations 7.55-57, which were generated from
the data in Figure 7.20.
aCpt
= -758.14 R -1 7 19 3 (7.58)
aR
Cps
= -962.52-1 9770 (7.59)
= -962.52 R
a R
acPpo
= -88.15 R-1. 3 9 4 1 (7.60)
aR
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Infrastructure B-1
The relationships between launch rate R and propellant costs are represented for
infrastructure B-1 in figure 7.21. Based on the relationships indicated in that figure, the
following equations have determined through a logarithmic curve fit of the curves in the
graph. These are the equations which relate the output variables for propellant cost to
launch rate R holding all other input variables constant.
Cpt = 1,395.00 R 3 7 69 (7.61)
Cps = 985.17 R-' 9 7 7 3 (7.62)
Cpo = 722.54 R-' 19 9 0 (7.63)
228
7.2.3
1200
1000
a 800
8
U
m 600
200
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Launch Rate
Figure 7.21
Effect of Launch Rate on Propellant Costs
for Infrastructure B-1
The following sensitivity functions represent the effect of a change in load factor on
propellant costs. They are derivatives of equations 7.61-63, which were generated from
the data in Figure 7.21.
acptPt
= -525.78 R -1 3 7 6 9 (7.64)
aR
Cps
= -962.81 R -1.9 7 7 3 (7.65)
R
po
= -143.79 R -1.1990 (7.66)
aR
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSIONS & POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
It is essential for the United States space program that a new space infrastructure be
established. The realities of political, technical, and economic competition in the world
community are significant factors beyond the basic human motivation for exploration and
discovery. The primary political reason is to maintain parity in space development with the
Soviet Union. To be a second-tier space power would be politically unsettling, from the
view of national prestige as well as from the military reality that space is an integral portion
of the nations military strength.
The technical achievements which made the U.S. a space power have provided a
solid backdrop for science in general. Scientific experiments and observations made in
space cannot be matched in many respects by those done on the Earth. The loss of a strong
foundation in space science and exploration would have a profound effect on the scientific
community and the technical level of achievement of the U.S. vis a vis the rest of the
world.
As space becomes more developed, its commercial applications will grow evermore
rapidly. Space operations will one day have a significant effect on global economics. The
U.S. must proceed with the development of a new space infrastructure to maintain a
competitive posture. The Soviet Union is not the only concern in this regard. The Chinese
have developed a launch capability and are proceeding with an independent space program.
The European Space Agency (ESA) has a strong and ambitious program, as does the
National Space Development Agency (NASDA) of Japan. All of these space programs
have recognized the profitability of commercial space launches and entered the market, in
direct global competition with U.S. firms. This is a trend that will surely be followed by
many more applications in the future.
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Expendable launch vehicles (ELVs) will play a significant role in the future space
infrastructure. There are roles beyond earth-to-orbit transportation which ELVs can fulfill
in a very cost effective manner, beginning with propellant reclamation. Enhancing the
orbital utilization of ELVs in this manner will add a degree of efficacy to the infrastructure
by reducing the resources required for orbital propellant supply. This will strengthen the
infrastructure by allowing finite resources to be used for other applications.
This final chapter will present conclusions drawn from the research and analyses
that have been presented on enhancing the orbital utilization of expendable launch vehicles.
Using the conclusions as a premise, recommendations will be made for development of an
orbital propellant supply infrastructure which utilizes ELV resources. A framework will be
established for this utilization, and a roadmap presented for its implementation. The policy
precedents which enable certain aspects of the implementation will be referred to, and the
technology development requirements will be addressed.
8.1 CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions of this section are based on the results of the OPSIS simulation
and the contents of the previous chapters. Answers will be provided for many of the
questions which have been raised regarding the enhanced utilization of ELVs. The
conclusions will be made in a sequential order which allow each conclusion to build on the
previous ones. The rationale behind each of the conclusions will be summarized in a brief
discussion following each.
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(1) A NEW INFRASTRUCTURE SHOULD BE DEVELOPED FOR
SPACE OPERATIONS OVER THE NEXT 10 TO 15 YEARS
The U.S. should proceed with a new infrastructure for space operations. The
infrastructure should be composed of several elements, including a space station, orbital
maneuvering vehicles, orbital transfer vehicles, earth to orbit transportation vehicles, and a
supply infrastructure for replenishment of consumables including propellant. The motives
for development of a new infrastructure are many. Political, military, and economic
competition with the other spacefaring nations are significant factors, as are the human
aspirations for scientific exploration and discovery.
(2) A NEW EXPENDABLE LAUNCH VEHICLE SHOULD BE
DEVELOPED FOR USE IN THE NEW INFRASTRUCTURE.
There is a need for development of a new vehicle to augment the current space
transportation system (STS) in the new infrastructure. Existing ELVs do not have the
capability for lifting the payloads required, and they are more costly than is desired. A new
launch vehicle will provide the required lift capability, and do so for less cost than current
systems. Development of a new vehicle will also allow U.S. industry to compete more
effectively in the international marketplace for space launch services. The new vehicle will
be likely be a product of either the Shuttle-C or the ALS program. Which one will be
developed is dependent on the political climate in the coming years, but indications are that
the ALS has the best chance of being developed.
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(3) THERE WILL BE A SIGNIFICANT DEMAND FOR CRYOGENIC
PROPELLANTS IN LOW EARTH ORBIT
A space based reusable orbital transfer is being planned for use in the new
infrastructure for a variety of high energy missions. This vehicle will have significant
economic advantages over expendable OTVs or ground based OTVs. The propellants used
will be liquid oxygen and liquid hydrogen, for which the annual demand will be from a few
to several hundred thousand pounds.
(4) THE TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITY FOR TRANSFER AND
LONG TERM STORAGE OF CRYOGENIC PROPELLANTS IN
ORBIT SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED
There has been considerable research to date on the topics of transfer and long term
storage of cryogenics in orbit. Many NASA centers are participating and actively funding
research in this area, as is the DoD, in particular for SDI. Flight experiments are planned,
but further delays in launch schedule could block the timely development of this
technological capability.
(5) THE PROPELLANT RECLAMATION SCENARIO FOR ELVS
PROPOSED BY INFRASTRUCTURE C IS THE BEST
APPROACH TO ORBITAL PROPELLANT SUPPLY FOR THE
FUTURE SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE.
The infrastructures under consideration can be seen in Figure 3.1. The scenario for
propellant reclamation proposed in infrastructure C is the best approach for a variety of
reasons. There are essentially eight reasons that point to this infrastructure as being the
best, and they are as follows.
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* COST EFFECTIVENESS: Infrastructure C reduces costs by at
least a factor of three over propellant supply options which
are currently under consideration (i.e. shuttle), and also
costs less than other infrastructures which are proposed in
this thesis. This can be seen in Figure 7.2.
*LOWER TECHNICAL RISK: Development of an ELV
propellant reclamation capability for the new infrastructure
will reduce the technology requirements on other systems.
In particular, the OTV will not need to be developed with
aerobraking technology. The primary reason for
development of aerobraking is to reduce propellant
consumption of reusable OTVs, and the primary reason for
reduction is the high cost of propellants in orbit. If
propellant costs decrease significantly, the high technology
aerobraking requirements placed on an OTV will be
eliminated.
* IMPROVED SAFETY: Utilization of ELVs can be done in an
unmanned manner eliminating the heightened safety
concerns when manned systems such as the shuttle are
involved.
* SUFFICIENT PROPELLANT SUPPLY: Propellant reclamation
using ELVs will provide the capability to put as much
propellant in orbit as is desired, simply by building and
launching dedicated ELVs. The shuttle is limited to flight
rates of less than 15 per year as indicated in Chapter 4, and
dedicated propellant delivery missions would have stiff
competition for manifesting. The construction cost of
another orbiter to raise launch rates for propellant delivery is
significant.
* REDUCED COMPLEXITY: Enhancing the orbital utilization of
ELVs reduces the number of components required in the
infrastructure, creating a simpler system.
234
* INCREASED FLEXIBILITY: Through ELV propellant
reclamation, the propellant supply infrastructure can be made
more flexible than if separate transportation tanks are
required. Separate transportation tanks are fixed in size
therefore fixed in propellant delivery quantities. By using
the propellant tanks inherent in an ELV, the quantity of
propellant delivered is readily variable creating flexibility for
the delivery system.
* SCHEDULING: ELVs which may incorporate propellant
reclamation technology are currently in the design phase.
There is no retro-fitting required to provide propellant
delivery as there is with the shuttle. An integrated design
can be made which will incorporate not only the earth to
orbit transporation capability into the ELV, but the propellant
reclamation capability as well.
* INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION AND COOPERATION:
Developing an ELV utilization capability for propellant
reclamation can allow other nations to participate directly in a
propellant supply infrastructure. By making their launch
vehicles capable of propellant transfer, they can provide a
portion of orbital propellants for their own use. International
partners entering now can participate in the design phase of
the propellant supply infrastructure.
These reasons favoring infrastructure C are consistent with NASA's programmatic
objectives for orbital fluid supply as shown in Chapter 5, particularly for cost, safety,
flexibility, and reduced complexity. General conclusions regarding each of the scenarios
will be discussed below in relation to the points made in favor of infrastructure C.
INFRASTRUCTURE A: Due to the policy which NASA began by cancelling the
Shuttle/Centaur high energy upper stage, the availability of the space shuttle to carry
cryogens to orbit is questionable. The primary reason for this policy is concern over
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safety. If the shuttle were to provide cryogenic propellants to orbit, the cost of doing so
would be at least three times higher than the costs with use of expendables in infrastructure
C as indicated in Chapter 7.
INFRASTRUCTURE B: The use of infrastructure B would provide propellant on
orbit that is comparable in cost to that which could be provided with the shuttle.
Infrastructure B-1 in which the transportation tank for propellants is expendable is much
more costly than B which reuses the tank. The costs of this scenario are significantly
higher than those for infrastructure C, in part because the amount of propellant that can be
supplied annually without dedicated transportation is fifty percent less than C.
INFRASTRUCTURE C: This scenario is the best alternative for propellant supply to
orbit. The cost of propellant delivery at 85 dollars per pound is significantly less than the
costs of other infrastructures by at least a factor of three. This is in part because the amount
of propellant that can be supplied annually by infrastructure C without requiring dedicated
transportation is significantly higher than for the other infrastructures.
INFRASTRUCTURE D: The use of an ELV for the propellant storage depot has
many problems given the projected demand. This makes this utilization scenario unfeasible
as discussed in Chapter 3.
INFRASTRUCTURE E: This scenario has the same problems as D for utilization of
the ELV as a propellant depot. However, there may be benefits to using the ELV as a high
energy upper stage for large payload missions. This utilization method should be
developed following propellant reclamation as discussed in Chapter 3.
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(6) ENHANCED ORBITAL UTILIZATION OF ELVS WILL
STRENGTHEN THE NEW SPACE INFRASTRUCTURE
By utilizing ELVs for propellant reclamation, they are exceeding their traditional
role of earth-to-orbit transportation. The cost for enhanced utilization of ELVs is much less
than the cost for development and implementation of alternate systems to accomplish the
same tasks. Therefore the cost of overall infrastructure operations is decreased. This
strengthens the infrastructure by providing more opportunity for growth, and diverting into
other areas, resources which would have gone into propellant delivery.
8.2 RECOMMENDATIONS
Orbital utilization of ELVs through propellant reclamation should be implemented in
the future space infrastructure. The general functional relationships between primary
elements of such an infrastructure are indicated in Figure 8.1.
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User spacecraft from various
la1e nations and commercial users
purchase propellants from depot.
Orbital propellant depot receives
propellants from ELVs and
disburses it to user spacecraft
Launch vehicles potentially from
various nations or commercial
users are utilized for propellant
reclamation to deliver propellant.
Propellant originates on earth,
needs to be transported to orbit.
Figure 8.1
Basic functional relationships of infrastructural elements.
NASA and the DoD are each interested in obtaining an infrastructure for propellant
supply and transfer in space. The presence of a propellant supply infrastructure will reduce
transportation costs significantly for high energy missions. This will allow greater
participation in the utilization of space for civil, military, and commercial ventures. The
risk associated with development of a high technology program very high. Government
has traditionally funded developments of this nature. When the benefits of a venture such
as development of space are shared by many, the risks of undertaking the development are
also shared by many through government funding. Government should bear the financial
burden for funding of the development of a new space infrastructure and the associated
developments for propellant reclamation. The civil and military space programs will be the
prime beneficiaries of such a development, at least initially, which aids in justification of
this recommendation.
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In aerospace, large programs have historically been government funded, with the
actual work being performed by the contractors. These roles are recommended for the
development of an infrastructure for propellant supply and transfer. Through the research,
development and test phase, the work should be primarily funded by the government, split
between the civil and military space programs in some efficacious manner. There should
be some international involvement as well. Foreign programs will be interested in
obtaining or having access to a propellant supply capability. In order to facilitate
international cooperation and transfer of technology from work being done on this subject
by other spacefaring nations, it should be a multinational effort. The proportion of the
funding and work to be done by foreign governments and contractors is difficult to
estimate, but will likely be less than that spent by the U.S.
The development and test phase of the program should be set up in a manner similar
to the research phase. Because of the level of risk involved and the national interest in the
program, the majority of the funding should be covered by the government, with some
private and some international funding. This phase will verify the technology required for
development of the program, and establish its feasibility. This scenario for development
has precedent in the communications, remote sensing, and launch vehicle industries. In
these examples, the government provided the developmental funding and when the
technologies were mature, turned them over to private industry for commercialization as
seen in section 4.5.
With feasibility established and interest in the program from government and/or
private users, private industry can proceed with production and deployment of the system
under private funding. The "anchor tenant" concept can be employed for the funding, as
was discussed in section 4.5.2. This method of funding is currently being initiated for low
earth space facilities. Such a precedent will provide a basis for moving forward with more
privately funded space program developments, of which a propellant supply infrastructure
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should be one. The government can provide the developer with a guaranteed leasing
agreement which will reduce the risk to investors, allowing private financing of the
program. The private sector should work with foreign contributors to set up an
organization which may follow the Intelsat model. Such an organization would create a
framework for participation, and an authority to run the operation.
Military users of orbital propellants will likely desire a separate facility from one
used for international civil and private spacecraft. This stems from security concerns, level
of control, and resource availability particularly in the event of conflict. The military
should use technology which had been developed in the integrated program previously, and
develop a separate orbital facility for their dedicated use. They may use the same contractor
as the privately funded program, but should directly manage their own facility in contrast to
the commercial facility which would be governed by private industry in an international
consortia.
Users of the facilities should be from various nations. A policy decision should be
made early in the program as to whether Soviet bloc nations would be allowed to participate
in the program if they wished to. The Soviet Union may be hoping to develop such a
facility for their own use, primarily out of military motives. Their military would surely
have the same concerns as that of the U.S. over sharing a facility.
Membership in an international consortia for supply of orbital propellants should be
in the spirit of the Intelsat model. A schematic of how the facility should work is shown in
figure 8.2.
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Figure 8.2
Orbital depot as middleman for international supply and demand.
An orbital depot should be the center of the propellant supply infrastructure. Use of
ELVs to supply propellants should be done by several nations as well as private users, if
they incorporate the necessary transfer technologies into their launch vehicles. Propellants
will be reclaimed from the launch vehicles and stored in the depot facility which will then
act as an orbital gas station to provide propellants to spacecraft for a number of users. The
user spacecraft should also be from a number of nations or private ventures. An
accounting system should be established for purchase of propellants from ELV suppliers
and selling of propellants to spacecraft users with the depot acting as middleman.
The development scenario which has been outlined in the previous discussion is
summarized in Table 8.1. The numbers used in this table regarding level of involvement
are estimates by the author. These estimates should allow favorable participation by the
various parties, which will strengthen the potential for development of this utilization
capability.
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Groups and % of functional involvement or responsibility
Program Task NASA DoD Foreign Private Sector
Technology Development Funding 40 25 25 10
Technology Development Work 10 10 25 55
Hardware Dev. & Test Funding 40 40 25 10
Hardware Dev. & Test Work 10 10 25 55
Production Oversight Oversight 25 75
Deployment Oversight 25 25 50
Operational Responsibility Oversight 25 25 50
Operational Utilization 25 25 25 25
Table 8.1
Development scenario for ELV propellant reclamation.
In order to accomplish this recommended scenario for incorporation of propellant
reclamation into the new space infrastructure, several things should occur. The following
recommendations will outline the necessary steps.
-ADVANCED SPACE OPERATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE
STUDIES SHOULD INCORPORATE ELV UTILIZATION
SCENARIOS
The ongoing studies for development and definition of the advanced space
infrastructure should consider the various scenarios presented here for enhanced orbital
utilization of ELVs. These scenarios offer the potential for reduced cost of the overall
infrastructure through reduction of separate system element development programs. ELVs
will be an important element of the new infrastructure and their potential for utilization
should be thoroughly investigated so that full advantage can be made of their capabilities.
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*ORBITAL PROPELLANT SUPPLY STUDIES SHOULD
INVESTIGATE ELVS AS A RESOURCE
The orbital utilization of ELVs through propellant reclamation has been identified
here as having the potential for substantially reducing the cost of orbital propellant supply.
Studies which are investigating scenarios for orbital propellant supply should seriously
consider ELV propellant reclamation.
* ORBITAL PROPELLANT TRANSFER TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT SHOULD BE ACCELERATED
The need for propellants in orbit is currently in existence and will grow
tremendously in the next ten years. Technology requirements for transfer and storage of
storable propellants have been demonstrated and are well established. However there is
much work to be done on developing the technological capability for transfer and long term
storage of cryogenic propellants. These technologies are critical many of the proposed
elements of the new infrastructure, particularly the OTV. Their development schedules
should be seriously addressed and accelerated to assure the maturity of the necessary
technologies for cryogenic propellant operations in orbit.
ADVANCED LAUNCH SYSTEM (ALS) AND SHUTTLE-C
STUDIES SHOULD INCORPORATE DESIGN OPTIONS WHICH
PROVIDE PROPELLANT RECLAMATION TECHNOLOGY
The utilization of ELVs for propellant reclamation is dependent on the incorporation
of the necessary technologies for propellant transfer into their designs. Studies for
advanced transportation vehicles should interface with studies for cryogenic transfer and
storage to collect data on performance and design for propellant transfer. The incorporation
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of these technologies into advanced launch vehicles should be verified, and propellant
transfer and storage studies should develop strong lines of communication, if not merge
with the programs for vehicle development.
INTERNATIONAL INVOLVEMENT SHOULD BE ENCOURAGED
AND PARTICIPATION IN DESIGN STUDIES INITIATED
Development of an infrastructure for orbital propellant supply and distribution is of
interest to all spacefaring nations. Participation by other nations will reduce the
development burden and foster technology transfer and international cooperation. Early
involvement will allow farsighted planning, thus reducing the potential for problems and
enhancing communication.
This is an opportune time for evaluation of systems which can make the new space
infrastructure more economically and operationally attractive. Space programs require a
large amount of resources, and during times of fiscal restraint such programs are not
readily approved. International participation will reduce the burden of development on any
single space program. The benefits should be made available to be used by all, and
reciprocally so should the costs and risks be shared. Additionally, international
cooperation in space has had strong support and participation in the past. New areas of
development that foster such cooperation can only help in reiterating the point that from
space there are no boundaries.
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APPENDIX: COMPUTER CODE
PROGRAM OPSIS
C DOUGLAS A. COMSTOCK
C MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
C SPRING 1988
C
C THIS PROGRAM IS THE ORBITAL PROPELLANT SUPPLY
C INFRASTRUCTURE SIMULATION (OPSIS)
C
C THIS IS THE EXECUTIVE PROGRAM WHICH RUNS THE
C SIMULATION FOR PROPELLANT RECLAMATION FROM EXPENDABLE
C LAUNCH VEHICLES IN ORBIT
C
C
REAL PMFST,MANM,MASS
C
CHARACTER VEHICLEA15,MMNAMEA15,SIMDATA15, ATAINA15
C
COMMON MASS(13,5),MANM(5,5),VMM(30,4) ,RECP(30,10),COST(8.1.-)
C
C VARIABLE DEFINITION
C
C M = COUNTER
C MANM = MANIFESTING CALCULATION MATRIX
C MASS = VEHICLE DEFINITION MATRIX
C PMFST = MANIFESTING RATIO
C N = COUNTER
C NSTAGE = NUMBER OF STAGES FOR VEHICLE
C TOTDV = TOTAL DELTA VELOCITY UP TO NSTAGE
C
C
C TO ENTER DATA
C
1002 CONTINUE
C
WRITE (6,A) ' ENTER NAME FOR THE OUTPUT DATA FILE WHICH"
WRITE (6,A) ' YOU WISH TO CREATE FROM THIS SIMULATION'
READ (5,'(A)') SIMDAT
C
OPEN (UNIT=7,FILE=SIMDAT,STATUS='NEW')
C
WRITE (7,50) SIMDAT
NCYC=1
C
C TO OPEN DATA FILE FOR VEHICLE
C
WRITE (6,A) ' ENTER NAME OF INPUT DATA FILE'
WRITE (6,A) ' WHICH YOU WISH TO USE FOR SIMULATION'
REALD (5,'(A)') DATAIN
OPEN (UNIT=lO,FIL=-DATAIN,STATUS='CLD')
REWIND (UNIT=10)
REALD (10,'(A)') VEHICLE
REALD (10,*) NROW,NSTAGE
C TO DESCRIBE MASS PROPERTIES DEFINITION MATRIX
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c
C THIS IS AN N X M MATRIX, WITH M COLUMNS REPRESENTING
C THE M-1 STAGES OF THE LAUNCH VEHICLE, AND M REPRESENTIN!,
C THE OVERALL MASS PROPERTIES OF THE LAUNCH VEHICLE.
C
C THE ROWS ALL REPRESENT DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF TIHE
C LAUNCH VEHICLE MASS, AND ARE BRIEFLY DEFINED BELOW
C BY ROW NUMBER.
C
C 1 TOTAL VEHICLE MASS INCLUDING THIS STAGE
C 2 MASS RATIO OF VEHICLE TO THIS STAGE
C 3 DELTA VELOCITY OF THIS STAGE
C 4 PROPELLANT USED BY THIS STAGE
C 5 RECLAIMABLE PROPELLANT FROM THIS STAGE
C 6 TOTAL WEIGHT OF ONLY THIS STAGE
C 7 TOTAL PROPELLANT WEIGHT OF ONLY THIS STAGE
C 8 RESIDUAL PROPELLANT WEIGHT OF ONLY THIS STAGE
C 9 RESERVE PROPELLANT WEIGHT OF ONLY THIS STAGE
C 10 PAYLOAD WEIGHT OF THIS STAGE
C 11 VACUUM SPECIFIC IMPULSE OF THIS STAGE
C 12 MASS FRACTION OF THIS STAGE
C 13 MASS OF ADDITIONAL PROP TRANSFER HARDWARE
C
READ (10,A) ((MASS(I,J),J=1,NSTAGE+I),I=1,NROW)
C
READ (10,A) X,Y,TREFF
C
MASS(13,NSTAGE) = X + Y A (MASS(G,NSTAGE)-MASS(7.NSTAGE))
MASS(13,NSTAGE+1) = MASS(13,NSTAGE)
C
WRITE (6,65) VEHICLE,NSTAGE
IF (NSTAGE .ED. 1) THEN
WRITE (6,60) ((MASS(I,J),J=1,NSIAGE+1),I=1,13)
ELSEIF (NSTAGE .ED. 2) THEN
WRITE (6,70) ((MASS(I,J),J=1,NSTAGE+1),I=1,13)
ELSEIF (NSTAGE .ED. 3) THEN
WRITE (6,80) ((MASS(I,J),J=1,NSTAGE+1),I=1,13)
ELSEIF (NSTAGE .EQ. 4) THEN
WRITE (6,90) ((MASS(I,J),J=1,NSTAGE+1),I=1,13)
END IF
C
WRITE (7,65) VEHICLE,NSTAGE
IF (NSTAGE .EQ. 1) THEN
WRITE (7,60) ((MASS(I,J),J=1,NSTAGE+1),I=1,13)
ELSEIF (NSTAGE .EO. 2) THEN
WRITE (7,70) ((MASS(I,J),J=1,NSTAE+1),I=1,13)
ELSEIF (NSTAGE .EQ. 3) THEN
WRITE (7,80) ((MASS(I,J),J=1,NSTA'lE+1),I=1.,1.)
ELSEIF (NSTAGE .EO. 4) THEN
WRITE (7,90) ((MASS(I,J),J=1,NSTAGE+41),I-1,13)
END IF
C
C TO OPEN DATA FIF.E FOR MISSION MODEL
C
READ (10,'(A)') MMNAME
READ (10,A) NYEARS,NCOL
C
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READ (10,*) ((VMM(I,J),J=1,NCOL),I=I,NYEARS)
WRITE (6,66) MMNAih,VEHICLC
WRi'TE (7,66G) MMNAME,VEH1CLE
C
C
C
C
1 '.).)
20 0
3k)
50
55
60
66
70
93 
WRITE
WR ICE
WI L E
1,: ITE
(6,70) ((VMM(K,J),J=1,NCOL) ,K=1,NYEARS)
(7,70) ((VMM(K,J),J=1,NCOL),'K=I,NYEARS)
(6,30)(7,30)
CALL PRCALC (NSTAGI',NCYC,NYEARS,X,Y,TREFF)
CALL COSTS (NSTAGE,NCYC,NYEARS)
ENDFILE (UNIT=7)
CLOSE (UNIT=10)
CLOSE (UNIT=7)
WRITE (6,30)
WRITE (6,A) ' DO YOU WISH TO RUN A NEW SIMULATION ?'
WRITE (6,A) ' IF YES ENTER '1' IF NO ENTER '0"'
READ (5,A) NAGAIN
WRITE (6,30)
IF (NAGAIN .EQ. 1) GO TO 1002
FORMAT (2F20.5)
FORMAT (//)
FORMAT (/)
FORMAT (/,2X,'THIS IS THE OUTPUT FILE ',A,/)
FORMAT (2X,F14.4)
FORMAT (2X,2F14.4)
FORMAT (/,2X, 'THIS IS LAUNCH VEHICLE ',A,/,
1 2X,'WHICH HAS ',12,' STAGES.',/)
FORMAT (/,2X,'THIS IS MISSION MODEL ',A,/,
1 2X,'FOR LAUNCH VEHICLE ',A,//,2X,1OX,'YEAR',
2 3X,'FLIGHT RATE',3X,'LOAD FACTOR',/)
FORMAT (2X,3F14.4)
FORMAT (2X,4F14.4)
FORMhAT (2X,5F14.4)
STOP
END
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SUBROUTINE MANIFEST (NSTAGE,PMFST,PREC,X,Y,TREFF)
C THIS SUBROUTINE CALCULATES THE EFFECI OF NON-OPTIMAL
C PAYLOAD MANIFESTING ON AMOUNT OF PROPELLANT AVAILABLE
C FOR RECLAMATION
C
C
REAL PMFST,MANM,MASS
C
COMMON MASS(13,5),MANM(5,5),VMM(30,4),RECP(30,1l),COST(.. 2)
C
C
C VARIABLE DEFINITION
C
C M = COUNTER
C MANM = MANIFESTING CALCULATION MATRIX
C MASS = VEHICLE DEFINITION MATRIX
C PMFST = MANIFESTING RATIO
C N = COUNTER
C NSTAGE = NUMBER OF STAGES FOR VEHICLE
C PREC = PROPELLANT AVAILABLE FOR RECLAMATION LB]
TOTDV = TOTAL DELTA VELOCITY UP TO NSTAGE
C
C
C TO DESCRIBE MANIFESTING PROPERTIES DEFINITION MATRIX
C
C THIS IS AN N X M MATRIX, WITH M COLUMNS REPRESENTING
C THE M-1 STAGES OF THE LAUNCH VEHICLE, AND M REPRESENTINi
C THE OVERALL MANIFESTING PROPERTIES OF THE LAUNCH VEHICLI..
C
C THE ROWS ALL REPRESENT DIFFERENT COMPONENTS OF THE
C LAUNCH VEHICLE MASS, AND ARE BRIEFLY DEFINED BELOW
C BY ROW NUMBER.
C
C 1 TOTAL VEHICLE MASS INCLULIIN13 THIS STAGE
C 2 MASS RATIO OF VEHICLE TO HIS STAGE
C 3 DELTA VELOCITY OF THIS STAGE
C 4 PROPELLANT USED BY THIS STAGE
C 5 RECLAIMABLE PROPELLANT FROM THIS STAGE
C
C
SUBT=MASS(10,NSTAGE)A(1.0-PMFST)-MASS(13, NSTAGE)
DO 10 N=1,NSTAGE
DO 15 M=1,5
MANM (M,N)=MASS(M,N)
15 CONTINUE
MANM(1,N)=MANM(1,N)-(SUBT)
10 CONTINUE
C
TO'rTIV=O. 0
IF (NSTAGE .ED. 1) 130O TO 1000
C
DO 20 N=1,NSTAGE-1.
MANM(2,N)=MANM(1,N)/(MANM(1,N)-MASS(4,N))
MANM(3,N)=32.174AMASS(11, N) AL-iG(MANM(2,J))
TOTDV=TOT DV+MANM(3,N)
20 CONTINUE
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C TO CALCULATE NECESSARY DELTA V FROM UPPER STAGE
MANM(3,NSTAGE)=MASS(3,NSTAGE+1)-TOTDV
C
C TO CALCULATE MASS RATIO OF UPPER STAGE
C
MANM(2,NSTAGE)=EXP(MANM(3,NSTAGE)/(3.174AMASS(11,NSTAGEI.)
C
1000 CONTINUE
C
C TO CALCULATE USED PROPELLANT IN UPPER STAGE
C
MANM(4,NSTAGE)=MANM(1,NSTAGE)-(MANM(1,NSTAGE)/MANM(2,NST'.,E))
C
C TO CALCULATE TOTAL PROPELLANT AVAILABLE FOR RECLAMATION
C
MANM(5,NSTAGE)=E)+S(,NSTAGE)+MASS(4,NSTAGE)-MANM(4,NSTAGIE)
PREC=MANM(5,NSTAGE)ATREFF
C
C
C TO PRINT OUT VARIABLES
C
C WRITE (6,100) PMFST,TOTDV
C WRITE (7,100) PMFST,TOTDV
C WRITE (6,200)
C WRITE (7,200)
C DO 50 N=1,5
C WRITE (6,100) MANM(N,NSTAGE),MASS(N,NSTAGE)
C WRITE (7,100) MANM(N,NSTAGE),MASS(N,NSTAGE)
C50 CONTINUE
C TO PRINT OUT THE LAUNCH VEHICLE MANIFESTING MATRIX
C
C WRITE (6,200)
C WRITE (7,200)
C DO 400 M=1,5
C IF (NSTAGE .EQ. 1) THEN
C WRITE (7,55) MANM(M,1)
C WRITE (6,55) MANM(M,1)
C ELSEIF (NSTAGE .EQ. 2) THEN
C WRITE (7,GO) MANM(M,1),MANM(M,2)
C WRITE (6,60) MANM.M,1),MANM(M,2)
C ELSEIF (NSTAGE .EQ. 3) THEN
C WRITE (7.70) MANM(M,1),MANM(M,2),
C 1 MANM(M,3)
C WHITE (6,70) MANM(M,1),MANM(M,2),
C 1 MANM(M,3)
C ELSEIF (NSTAGE .EQ. 4) THEN
C WRITE (7,80) MANM(M,1),MANM(M,2),
C 1 MANM(M,3),MANM(M,4)
C WRITE (6,80) MANM(M,1),MANM(M,2),
C 1 MANM(M,3),MANM(M,4)
C END IF
C400 CONTINUE
C
C WRITE (6,250)
C WRITE (7,250)
100 FORMAT (2F18.4)
200 FORMAT (/)
250 FORMAT (//)
55 FORMAT (2X,2F12.2)
60 FORMAT (2X,3Fl2.2)
70 FORMAT (2X,4F12.2)
80 FORMAT (2X,5F12.2)
C
C
RETURN
END
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SUBROUTINE PRCALC (NSTAGE,NCYC,NYEARS,X,Y,TREFF)
THIS SUBROUTINE CALCULATES THE AMOUNT OF PROPELLANT
AVAILABLE FOR RECLAMATION FOR THE PARTICULAR LAUNCH
VEHICLE GIVEN THE LOAD FACTOR AND THE FLIGHT RATE
REAL PMFST,MANM,MASS
CHARACTER VEHICLEA15
COMMON MASS(13,5),MANM(5,5),VMM(30,4),RECP(30,10),COS'r(O. ;.'
VARIABLE DEFINITION
M = COUNTER
MANM = MANIFESTING CALCULATION MATRIX
MASS = VEHICLE DEFINITION MATRIX
PMFST = MANIFESTING RATIO
N = COUNTER
NSTAGE = NUMBER OF STAGES FOR VEHICLE
PREC=O.O
DO 100 I=1,NYEARS
RECP(I,1)=VMM (I, 1)
CALL MANIFEST (NSTAGE,VMM(I,3),PREC,X,Y,TREFF)
RECP(I,2)=PREC
RECP(I,3)=RECP(I,2)AVMM(I,2)
100 CONTINUE
C
WRITE (6,A) ' THIS IS THE AMOUNT OF PROPELLANT
WRITE (6,A) ' EACH FLIGHT AND FOR EACH YEAR OF
WRITE (6,30)
WRITE (7,A) ' THIS IS THE AMOUNT OF PROPELLANT
WRITE (7,A) ' EACH FLIGHT AND FOR EACH YEAR OF
WRITE (7,30)
WRITE (6,A) ' YEAR PFR FLIGHT
DO 120 I=1,NYEARS
WRITE (G,90) (RECP(I,K),K=1,3)
WRITE (7,90) (RECP(I,K!),;=1,3)
CONTINUE
AVAILABLE t '
OPERATION.
AVAILAELE 'jl'
OPERATION.'
TOI' AI.
WRITE (6,30)
WRITE (7,30)
SUM=()
DO 300 I=I,NYEARS
SUM=SUM+RECP( ,3)
CONTINUE
WRITE (6,50) SUM
WRITE (7,50) SUM
FORMAT (/)
FORMAT (2X,'THE TOTAL PROPELLANT DELIVERED OVER THE', ,
1 2X,'LIFE OF THE PROGRAM IS',F14.2,' LB]',/)
FORMAT (2X,3F15.2)
RETURN
END
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C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
300
C
30
50
90
C
SUBROUTINE COSTS (NSTAGE,NCYC,NYEARS)
THIS SUBROUTINE CALCULATES THE COST OF PROPELLANT
AVAILABLE FOR RECLAMATION FOR THE PARTICULAR LAUNCH
VEHICLE GIVEN THE LOAD FACTOR AND THE FLIGHT RATE
REAL PMFST,MANM,MASS
CHARACTER COSTIA1 ',7COST2A15,COST3A15,COST4Al5,COST5A,
1 COSTGA15,COST7AlS,COST8A15
COMMON MASS(13,5),MANM(5,5),VMM(30,4),RECP(30,1O),COST(8,12)
VARIABLE DEFINITION
M = COUNTER
MANM = MANIFESTING CALCULATION MATRIX
MASS = VEHICLE DEFINITION MATRIX
PMFST = MANIFESTING RATIO
N = COUNTER
NSTAGE = NUMBER OF STAGES FOR VEHICLE
COST DEFINITION MATRIX
THIS MATRIX PROVIDES A DEFINITION OF COSTS OF THE
PROPELLANT RESUPPLY SYSTEM. IT CONSISTS OF 12 COLUMNS
AND 8 ROWS, WHICH ARE DESCRIBED BELOW.
COLUMNS:
1) NVEH =
2) WE =
3) FO =
4) F1 =
5) 00 =
6) 01 =
7) R =
8) CO =
9) C1 =
10) P
11) CCUM =
12) CTOTAVE =
NUMBER OF ITEMS PRODUCED OVER LIFE OF FI'OGRAM
WEIGHT EMPTY OF HARDWARE
CONSTANT FACTOR IN NON-RECURRING COST EQUATION
CONSTANT FACTOR IN RECURRING COST EQUATIONS
EXPONENTIAL FACTOR IN NON-RECURRING COST EONS
EXPONENTIAL FACTOR IN RECURRING COST EUATIONS
FACTOR FOR LEARNING CURVE IN REC(URRING COST El
TOTAL NON-RECURRING COST FOR SYSTEM ELEMENT
FIRST UNIT COST FOR SYSTEM ELEMENT
FACTOR DERIVED FROM R USED IN COST EUATIONS
TOTAL RECURRING COST FOR SYSTEM ELEMEN!i
TOTAL AVERAGE COST FOR SYSTEM ELEMENT
THE
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
EIGHT ROWS ARE DESCRIBED BELOW
SOLID STAGE TRANSPORTATION COSTS
LIQUID STAGE RANSPORTATION COSTS;
TOTAL TRANSPORTATION COSTS
DELTA TRANSPORTATION COSTS (RECLAMATION EUIP)
TRANSPORTATION TANK' COSTS
STORAGE FACILITY COSTS
OTV COSTS
LARGE UPPER STAGE COST<:;
NVEH=O.O
DO 300 I=1,NYEARS
NVEH = NVEH + VMM(I,ZJ
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C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
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300 CONTINUE
WRITE (6,54) NVEH
WRITE (6,54) NVEH
WRITE (7,54) NVEH
C
REALD (10,*) NROW,NCOL
READ (10,'(A)') COSTI
READ (10,A) (COST(1,J),J=,NCOL)
COST(1,1)=NVEH
WRITE (6,65) COSTL
WRITE (7,65) COST1
COST(1,2)=MASS(6,1)-MASS(7,1)
ROW=1
CALL COSTCALC(ROW)
C
IF (NROW .GE. 2) THEN
READ (10,'(A)') COST2
READ (10,A) (COST(2,J),J=1,NCOL)
COST(2,1)=NVEH
WRITE (6,65) COST2
WRITE (7,65) COST2
COST(2,2)=MASS(6,2)-MASS(7,2)
ROW=2
CALL COSTCALC(ROW)
C
C TO CALCULATE VARIABLES FOR TOTAL VEHICLE
C
COST(3,1)=COST(1,1)
COST(3,2)=COST(1,2)+COST(2,2)
COST(3,8)=COST(1,8)+COST(2,3)
COST(3,9)=COST(1,9)+COST(2,9)
COST(3,11)=COST(1,11)+COST(2,11)
COST(3,12)=COST(1,12)+COST(2,12)
END IF
C
IF (NROW .GE. 4) THEN
READ (10,'(A)') COST4
READ (10,A) (COST(4,J),J=l,NCOL)
READ (10,A) OPFACT
COST(4,1)=NVEII
COST(4,2)=MASS(13,NSTAGE)
WRITE (6,65) COST4
WRITE (7,65) COST4
ROW=4
CALL COSTCiLC (ROJW)
OPCOST=OPEACACOST(3,,1 1)
COST(4,11)=CUST(4,11)+UPCOST
COST(4,12)-(.OST(4,12)4NVEH++UF J OlS)/NVEII
IF (OPFACT .NE. 0) THEN
WRITE (G,A) ' OERAT.1IN'' T COS S ARE INCL..'i:I'
WRITE (7,A) ' OPEFATIONS COSTS ARE INCL; ?'T"
END II
END IF
C
IF (NROW .GE. 5) THEN
READ (10,'(A)') COSI'
READ (10,A) (COST(5,J),J-1,NCOI.)
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COST(5,1)=NVEH
WRITE (6,65) COST5
WRITE (7,65) COST5
ROW=5
CALL COSTCALC(ROW)
END IF
C
IF (NROW .GE. 6) THEN
READ (10,'(A)') COST6G
READ (10,A) (COST(G,J),J=I,NCOL)
READ (10,A) STCAP
COST(G,1) = RECP(1,3)/(STCAPA2)
COST(G,1) = AINT(COST(6,1)) + 1
WRITE (6,65) COSTG
WRITE (7,65) COST6
ROW=6
CALL COSTCALC(ROW)
END IF
C
IF (NROW .GE. 7) THEN
READ (10,'(A)') COST7
READ (10,A) (COST(7,J),J=1,NCOL)
WRITE (6,65) COST7
WRITE (7,65) COST7
ROW=7
CALL COSTCALC(ROW)
END IF
C
IF (NROW .GE. 8) THEN
READ (10,'(A)') COST8
READ (10,A) (COST(8,J),J=1,NCOL)
WRITE (6,65) COSTS
WRITE (7,65) COSTE3
ROW=8
CALL COSTCALC(ROW)
END IF
C
C TO PRINT OUT THE COST MATRIX
C
WRITE (G,30)
WRITE (7,30)
WRITE (6,A) ' THIS IS THE COST MATRIX FUR THE S!M.JLATIO'
WRITE (7,A) ' THIS IS THE COST MATRIX FOR THE SIMULATION
WRITE (6,30)
WRITE (7,30)
WRITE (6,200)
WRITE (7,200)
DO 150 I=1,NROW
WRITE (6,100O) (COST(I,J),J=1,4)
WRITE (7,100) (COST(I,J),J=1,4)
150 CONTINUE
WRITE (6,30)
WRITE (7,30)
C
WRITE (6,210)
WRITE (7,210)
DO 160 I=1,NROW
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WRITE (6,100) (COST(I,J),J=5,8)
WRITE (7,100) (COST(I,J),J=5,8)
160 CONTINUE
WRITE (6,30)
WRITE (7,30)
WRITE (6,220)
WRITE (7,220)
rio 170 I=1,NROW
WRITE (,100) (COST(I,J),J=9,12)
WRITE (7,100) (COST(I,J),J=9,12)
1.70 CONTINUE
WRITE (6,30)
WRITE (7,30)
PSUM=O.O
1DO 502 I=1,NYEARS
PSUM=PSUM+RECP(I,3)
,,02 CONTINUE
i- COSTS TO ORBIT
PROPCOST=(COST(4,8)+COST(4,11)+COST(5,8)+COST(5,11))/PSU'
WRITE (6,30)
WRITE (7,30)
WRITE (6,A) ' THE COSTS TO ORBIT ARE AS FOLLOWS'
WRITE (7,A) ' THE COSTS TO ORBIT ARE AS FOLLOWS'
WRITE (6,230) COST(4,8)+COST(5,8),
1 COST(4,11)+COST(5,11),PSUM,PROPCOST
WRITE (7,230) COST(4,8)+COST(5,8),
1 COST(4,11)+COST(5,11) , PSUM,PROPCOST
C COSTS OF STORAGE
PROPCOST=(COST(G,8)+COST(6,11))/FSUM
WRITE (6,30)
WRITE (7,30)
WRITE (6,A) ' THE COSTS OF STORAGE ARE AS FOLLOWS'
WRITE (7,) ' THE COSTS OF STORAGE ARE AS FOLLOWS'
WRITE (6,230) COST(6,?),C UST(G,11),FSUM, FRO'fOS r
WRITE (7,230) COST(6,8),COST(G,11),PSUM,PROFCOST
C TOTAL COSTS
(:.
PROPCOST=(COST(4,83)4C,'iT(4,11)*COST('5,,)+OST(5,11)
1 +COST(G,8)+COST(6,11))/PSUM
WRITE (6,30)
WRITE (7,30)
WRITE (6, ) i THE TOTAL COSTS APE AS FOLLOWSi
WRITE (7,A) ' THE TOTAL COSTS APE AS i'ULLOWS'
WRITE (6,230) COST(4,8)+COST(5,)4COST(6.8),
1 COST(4,11)+COST(5, 11) +COST(6,11),PSUh.PROPCOST
WRITE (7,230) COSlf4,.8)+COS ( 5 .) cOST (,),
1 COST(4,11)+COST(5,11)+COST(G,11),iSUM,PR)PCOST
C;
O ADDITIONAL COST OUTFU r
C
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WRITE (6,30)
WRITE (6,240) COST(3,12)
WRITE (6,244) COST(3,12)/MASS(1O,NSTAGE)
WRITE (6,248) COST(3,12)/(MASS(1O,NSTAGE)AVMM(1,3))
WRITE (7,30)
WRITE (7,240) COST(3,12)
WRITE (7,244) COST(3,12)/MASS(10,NSTAGE)
WRITE (7,248) COST(3,12)/(MASS(1O,NSTAGE)AVMM(1,3))
C
C
30 FORMAT (/)
54 FORMAT (2X,'TOTAL NUMBER OF VEHICLES IS ',13,/)
60 FORMAT (2X,2F14.4)
65 FORMAT (/,2X,'THESE ARE THE COST CALCULATIONS FOR ',A,/)
80 FORMAT (2X,4F18.4)
200 FORMAT(14X,'NVEH',16X,'WE',16X,'FO',16X,'Fl')
210 FORMAT(16X,'QO',16X,'1l',17X,'R',16X,'CO')
220 FORMAT(16X,'Cl',17X,'P',14X,'CCUM',11X,'CTOTAVE')
100 FORMAT(4F18.4)
230 FORMAT(1OX,'EXNONREC'.13X,'EXREC',14X,'PSUM',4X,
1 'PROPCOST[$/LB]',/,4F18.4)
240 FORMAT(1OX,'AVERAGE LAUNCH COSTS',IOX,F15.2,' CS/LAUNCH]
244 FORMAT(10X,'NOMINAL P/L DELIVERY COST',5X,F15.2,' CS/LB]-)
248 FORMAT(lOX,'ACTUAL P/L DELIVERY COST',6X,F15.2,' [S/LB]',
C
RETURN
END
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SUBROUTINE COSTCALC (ROW)
C
COMMON MASS(13,5),MANM(5,5),VMM(30,4),RECP(30,10),COST(6 L2)
C
C THIS SUBROUTINE PERFORMS THE CALCULATION FOR THE COST
C OF SYSTEM ELEMENTS IN THE PROPELLANT RESUPPLY SCENARIO
C
C VARIABLE DEFINITION
C
NVEH = COST(ROW,I)
WE = COST(ROW,2)
FO = COST(ROW,3)
F1 = COST(ROW,4)
00 = COST(ROW,5)
01 = COST(ROW,G)
R = COST(ROW,7)
C
VARLN=0.693147
C
CO=FOA(WEAAOO)
C1=FlA(WEAAQl)
P=LOG(R)/VARLN
CCUM=CIA(((((NVEH+O.5)AA(P+))-.5(P+) )/(P+1 ) ) 1 )
CTOTAVE=(CO+CCUM)/NVEH
C
COST(ROW,8) = CO
COST(ROW,9) = C1
COST(ROW,10) = 
COST(ROW,11) = CCUM
COST(ROW,12) = CTOTAVE
WRITE (7,80) FO,F1,00,1
WRITE (7,90) CO,Cl,P,CCUM
WRITE (7,100) CTUTAVE
WRITE (6,80) FO,Fl,O,Q1
WRITE (6,90) CO.C1,P.CCUJM
WRITE (6,100) CTOTAVE(
BO FORMAT (18X,'FO',lGX,iFl',GX'O',lGX, ' l', /,2X,4F18.4
90 FORMAT (18X,'CO',GX, l',17X'P',14X'CCUM',/,2X,4F18.4
100 FORMAT (13X,'CIOTAVE ,/,2X,F18.4)
RETURN
EN I)
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